concurring in part and dissenting in part.
T 77 Today, the plurality interprets article IX, section 7 as prohibiting the expenditure of any state funds that might incidentally or indirectly benefit a religious school. This breathtakingly broad interpretation would invalidate not only the Choice Scholarship Program ("CSP"), but numerous other state programs that provide funds to students and their parents who in turn decide to use the funds to attend religious schools in Colorado. The plurality's interpretation barring indirect funding is so broad that it would invalidate *480the use of public funds to build roads, bridges, and sidewalks adjacent to such schools, as the schools, in the words of the plurality, "rely on" state-paid infrastructure to operate their institutions. PI op. 128. Because I fundamentally disagree with the plurality's interpretation, I respectfully dissent from Part III of its opinion on the following two grounds.1
178 First, the language of article IX, seetion 7, does not compel this result. It prohibits a government entity from "mak[ing] any appropriation or payling] from any public fund or moneys whatever ... to help support or sustain any [church or sectarian] school ... whatsoever." It thus invalidates a public expenditure made "to help support or sustain" church or sectarian schools. It does not suggest, as the plurality would have it, that any program that provides public money for other purposes-for example, to assist students-is constitutionally suspect simply because the funds indirectly or incidentally benefit church or sectarian schools. Such a reading is contrary to Americans United for Separation of Church and State Fund, Inc. v. State, 648 P.2d 1072, 1083 (Colo.1982), in which we upheld a state grant program similar to the CSP on the ground that "the aid is designed to assist the student, not the institution." Our approach in Americans United mirrors long-standing Establishment Clause doctrine, under which a program "of true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals" is "not readily subject to challenge" because the "circuit between government and religion [has been] broken." Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002). The plurality not only misinterprets the language of section 7, it mistakenly departs from this fundamental tenet of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
179 But a more serious error on the part of the plurality is its steadfast refusal to consider whether section 7 is unenforceable due to possible anti-Catholic bias. The plurality applies what it believes to be (erroneously in my view) the "plain language" of the section. But the plurality cannot sweep the possibility of anti-Catholic bigotry under the plain language rug. The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that allegations of such animus must be considered, even where the "plain language" does not invoke religion. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (rejecting government's contention that constitutional inquiry must end when text does not mention religion, as "facial neutrality is not determinative" of a Free Exercise claim). While a state may choose to, but is not bound to, interpret its own constitutional provisions coextensively with their federal counterparts, the federal constitutional provisions are nonetheless binding on the states. Americans United, 648 P.2d at 1078. Here, the plurality has failed to perform its duty to consider whether section 7 is enforceable under the U.S. Constitution before enforcing it against the CSP. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I.
T 80 The plurality first takes a wrong turn in interpreting the language of section 7 as invalidating any government expenditure that indirectly benefits religious schools. That is not what the language of section 7 says.
181 Section 7 bars a government entity from "mak[ing!l any appropriation, or payling] from any public fund or moneys whatever ... to help support or sustain any [church or sectarian] school ... whatsoever." This language bars the expenditure of public funds "to help support or sustain" certain schools. But here, the CSP funds are expended not "to help support or sustain" those schools, but rather to help the student recipients. The language does not suggest, as the plurality believes, that government funds that are directed to a student but happen to have an incidental beneficial effect on certain schools are also forbidden. The *481plurality stresses that the language prohibits a government entity from making such an expenditure "whatever" to certain schools "whatsoever." PI. op. 127. While these terms reinforce the prohibition on making certain expenditures, they do not modify or expand upon what kind of expenditures are prohibited-that is, expenditures "to support or sustain" a church or sectarian school. In other words, contrary to the plurality's reasoning, these words do not transform the prohibition on expenditures "to support or sustain" certain schools into a prohibition on any expenditures that have the incidental effect of benefiting certain schools.
1 82 We elucidated the distinction between direct and indirect assistance in Americans United, where we upheld a state grant program that disbursed state grant monies into the school accounts of student grant recipients who attended religious colleges. We first addressed the challengers' Establish ment Clause claim, noting that to withstand an Establishment Clause challenge, the program "must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion." 648 P.2d at 1079 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971)). At issue in particular was whether the program's "primary effects [were] to advance religion...." Id. at 1077. We concluded that the program's "primary effect" was not to advance religion because "[the design of the statute [was] to benefit the student, not the institution." Zd. at 1081.
