(concurring).
The Court of Civil Appeals has accurately disposed of the appeal. 509 S.W.2d 954. It may be that we will someday be faced with a case where we will not require the condemnor to pay for all of the actual consequences of the taking and the facility to be constructed — the reason for that limitation on condemnee’s recovery being that the fear of the facility is a product of wild fancy. See 1 Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain § 61 [1953]. However, imaginary danger is certainly not in the present case. The parties might debate the extent of the danger, though they should not be allowed to do so. But no one can find any reason to argue that fear of a high pressure gas pipeline is based on sheer ignorance or is a reaction to an imaginary danger.
Condemnor’s expert witnesses testified that the market value of the remainder was not diminished by the taking. The majority opinion apparently regards the offer of this testimony by the condemnor as taking “the position that fear of a danger from the pipeline is not a factor affecting market value.” The door is then opened to try out questions of the similarity of pipelines and to make proof of subsequent disasters. I submit that the trial thus becomes needlessly more complicated and confusing. The purpose of the introduction of evidence of the subsequent event may be limited, by condemnor’s offer and by the court’s instruction to the jury, but the jurors may have great difficulty in confining their thoughts accordingly. Since that proof could be highly prejudicial to the condemnor, and since there is no issue that requires its consideration for any purpose necessary to the case of the condemnee, evidence of the subsequent disaster should be excluded.
WALKER, J., joins in this concurring opinion.