This is an appeal from an order denying appellant a mandatory injunction requiring appellee to furnish appellant telephone service upon appellants making a reasonable deposit.
Appellant applied to the telephone company for service and after considerable discussion the appellee agreed to install a telephone conditioned on appellant making a deposit of $500.00 which appellant declined to do.
The suit was filed by appellant against ap-pellee in the sum of $1,000.00 for actual damages, and exemplary damages in the sum of $5,000.00, with additional sum of $3,750 as attorney’s fees in the trial of the case.
Appellant sought an order directing ap-pellee to make the installation of telephones, as requested, and to enjoin the company from oppressive and capricious conduct in requiring appellant to deposit $500.00.
Plaintiff stated that it would make a $50.00 deposit and that defendant had refused to malee the installation until a deposit of $500.-00 was made, and that plaintiff was unable to make such deposit.
A hearing was had on April 10, 1964, and on April 28, 1964, an order was rendered, in part as follows :
“It is accordingly ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the prayer of the Plaintiff for a temporary *697mandatory injunction requiring the Defendant, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, to install telephone service for the Arvin Harrell Company without a cash deposit of $500.00 or the separate guaranty of a responsible party, he and the same is in all things denied with costs adjudged against the Plaintiff.”
The appeal is based on eight points and are to the effect that the trial court erred in denying a mandatory order directing appellee to furnish telephone service to appellant because appellee had contracted to do so, and in denying such order upon the payment of $19.50 or $50.00 as deposits respectively.
We do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in denying a mandatory injunction.
The Supreme Court, in Story v. Story, 142 Tex. 212, 176 S.W.2d 925 held:
“It is the office of a temporary injunction to maintain the status quo pending the determination of the controversy between the parties.”
The purpose of an injunction is to maintain the status quo.
In Kane v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. et al, Tex.Civ.App., 176 S.W.2d 965, no writ history, it was held:
“Hence the granting of a mandatory temporary injunction, in the face of such consequences, would have completely disrupted, rather than maintained, the status quo theretofore existing in regard to the very matter in controversy.”
A temporary mandatory injunction will be granted only with great caution and in case of extreme hardship.
International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Anderson County, Tex.Civ.App., 150 S.W. 239, affirmed 106 Tex. 60, 156 S.W. 499.
The record does not disclose any perceptible or specific damage. Appellant at the time of the hearing had telephone service at an answering service. An employee of such service answers all calls made to appellant.
On November 19, 1963, Harrell and Whit-low Elzner had a conversation with an employee of appellee and the appellee discovered that Elzner was interested in the organization and that he had filed for bankruptcy owing appellee $400.00 or $500.-00.
Article 1440, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St, provides for installing services as a condition precedent to furnishing the same and the utility shall pay 6% interest per annum on such deposit. The telephone company has the right to require deposits.
Community Natural Gas Co. v. Moss, Tex.Civ.App., 55 S.W.2d 224, 225, no writ history.
We believe appellee’s requirement of a $500.00 deposit or a separate guaranty was reasonable.
Arvin Harrell, the President of appellant is employed by a local funeral home as a mortician on a monthly salary, and his qualifications as a joint contractor as he related are:
“My experience in the building business has been my association with Mr. Elz-ner. I mean, I would be employed by him for a period of approximately a year, and I was connected with the building quite a bit then. But my knowledge of the building business is not great. That is the reason I have Mr. Elzner hired to run the business for me. I am in the funeral business. I am just president of the corporation. I confer with him on these situations.”
Mr. Elzner is the only employee of appellant and was a building contractor until he went into bankruptcy in 1963.
*698• The evidence was insufficient to justify the issuance of a temporary mandatory injunction.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.