specially concurring, in which GOLDEN, J., joins.
[¶ 35] I continue to join in Justice Golden’s specially concurring opinion, but I find it necessary to respond to the majority’s reply to that opinion. The majority is simply wrong, and by issuing its opinion, the majority has written out of W.R.A.P. 6.01(b) the language “all matters and proceedings not the subject of the appeal.” Sometimes, the context of an issue can make otherwise seemingly clear language seem unclear. But that is not true here. The subject of this appeal is the sentence imposed upon the appellant. That fact deprived the district court of jurisdiction over the sentence. The language in W.R.Cr.P. 35(b), emphasized by the majority, simply sets a period of limitations during which a sentence may be reduced; it does not grant the district court jurisdiction where it has none. Indeed, W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) actually extends that period of limitations to
within one year after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within one year after entry of any order or judgment of the Wyoming Supreme Court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction or probation revocation.
Extension of the district court’s jurisdiction to reduce a sentence in such manner suggests that jurisdiction to reduce a sentence is not retained during the appeal.
[¶ 36] I also fail to see any significance in the fact that only the untimely briefing in this ease allowed this Court to learn of the filing of the motion for sentence reduction. Nowhere either in the Rules of Criminal Procedure or in the Rules of Appellate Procedure does it suggest that the retention of jurisdiction in the district courtdepends upon whether or not the parties or the district court are able to keep something secret from this Court. The district court should have denied the motion for want of jurisdiction, or the appellant should have sought remand from this Court to pursue his motion.
[¶ 37] Next, the majority says that “[n]o appeal was taken from the order granting the sentence reduction.” The first question raised by that comment might be to ask why the appellant would appeal from an order granting his motion. Beyond that, the failure to appeal from an order granted without jurisdiction is of no legal consequence in the determination of whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the underlying motion. It certainly does not lead to the majority’s conclusion that, “[a]ccordingly, neither the district court’s authority to reduce a sentence after an appeal is docketed nor the validity of the sentence reduction is presently before this Court.” The question of the district court’s authority to reduce a sentence after an appeal is docketed is before this Court because it happened in this very case, and it raised a question of jurisdiction. If the district court had jurisdiction to reduce the sentence, then the subject of the appeal was moot, and we should not have issued an opinion about it.
[¶ 38] Finally, I cannot argue with the majority’s statement that Jacobs v. Jacobs, 895 P.2d 441, 444 (Wyo.1995) and Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 255, 257-58 (Wyo.1991) “il-*1086lústrate proper application of W.R.A.P. 601(b).” Of course they do. They stand for the proposition that, in a divorce ease, even while an appeal pends, issues like child support and visitation may continue to arise that need the attention of the district court, and the district court retains jurisdiction to consider those matters. Those cases are entirely dissimilar from the facts of this case, which is why Justice Golden was correct to cite them as he did in his specially concurring opinion. It is that dissimilarity that proves the majority wrong in this case.
[¶ 39] Once a criminal sentence has been appealed, the district court loses jurisdiction of that sentence until this Court issues its mandate in the case. Otherwise, we are just down here spinning our wheels, reading briefs, listening to oral argument, and writing an opinion on a moot point, which obviously is what W.R.A.P. 6.01 is trying to avoid. The point is best illustrated by this question: If this Court reverses the original judgment and sentence, what is the effect of the sentence reduction?