PRESCOTT v. OKLAHOMA CAPITOL PRESERVATION COMMISSION

REIF, C.J.,

concurring specially to the denial of rehearing,

{1 For the most part, I concur to the denial of Appellee's petition for rehearing. Several reasons support such action.

12 First, the per curiam opinion contains no misstatement of fact or law. Furthermore, the per curiam opinion sets forth settled law that is dispositive of the issue presented and correctly applies such law in deciding the issue. More particularly, the per curiam opinion properly seeks the intent of Article 2, Section 5 in its text and the plain meaning of its language. Because this intrinsic analysis revealed no ambiguity, resort to extrinsic aids is improper and unnecessary. f

T3 As this Court has recently observed, "Absent an ambiguity, the intent of the framers and electorate is settled by the language of the provision itself and courts are not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the provision." Fent v. Fallin, 2014 OK 105, ¶ 10, 345 P.3d 1113, 1116. The reason for this rule is simple: "Constitutional provisions are not made for parsing by lawyers, but for the instruction of the people and the representatives of government, so that they may read and understand their rights and duties." Id., ¶ 12, 345 P.3d at 1117.

I 4 Interestingly, the Legislature has likewise shown that it considers the language in Article 2, Section 5, to provide clear and unambiguous instruction for public officials. *1035In 1981, the Legislature enacted 58 O.S8. § 20.10, now 53 0.8.2011, § 1.18. This statute governs the expenditure of funds by the Oklahoma Historical Society and provides, in pertinent part, that "Funds shall not be applied, donated or used directly or indirectly for the use, benefit or support of any sect, church, denomination or system of religion, or for the use, benefit or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary, or sectarian institution as such." This statutory language is virtually identical to the text of Article 2, Section 5.

15 Finally, the narrow scope of the per curiam opinion is also consistent with the principle of judicial restraint. This principle dictates that if resolution of an issue effectively disposes of a case, a court should resolve the case on that basis without reaching any other issues that might be presented. Manning v. Upjohn Co., 862 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir.1984).

T6 Even though these considerations support the denial of rehearing, I would grant rehearing for the'limited purpose of addressing the case of Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 1972 OK 45, 496 P.2d 789. Although clearly distinguishable from the case at hand, the Meyer case nonetheless provides helpful guidance in deciding whether a particular use of public property is for the benefit of a system of religion.

T7 In Meyer, the taxpayer-plaintiff sought removal of a 50° Latin Cross from City property located at. the Oklahoma City Fair Grounds. This Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the taxpayer's petition, observing: "The alleged commercial setting in which the cross now stands ... obscures whatever suggestions may emanate from its silent form [and] vitiate[s] any use, benefit or support for any sect, church, denomination, system of religion or sectarian institution as such." Id., ¶ 11, 496 P.2d at 792-3.

T8 This conclusion was grounded on two factors. First, this Court noted that "The cross is in a distinctly secular environment in the midst of persons in pursuit of distinctly secular entertainment." Id., 496 P.2d at 792. Secondly, this Court stressed that the cross did not "display, articulate or portray ... any ideas that are alleged to pertain to any of the sectarian institutions or systems named in Article 2, § 5." Id.

T9 The cireumstances of the case at hand fail this test. First, the State Capitol, unlike the Oklahoma City Fair Grounds, is not a "commercial setting" nor "a distinctly secular environment" where persons are seeking "distinctively secular entertainment." - The State Capitol is the Seat of State Government where the business of the people is debated and transacted.

10 Secondly, the Ten Commandments monument at issue in this case is nothing like the plain simple eross whose "symbolic message" was said to be "evanescent" or fleeting within the "commercial setting" of the fair grounds. The Ten Commandments monument in this case does explicitly "display" and "articulate" ideas that directly pertain to the Judeo-Christian system of religion.

{11 The text of the Ten Commandments displayed on the monument is an edited version of the text of the Ten Commandments appearing in the King James Version of the Bible. Exodus 20:1-17 and Deuteronomy 56-21 (Authorized King James Version, Thomas Nelson Inc., 1999). While four of the commandments displayed on the monument do have counterparts in Oklahoma statutory law (proseriptions against killing, stealing, adultery and bearing false witness), these commandments are subsumed in a distinctly religious context that obscures whatever historical suggestions may emanate from them.

12 The text of the Ten Commandments displayed on the monument begins with the declaration "I AM the LORD thy GOD." This declaration is followed by four directions for the worship of God. In addition, the "historical" commandments are immediately preceded by a divine promise of long life for honoring one's parents. They are immediately followed by divinely ordained proscriptions against coveting things belonging to one's neighbor; a matter of conscience, not general social order. This dominance of the explicit religious message renders the monument "operative in an effective way" for the benefit of the of the Judeo-Christian system of religion. Meyer, ¶ 11, 496 P.2d at 792. As such, the monu*1036ment's dlsplay on public property is properly enjoined. Id.