83 We returned to this reasoning in considering whether the grant program was consistent with section 7. The challengers claimed that the grant program violated seetion 7 because it was "an appropriation to help support or sustain schools controlled by churches or sectarian denominations." Id. at 1083. Harkening back to our reasoning in the Establishment Clause context, we observed that "as stated previously, the aid [was] designed to assist the student, not the institution." Id. Importantly, we recognized that "there is always a possibility that aid in grant form may seep over into the nonsecular functions of an institution," but concluded that "[alny benefit to the institution appears to be the unavoidable by-product of the administrative role relegated to it by the statutory scheme." Id. "Such a remote and incidental benefit," we continued "does not constitute, in our view, aid to the institution itself within the meaning of [alrticle IX, [slection 7." Id. at 1083-84 (emphasis added). Thus, under Americans United, the focus of the inquiry is whether the funds are expended to help support certain schools or whether they are expended for some other purpose-for example, to assist students, as in that case and here.
84 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized this same distinction in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In Zelman, for example, the Court upheld a program that gave tuition assistance to students from kindergarten to eighth grade in certain districts that could be used to attend any public or private school of their parents' choosing, including religious schools. 586 U.S. at 645, 122 S.Ct. 2460. The Court began by observing that the Establishment Clause prevents states from enacting laws that have the "purpose" or "effect" of advancing or inhibiting religion. Id. at 648-49, 122 S.Ct. 2460. There was no dispute that the program had a valid educational (and secular) purpose, and therefore the Court focused on whether it unconstitutionally advanced religion. Id. at 649, 122 S.Ct. 2460.
85 The Court relied upon its "consistent and unbroken" line of precedent holding that aid programs generally do not impermissibly "advance religion" when "government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals." Id. The Court discussed Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 77 L.Ed.2d 721 (1983), where a Minnesota tax deduction program permitted deductions for educational expenses, including for religious schools. Id. at 649-50, 122 S.Ct. 2460. The Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge in that case based on the fact that "public funds were made available to religious schools 'only as a result of numerous, private choices of school-age children?" Id. at 650, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (quoting Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399-400, 103 S.Ct. 3062). The Court then pointed to Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, *482474 U.S. 481, 106 S.Ct. 748, 88 L.Ed.2d 846 (1986), which sustained a Washington state | vocational scholarship program that provided aid to a student studying to be a pastor based on "identical reasoning"-namely, that any aid that "'ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients'" Id. (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 487, 106 S.Ct. 748). Finally, the Court turned to Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1, 10, 113 S.Ct. 2462, 125 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993), in which it found no Establishment Clause violation where a federal program permitted sign-language interpreters to work with students in religious schools. Id. at 651, 122 S.Ct. 2460. Again, no violation occurred because "parents were the ones to select a religious school as the best learning environment for their child," thus severing the link between government and religion. Id. at 652, 122 S.Ct. 2460.
186 Applying this principle to the case before it, the Court concluded that the program was one of "true private choice" and consistent with the Establishment Clause. Id. at 658, 122 S.Ct. 2460. Significantly, the Court recognized that there may be "incidental advancement of a religious mission" in these sorts of programs. Id. However, such incidental advancement is "reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits." Id. Moreover, the Court refused to attach constitutional significance to the fact that ninety-six percent of the aid recipients enrolled in religious schools. Id. at 658, 122 S.Ct. 2460. Accord- | ing to the Court, "[the constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on whether and why ... most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school." Id. The point is that aid recipients are the ones to make the choice. Id. at 662, 122 S.Ct. 2460. See also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (observing that under the Establishment Clause, "the link between government funds and religious training is broken by the independent and private choice of recipients" (citing Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002))).
