I concur in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Castles.
I think the principles laid down by this court in its unanimous opinion in State ex rel. Blenkner v. Stillwater County, 102 Mont. 130, 56 Pac. (2d) 1085, are applicable here. In that case it was held that an application for a writ of mandamus must allege facts which show not only a duty on the part of the respondents, but also an ability on respondents’ part to perform that duty and, further, that where it is sought to compel the payment of money, it must be made to appear that there are funds from which the payment can be made.
In the opinion in State ex rel. Dean v. Brandjord, 108 Mont. 447, 461, 92 Pac. (2d) 273, 279, which was a mandamus action to compel payment of old age assistance granted to relator but reduced by order of the Welfare Department, in discussing the discretion vested in the Welfare Department this pertinent observation is made:
‘ ‘ The State Board having been given so much to operate on for *322that period, and no more, it then became its duty under the Act to adopt a policy which would best subserve the cause of old age assistance within the means furnished for that purpose. Whether it would be wiser for it to pay full quotas and prematurely expend most, if not all, of the entire fund appropriated for the given period, or whether the needy aged now qualified to receive payments, and the ever increasing number of prospective recipients who may qualify later, would be more equitably and effectively assisted by the general reduction inaugurated by the board, is solely a question of administrative discretion vested exclusively in the board and its administrator. If a general policy of reduction is by the board deemed necessary for the government of the state and county departments, it is its function and duty imposed by the legislature to make such reductions. It is not our province to interfere with the discretionary actions of the State Board, where it appears that it is acting within the scope of its authority. Freeman v. Board of Adjustment, 97 Mont. 342, 34 Pac. (2d) 534; State ex rel. School Dist. No. 29, Flathead County, v. Cooney, 102 Mont. 521, 59 Pac. (2d) 48; State ex rel. Bowler v. Board of Com’rs, 106 Mont. 251, 76 Pac. (2d) 648.”
Since I agree with the interpretation of section 71-305, R.C.M. 1947, set forth in Mr. Justice Castles’ dissenting opinion, I do not believe that we should limit the discretion of the State Board in its attempt to protect the women and children of affected families as long as possible with the funds available, without prejudicing welfare recipients throughout the State of Montana. I believe all parties concede the situation is temporary and urgent and I do not believe that it was the intention of the Legislature to require strict formality in every particular before some provision can be made to render immediate assistance.
It is extremely unfortunate that the record in this matter comes before this court solely on a motion to quash, filed by the attorney general, because while to my mind the motion is well-taken and should have been sustained, but since the ma*323jority of this court feel otherwise, it permits the disposition of this matter without any evidence being presented on behalf of the State Department and results in a decision being made, in a matter which I deem of great importance to all people of our state, upon a one-sided presentation of what the fact situation really is.
Referring to the comments of Mr. Justice Angstman in his concurring opinion, particularly with regard to the statement that the affirmance of the district court does not necessarily increase the amount of assistance to be paid over and above what the Welfare Department allowed, Mr. Justice Castles’ dissenting opinion points out very carefully that it is the families of the strikers who are being protected, and not the strikers themselves, and since I agree with him I would say that a reasonable interpretation of the order of the Welfare Department is that the family must qualify for general relief in order to have received public assistance at a rate not to exceed 50 percent of the standard budget. Thus it would appear to me that all present recipients of general relief under the Board’s order would be able to show “need” and be qualified under the order of the district court to receive the full standard budget. If this be true the district court order doubles the welfare load being presently carried and in addition thereto will add such single men as qualify. It would seem to me then that to comply with the order of the district court will require the expenditure of more than twice as much money as to allow the matter to be handled by the Welfare Department, the body charged with the administration of public relief, and best able to determine how far it can go with the funds available to it for that purpose without prejudicing the well-being of welfare recipients throughout the state.