(dissenting) :
The majority opinion is correct in concluding that, under the evidence, a jury could reasonably find that the defendant “violently jerked” plaintiff’s neck, and that such “jerking” ruptured the cervical discs. However, a jury, without proper expert testimony, could not reasonably find that the defendant was negligent in his treatment.
This court has previously held that ordinarily a plaintiff, in a malpract’ce suit, must prove by expert testimony that the defendant practitioner failed to exercise such care and diligence as is ordinarily exercised by skilled practitioners (in the same field) doing the same type of work in the vicinity, and that the want or failure of the required skill and care was the cause of the injury.1
There is, however, an exception to the foregoing rule which this court recognizes and has applied in at least one case.2 This exception is that no expert evidence is necessary where the practitioner’s want of skill or care has been such as to be within the comprehension of lay persons and to require only common knowledge and experience to understand and judge it.
The determining question in the instant case is whether it falls within the general rule or the exception. It is my opinion that it falls within the former.
A chiropractor as well as a physician is not a warrantor of a cure or an insurer of a successful result. In Marsh v. Pemberton,3 there was no doubt that the plaintiff-patient suffered severe injury to his leg because of a tight cast applied by the defendant physician. However, we held that, .in the absence of proper expert testimony, the matter of negligence could not be submitted to the jury. The same reasoning applied in Pemberton is applicable here.
*322The mere fact that the defendant jerked the plaintiff’s neck resulting in ruptured cervical discs does not necessarily mean that the defendant departed from standard chiropractic standards. The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
. e. g., Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257 (1931); Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 121, 83 P.2d 1021, rehearing denied, 96 Utah 140, 85 P.2d 76S (1938); Forrest v. Eason, 123 Utah 610, 261 P. 2d 178 (1953); Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (Í959).
. Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 523 (1957), which is discussed in the main opinion. Walkenhorst v. Kes-ler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937), cited in main opinion, is not in point. There, a chiropractor stepped out of his field and diagnosed as a physician.
. Supra, note 1.