(dissenting):
The Majority holds that Miss Bubb had the right to authorize a search of the barn located on her Centre County farm. 1 agree with that conclusion. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969); Commonwealth v. Kontos, 442 Pa. 343, 276 A.2d 830 (1971). Cf. Commomvealth v. Storck, 442 Pa. 197, 275 A.2d 362 (1971); Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, 421 Pa. 169, 218 A. 2d 249 (1966). But the Court goes further and concludes that the scope of Miss Bubb’s authority was sufficiently broad to permit a search of appellant’s closed footlockers and cartons found in the barn. I disagree.
As stated by the Majority, Minnie Bubb rented part of her home to her niece and her niece’s husband, She permitted them to use a barn on the premises. In turn, the niece’s husband permitted appellant to use the loft of the barn to store boxes and was paid $75.00 “per shipment,” After Miss Bubb discovered a suspicious “weed” in a paper sack in the barn, she requested that the State Police investigate and granted them access to the barn. Once in the barn, the police opened several boxes and two footlockers, containing a total of seventy-six pounds of mari-j uana. After questioning, the niece’s husband implicated appellant as the owner of the boxes.
Initially, except for the “weed” discovered in a paper sack by Minnie Bubb which led to her call to the police, *238this case in no way involves a private search that nets contraband. See Commonwealth v. Kozak, 233 Pa.Super. 348, 336 A.2d 387 (1975); Commonwealth v. Eshelman, 236 Pa.Super. 223, 345 A.2d 286 (1975) (dissenting opinion by Hoffman, J.). Further, Minnie Bubb retained the power to consent to a search of the barn, in that she was the owner and joint user of the barn. Frazier v. Cupp, supra; Commonwealth v. Kontos, supra. That consent, however, was limited. Once in the bam, Minnie Bubb could not consent to a search of areas in which or over which she had no authority.
This conclusion is bolstered by our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258, 260-62, 312 A.2d 29, 31 (1973): “At the time of the search-appellant was a guest in the apartment of his friend, Robert Wander. On the basis of a sale of marijuana by Wander to a police agent, an arrest warrant for him and a search warrant for his premises were, obtained. The police arrested Wander at his place of work and accompanied by him proceeded to his apartment. At this time, the police had no knowledge of appellant’s existence. Approaching the apartment, Wander informed the police that he had a friend visiting him. When the police arrived, they read the warrant to Wander and entered. [T]he record does establish that the police announced they had authority to search everything in the apartment and that appellant claimed two suitcases lying on the floor . : . were his. Despite being on notice that the suitcases did not belong to Wander, the police began searching them simultaneously with their initiating a search of the apartment. In one of appellant’s suitcases they found a single ounce of marijuana.
“The Commonwealth attempts to justify its search of appellant’s suitcases solely on the ground that it was authorized by a valid warrant. It argues that because the suitcases were separated from appellant’s person and lo*239cated within Wander’s apartment, they were properly searched. We disagree.
“The search of appellant’s suitcase under the authority of the search warrant for Wander’s apartment is analogous to those situations in which consent searches have been invalidated because the place or thing searched was in the exclusive control or possession of a nonconsenting party, and the consenting party did not have ‘an independent right of his own to consent to the seizure. . . ’ Commonwealth v. Storck, 442 Pa. 197, 200, 275 A.2d 362, 364 (1971) [citations omitted]. It is controlled by the same rationale. The reasoning of these ‘consent’ search cases is that a person cannot waive the Fourth Amendment rights of another with respect to property owned or possessed by that other person.”
In my view, the instant case is controlled by Platou. Despite Wander’s control over the premises, Platou did not lose his fourth amendment right to privacy. In the instant case, Miss Bubb knew that her niece and her husband used the barn and had seen their friends in the area of the barn. She could infer, therefore, that the footlockers and cartons were not abandoned property. That is, boxes and footlockers stored in a barn loft, by their nature, show that their owner has an expectation of privacy concerning the contents. Further, appellant’s view was not unreasonable. He had entered into a financial arrangement with the niece’s husband, legally on the premises, to store the boxes. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).
The Majority attempts to distinguish Platou from the instant case as follows: “The holding of Commonwealth v. Platou, [supra], is inapposite in that Miss Bubb did not know who might be the owner of the cartons, footlockers, and materiel. Where such knowledge is lacking, it is unreasonable to expect the police to be able to frame a search warrant.” (At 1247). This is simply not true, provided, *240of course, that the police have probable cause to search.1 Rule 2005, Pa.R.Crim.P., provides that: “Each search warrant shall:
“(a) specify the date and time of issuance;
“ (b) identify the property to be seized;
“(c) name or describe with particularity the person or place to be searched; . . See also, Commonwealth v. Kaplan, 234 Pa.Super. 102, 339 A.2d 86 (1975). That is, the police may procure a warrant despite the fact that they do not know the owner of the suspected contraband. In the instant case, the police could have obtained a warrant by showing probable cause to suspect that the boxes and footlockers contained marijuana; they were not required to swear that appellant owned the contraband.
Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of sentence and order a new trial.
SPAETH, J., joins in this Dissenting Opinion.. Under the facts of the instant case, it is not necessary to determine whether the police in fact had probable cause to search appellant’s belongings.