(87 The plurality rejects as "irrelevant" this wealth of Supreme Court precedent that reinforces our reasoning in Americans United, 2 pointing out that it interprets the federal Establishment Clause, not section 7. PI op. §46. But the plurality's approach is directly contrary to Americans United, where, as discussed above, we expressly relied upon our reasoning in considering the Establishment Clause claim in rejecting the section 7 claim. See 648 P.2d at 1083 ("[Als stated previously [with regard to the Establishment Clause], the aid is designed to assist the student, not the institution."). That the aid in question was expended to support students, not the institution, was a critical factor in both our Establishment Clause and section 7 inquiries.
{88 More problematic is the plurality's conclusion that "[bly its terms, section 7 is far more restrictive than the Establishment Clause regarding governmental aid to religion." PI. op. §46. The plurality's mistake is to confuse specificity with restriction. Section 7 is certainly more specific than the Establishment Clause,3 in that it contains a specific prohibition against making public expenditures "to help support or sustain" certain schools. We made a similar point regarding the specificity of article II, section 4 *483of the Colorado Constitution-which recognizes the "free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship," as well as that "[nlo person shall be required to attend or support any ministry or place of worship"-in Americans United, observing that the state provisions are "considerably more specific than the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." 648 P.2d at 1081. However, far from casting aside the federal counterpart and its accompanying jurisprudence, we declared that the state provisions should be read "to embody the same values of free exercise and government non-involvement secured by the religious clauses of the First Amendment." Id. at 1081-82. We reiterated that "although not necessarily determinative of state constitutional claims, First Amendment jurisprudence cannot be totally divorced from the resolution of these claims." Id. at 1078. Here, the Establishment Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, ends up in the same place as the text of section 7-namely, prohibiting expenditures made to assist institutions, but not prohibiting expenditures made to support students.
1 89 The plurality acknowledges that "the CSP does not explicitly funnel money directly to religious schools, instead providing financial aid to students." PI. op. 128. But it reasons that because "private religious schools rely on students' attendance (and their corresponding tuition payments) for their survival, the CSP's facilitation of such attendance necessarily constitutes aid to 'support or sustain' those schools." Id. (emphasis added). In case there was any doubt, the plurality again emphasizes the breadth of its holding, announcing that because the CSP provides "public money to students who may then use that money to pay for a religious education, [it] aids religious institutions." Id.
190 Under the plurality's interpretation, anything that enables students to attend a religious school "helps support or sustain" that school. This interpretation is so broad that it would easily have swept aside the grant program at issue in Americans United. It would also invalidate the programs at issue in Zelman, Witters, Mueller, and Zobrest described above, all of which facilitated students' attendance because of tuition assistance (Zelman and Witters), a tax deduction (Mueller), or the provision of an interpreter (Zobrest). The plurality's breathtakingly broad interpretation of section 7's prohibition would also sweep aside numerous Colorado programs that permit students to use government funds to attend religious schools. For example, the Exceptional Children's Educational Act permits school districts to place students in private "facility" schools, including religious schools, in order to provide them with a "free and appropriate education" under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. § 22-20-109(1)(a), C.R.S. (2014). Similarly, the Denver Preschool Program allows parents to use public funds to send their children to any licensed preschool, including religious preschools. Denver Mun. Code, ch. 11, art. III, § 11-22(5)(@). Indeed, under the plurality's decision, any program that provides an incidental benefit to certain schools-for example, programs for public infrastructure and safety-will be constitutionally suspect because the schools rely upon the services to operate. Cf Freedom from Religion Found. Inc. v. Romer, 921 P.2d 84, 90 (Colo.App.1996) (discussing an injunction enjoining government officials from permitting public facilities and funds to be used to facilitate papal visit).
T91 The plurality refuses to contemplate the far-reaching implications of its interpretation and instead "chooses to focus [its] analysis solely on the CSP." PI. op. 1 29 n. 15. Yet the plurality's refusal to recognize such implications does not make those implications disappear. In the end, the CSP passes muster under section 7 because it is not an expenditure to help support or sustain certain schools. Instead, it is an expenditure to help support students, who may then choose to use the funds to attend those schools. No one, not even the plurality, disputes this is how the program operates. PI. op. 128. I would affirm the court of appeals.
I.
