Concurring Opinion by
NAKAMURA, J.I concur in the result. I write separately because my concurrence hinges on my interpretation of the “reasonable grounds to believe” language in Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 709-906(4) (Supp.2003) as imposing the probable cause standard, rather than a less stringent standard. This interpretation is based on reading HRS § 709-906(4) in pari materia1 with HRS § 709-906(2) (Supp. 2003) and the legislative history of HRS § 709-906(4).
HRS §§ 709-906(2) and 709-906(4) provide in pertinent part:
(2) Any police officer, with or without a warrant, may arrest a person if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is physically abusing, or has physically abused, a family or household member and that the person arrested is guilty thereof.
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(4) Any police officer, with or without a warrant, may take the following course of action where the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that there was physical abuse or harm inflicted by one person upon a family or household member, regardless of whether the physical abuse or harm occurred in the officer’s presence:
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(b) Where the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that there is probable danger of further physical abuse or harm being inflicted by one person upon a family or household member, the police officer lawfully may order the person to leave the premises for a period of separation of twenty-four hours ...;
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(e) If the person so ordered refuses to comply with the order to leave the premises or returns to the premises before the expiration of the period of separation, or if the person so ordered initiates any contact with the abused person, the person shall be placed under arrest' for the purpose of preventing further physical abuse or harm to the family or household member[.]
(Emphasis added).
The majority opinion focuses on the threshold requirement of HRS § 709-906(4) that a police officer has “reasonable grounds to believe” that there was physical abuse or harm inflicted on a family or household member. It concludes that there was insufficient evidence to prove this element and thus does not reach the other points of error raised by the defendant.
Probable cause is required for an arrest under both the United States Constitution *388and the Hawaii Constitution. State v. Navas, 81 Hawai'i 113, 115-16, 913 P.2d 39, 41-42 (1996); State v. Gustafson, 55 Haw. 65, 70 n. 2, 515 P.2d 1256, 1259 n. 2 (1973). Therefore, the phrase “reasonable grounds to believe” as used in HRS § 709-906(2) (the arrest provision), which authorizes a police officer to arrest a person for physically abusing a household member, must impose the probable cause standard. The identical “reasonable grounds to believe” language used in HRS § 709-906(4) (the “stay-away” provision) must likewise be construed as imposing the probable cause standard. Gaspro, Ltd. v. Comm’n of Labor and Industrial Relations, 46 Haw. 164, 172, 377 P.2d 932, 936 (1962) (“In the absence of an express intention to the contrary, words or plorases used in two or more sections of a statute are presumed to be used in the same sense throughout.”).
Construing the pirrase “reasonable grounds to believe” in HRS § 706-906(4) as requiring probable cause is also supported by its legislative history. The “reasonable grounds to believe” language appeared in the version of the arrest and “stay-away” provisions contained in the original statute enacted in 1973. 1973 Haw. Sess. L. Act 189, § 1 at 323-24. The committee report accompanying the original legislation described the “stay-away” provision as establishing a course of action for a police officer to follow in cases where the physical harm inflicted on the alleged victim was “readily apparent.” Hse. Stand. Com. Rep. No. 657, in 1973 House Journal 1065.2 The committee report’s reference to the physical harm inflicted being “readily apparent” reinforces my conclusion that the Legislature intended to impose the probable cause standard.
Police officers would have greater flexibility to diffuse potentially violent domestic situations if HRS § 706-906(4) imposed a less stringent standard such as reasonable suspicion with respect to whether physical abuse or harm had been inflicted. However, based upon my reading of HRS § 706-906(4), the Legislature required probable cause as the threshold for the police to take action under the “stay-away” provision.
In my view, the prosecution failed to introduce substantial evidence that the police officers had probable cause to believe that the defendant had inflicted physical abuse or harm on his daughter. Accordingly, I agree that the judgment of the family court must be reversed.
. Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 1-16 (1993) provides:
Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.
. The 1973 legislation only permitted a police officer to arrest for physical abuse when the abuse occurred in the officer's presence. 1973 Haw. Sess. L. Act 189, § 1 at 323.