also specially concurring:
I agree with the affirmance of the appellate court’s judgment in this case. I write separately because I believe that defendant’s petition was not properly brought under section 2 — 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1401 (West 1998)).
Section 2 — 1401 provides relief by petition from final orders and judgments after 30 days have elapsed from the entry thereof. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1401(a) (West 1998). The petition must be filed not later than two years after entry of the order or judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1401(c) (West 1998). Section 2 — 1401(f) of the Code makes clear that “[njothing contained in this Section affects any existing right to relief from a void order or judgment, or to employ any existing method to procure that relief.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1401(f) (West 1998). A void judgment is one that was entered without jurisdiction of the parties or the subject matter and such a judgment may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally. People v. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1, 5 (1987). Neither the two-year time limitation nor the due diligence requirement of section 2 — 1401 apply to a petition challenging a judgment as void. R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 304, 309 (1986).
In Sawant, the circuit court entered a default judgment against defendant Allied. Allied filed a special and limited appearance and a motion to quash service of summons, alleging lack of personal jurisdiction. Sawant, 111 Ill. 2d at 306. The circuit court struck the special and limited appearance and denied the motion to quash, holding that Allied used improper procedure, had not diligently presented its defense, and that Allied was subject to Illinois jurisdiction. Sawant, 111 Ill. 2d at 308-09. The appellate court disagreed with each of these findings and reversed. Sawant, 111 Ill. 2d at 309. On further appeal, plaintiffs argued that Allied’s filing of its special and limited appearance constituted a collateral attack on the judgment under section 2 — 1401 of the Code and that Allied had not established the requisite due diligence. This court rejected that argument, noting that a void judgment may be attacked at any time and that due diligence need not be shown. Section 2 — 1401 of the Code did not preempt other means of attacking a void judgment or order. We noted that,' although Allied’s choice of a special and limited appearance as a method to chailenge the jurisdiction of the circuit court may be unusual, it was nonetheless proper. Sawant, 111 Ill. 2d at 309-10.
The majority in the instant case cites Sawant as authority for the proposition that a party may seek relief under section 2 — 1401 beyond the two-year time limitation where the judgment is alleged to be void. 196 Ill. 2d at 447. However, Sawant does not support this assertion. In addressing the plaintiffs’ argument there that section 2 — 1401 did not provide relief to Allied in challenging the circuit court’s jurisdiction, this court observed that:
“A defendant who is contesting personal jurisdiction is not ‘strictured by either the time limitations [citation] or the requirement of due diligence to which petitions relying on’ section 2 — 1401 must conform.” Sawant, 111 Ill. 2d at 309-10, quoting Home State Savings Ass’n v. Powell, 73 Ill. App. 3d 915, 917 (1979).
The method used by Allied in- that case to attack the judgment as void was a special and limited appearance. The quoted statement merely noted that this method was not subject to the restrictions of section 2 — 1401.
A motion filed more than two years after entry of the judgment challenged does not meet the time limitation for motions under section 2 — 1401. The statute contains no exception to that time limitation for a motion attacking a judgment as void. Instead, it expressly permits a party to attack a judgment as void outside the scope of the statute. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1401(f) (West 1998). Prior appellate decisions establish that a party may challenge a void judgment at any time by motion directed to the court. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Parks, 122 Ill. App. 3d 905, 909 (1984); Augsburg v. Frank’s Car Wash, Inc., 103 Ill. App. 3d 329, 332-33 (1982) (construing section 72 of the former Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 72), the predecessor to section 2—1401); Home State Savings Ass’n v. Powell, 73 Ill. App. 3d 915, 917 (1979) (noting that section 72(6) of the former Civil Practice Act (now section 2—1401(f) of the Code) explicitly provides that relief from a void judgment is not limited by section 72).
Thus, where a party files a motion challenging a judgment as void more than two years after the judgment was entered, the motion is not properly brought under section 2 — 1401. The party may simply challenge the judgment by motion directed to the circuit court.
Here, although defendant mislabeled his petition as one under section 2 — 1401 of the Code, courts should be liberal in recognizing such a petition as a collateral attack on a void judgment. See People v. Reymar Clinic Pharmacy, Inc., 246 Ill. App. 3d 835, 841 (1993). Accordingly, defendant’s petition may be considered outside the scope of section 2—1401 as a collateral attack upon a void judgment.
JUSTICES FITZGERALD and THOMAS join in this special concurrence.