{ 92 A more fundamental problem with the plurality's opinion is that it holds that because section 7 is enforceable on its "plain language," it need not consider whether the *484provision is in fact enforceable due to possible anti-Catholic animus.4 As developed above, I believe the plurality is wrong on the plain language. But even if it were right, it would then be obligated to consider whether the language could be enforced to strike down the CSP. In this case, the plurality simply sticks its head in the sand and hopes that because it cannot see the allegations of anti-Catholic bias, no one else will.
193 The plurality relies upon People v. Rodriguez, 112 P.3d 693, 696 (Colo.2005), for the proposition that constitutional provisions will be enforced "'as written' whenever their language is 'plain and their meaning is 'clear'" PI. op. 182. But that statement cannot be taken in a vacuum; indeed, it must be read against the backdrop of federal constitutional law generaily, which, under certain circumstances, may require a court to go behind the words of a statute or state constitutional provision. This is one of those circumstances.
194 The Supreme Court made this point clear in Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, where it considered a challenge under the Free Exercise Clause 5 to city ordinances that banned the ritual sacrifice of animals. The City argued that the ordinances were neutral on their face and therefore immune from constitutional serutiny. Id. at 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The Court rejected this argument, holding instead that "[flacial neutrality is not determinative" of a Free Exercise claim. Id. According to the Court, "(tlhe Free Exercise Clause ... extends beyond facial discrimination.... The [Clause] protects against government hostility which is masked, as well as overt." Id. The court concluded that "[the record in this case compels the conclusion that suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship service was the object of the ordinances." Id. Because the ordinances were not neutral, the Court went on to consider whether they were narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest. The Court concluded that they were not. Id. at 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217.
195 Under Lukumi, the plurality cannot begin and end its analysis with the conclusion that the plain language of section 7 is not discriminatory. In fact, the very case upon which the plurality relies for the proposition that states "may draw a tighter net around the conferral of [government] aid" to religion, pl. op. 1 46-Locke v. Davey-reinforces Lu-kumi's instruction that courts must look behind the text to discover any religious animus. 540 U.S. at 725, 124 S.Ct. 1807. In Locke, which involved a Washington state scholarship program that excluded students pursuing a degree in theology, the Court concluded that "[flar from evincing the hostility toward religion which was manifest in Lukumi, we believe that the [Washington program] goes a long way toward including religion in its benefits." Id. at 724, 124 S.Ct. 1307. The Court upheld the program against a free exercise challenge only after concluding that it could find nothing "that suggests animus toward religion." Id. at 725, 124 S.Ct. 1807. The relevant point here is not the Court's conclusion on the matter but that it performed the inquiry in the first place.
1 96 Moreover, in this instance, the text of section 7 is not as neutral as the plurality would have it. As noted above, the text bars expenditures "to help support or sustain any school" that is "controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatsoever." The plurality equates the term "sectarian" with the term "religious," concluding that "the two words are synonymous." PI op. 127. But even Black's Law Dictionary 1557 (10th ed. 2014), upon which the plurality relies for its conclusion, does not equate the two terms, suggesting that sectarian relates to "a particular religious sect." (emphasis added), In fact, in a 1927 case, this court upheld a school board rule requiring Bible reading in public schools against a section 7 challenge on the *485ground that such activity was not "sectarian"-that is, related to a particular sect. People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 P. 610, 615-16 (1927) (stating that "[slectarian meant, to the members of the [Colorado constitutional] convention and to the electors who voted for and against the Constitution, 'pertaining to some one of the various religious sects, and the purpose of said section 7 was to forestall public support of institutions controlled by such sects."), (overruled by Conrad v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 662 (Colo.1983)). See also Zelman, 536 U.S. at 721, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that public schools were considered "nonsectarian" "which was usually understood to allow Bible reading and other Protestant observances"). In sum, contrary to the plurality's interpretation, the term "sectarian" refers to a particular religious sect, not to religion generally.
T97 In Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 147 L.Ed.2d 660 (2000), a plurality of the Court referred to the "shameful pedigree" of anti-sectarian sentiment in the 1870's. According to the plurality:
Opposition to aid to "sectarian" schools aequired prominence in the 1870's with Congress' consideration (and near passage) of the Blaine Amendment, which would have amended the Constitution to bar any aid to sectarian institutions. Consideration of the amendment arose at a time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general, and it was an open secret that "sectarian" was code for "Catholic." See generally Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 38 (1992) (emphasis added).
Id. at 829, 120 S.Ct. 2580. The plurality in this case "deecline[s] to ascribe to [Mitchell ] the force of law" because it is a plurality opinion. PI. op. 144 n.20. But this passage from Mitchell is not relevant to this case because it has "the force of law," 6 as the plurality implies; it is relevant for its description of historical context. And while Justice O'Connor, in her separate opinion ~ concurring in the judgment joined by Justice Breyer, objected to the plurality's reasoning in Mitchell, she lodged no objection to the plurality's historical description. 530 U.S. at 837, 120 S.Ct. 2530 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). In fact, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, recounted the same history in his dissent in Zelman. 536 U.S. at 717, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As Justice Breyer observed, anti-Catholic sentiment "played a significant role in creating a movement that sought to amend several state constitutions (often successfully), and to amend the United States Constitution (unsuccessfully) to make certain that government would not help pay for 'sectarian' (i.e., Catholic) schooling for children." 536 U.S. at 720, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
T 98 Today's plurality is nothing less than adamant about its refusal to consider the possibility of anti-Catholic animus, accusing intervenor-respondents of injecting into the litigation "little more than a Trojan horse inviting [the court] to rule on the actual legitimacy of section 7." PI. op. 180 n. 16. But this is no Trojan horse. The intervenor-respondents presented expert testimony on the question before the trial court. The trial court found the evidence and argument "unpersuasive." The issue was extensively considered by Judge Bernard in his dissent in the court of appeals. See Taxpayers for Publ. Educ., 11 162-220 (Bernard, J., dissenting). And before this court, echoing Judge Bernard's dissent, petitioners argue that the argument is meritless, not that it should not be considered.
T 99 In the end, the plurality's head-in-the-sand approach is a disservice to Colorado, as it allows allegations of anti-Catholic animus to linger unaddressed. The plurality should squarely address the issue of whether section 7 is enforceable, as this court has done with other provisions of the Colorado Constitution. See, eg., Colo. Educ. Assoc. v. Rutt, 184 P.3d 65, 79 (Colo.2008) (interpreting article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution as enforced against labor organizations consis*486tently with First Amendment jurisprudence). Because the plurality fails to do so, and because it misinterprets the text of section 7 and ignores relevant Establishment Clause jurisprudence, I respectfully dissent from its opinion. .
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE COATS and JUSTICE BOATRIGHT join in this concurrence in part and dissent in part.
. I join Part II because I agree that the petitioners have no remedy under the Public School Finance Act of 1994, §§ 22-54-101 to -135, C.R.S. (2014), as the Act expressly commits enforcement of its provisions to the Board.
. The plurality also distinguishes Americans United and Zelman on the facts. PI. op. 1134-43 (Americans United)} 147 (Zelman). Of course programs will differ from one another in operation. Here, the differences identified by the plurality are plainly distinctions without a difference, as evidenced by the fact that, in the plurality's view, even if the CSP contained the features it identifies from Americans United, those features would not render the CSP constitutional. PL op. 138 n.18; 138 n.19. Moreover, much of what the plurality relies on to distinguish Americans United from this case has been . rendered unconstitutional by subsequent developments in the law. See Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1269 (10th Cir.2008) (striking down the portion of the state grant program at issue in Americans United that precluded aid to "pervasively sectarian" institutions as unconstitutionally discriminatory among religions and as unconstitutionally invasive of religious belief and practice).
. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion...." U.S. Const. amend. I.
. Because I would uphold the CSP, I, like the majority of the court of appeals, would not need to reach this issue. Taxpayers for Public Education v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 2013 COA 20, ¶ 62, — P.3d —. But because I disagree with the plurality's treatment of the issue, I address it here.
. prohibiting U.S. Const. 5. "Congress shall make no law . the free exercise [of religion]." amend. I.
. "While not a binding precedent, [a plurality opinion] should obviously be the point of reference for further discussion of the issue." Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983).