People v. Alvarez CA6

Filed 9/15/23 P. v. Alvarez CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H050620
(Santa Cruz County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 22CR04258)

v.

BRYAN ISAAC ALVAREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Bryan Isaac Alvarez pleaded no contest to a single felony count of
carrying a loaded concealed firearm for which he was not listed as the registered owner
(Pen. Code, § 25400, subd. (c)(6)).1 The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and
placed defendant on probation for two years with various terms and conditions, including
serving 60 days in county jail.
Defendant asserts that his conviction violates his Second Amendment right to
possess a firearm, citing the United States Supreme Court’s decision in New York State
Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d
387] (Bruen). For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the judgment.

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All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
 II. BACKGROUND
After the trial court overruled defendant’s demurrer asserting that the statute under
which he was charged violated the Second Amendment, defendant pleaded no contest to
one felony count of carrying a loaded concealed firearm for which he was not listed as
the registered owner. The trial court previously dismissed one felony count of possession
of a firearm by a minor (§ 29610) pursuant to the prosecution’s motion. Defendant
waived his rights to a preliminary hearing and a presentencing report. The factual basis
for defendant’s plea was announced as follows: “On the date and time listed in the
complaint in the county of Santa Cruz the defendant did carry a loaded firearm when he
was not eligible to possess it.” Defendant obtained a certificate of probable cause to
challenge the overruling of his demurrer, and this appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant asserts that his conviction violates the Second Amendment to the
United States Constitution. He argues that California’s firearms licensing statutes are
unconstitutional, citing the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen, supra. He
argues that the firearms licensing statutes cannot be saved by judicial revision, and that
even if they could, his conviction still must be reversed because the licensing statutes in
effect at the time of the charged offense were unconstitutional.
The Attorney General concedes that one portion of California’s firearms licensing
statutes, the “good cause” requirement, is unconstitutional under Bruen. However, the
Attorney General asserts that this requirement is no longer enforced by the state and is
severable from the remaining requirements of the licensing statutes, which the Attorney
General argues remain constitutional. The Attorney General also asserts that defendant
does not have standing to raise his constitutional challenge, because he has not
established that he would otherwise have been issued a license under the remaining
licensing requirements. The Attorney General also contends that the firearms licensing
statutes are enforceable even if they require judicial revision.

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 In reply to the Attorney General’s standing argument, defendant states that his
challenge to the firearms licensing statutes is a facial one, and thus he asserts that he has
standing to raise this challenge.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“ ‘The interpretation of a statute and the determination of its constitutionality are
questions of law. In such cases, appellate courts apply a de novo standard of
review.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469, 474.)
“An ‘as applied’ challenge ‘contemplates analysis of the facts of a particular case
or cases to determine the circumstances in which the statute or ordinance has been
applied and to consider whether in those particular circumstances the application
deprived the individual to whom it was applied of a protected right.’ [Citation.] ‘When a
criminal defendant claims that a facially valid statute or ordinance has been applied in a
constitutionally impermissible manner to the defendant, the court evaluates the propriety
of the application on a case-by-case basis to determine whether to relieve the defendant
of the sanction.’ [Citation.]” (In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144, 157–158 (D.L.).)
Conversely, “ ‘[a] facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute or ordinance
considers only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular
circumstances of an individual.’ [Citation.] A facial challenge seeks to void the statute
as a whole by showing that ‘ “no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would
be valid,” i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all its applications.’ [Citation.] Put
another way, ‘a facial challenge must fail where the statute has a “ ‘plainly legitimate
sweep.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 157.)
B. Bruen
In Bruen, the United States Supreme Court examined New York’s firearm
licensing requirements, which stated that a person who seeks to possess a firearm at home
or in one’s place of business “must convince a ‘licensing officer’—usually a judge or law
enforcement officer—that, among other things, he [or she] is of good moral character, has

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no history of crime or mental illness, and that ‘no good cause exists for the denial of the
license.’ [Citation.]” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 2122–2123].)
To obtain an unrestricted license to carry a firearm outside the applicant’s home or
business, New York required the applicant to demonstrate that “ ‘proper cause exists’ ”
for the license. (Id. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 2123].) The court extended its earlier
decisions to hold that the Second Amendment protects “an individual’s right to carry a
handgun for self-defense outside the home.” (Id. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 2122].) The
court then held that the test for assessing the constitutionality of a firearms restriction
under the Second Amendment is as follows: “When the Second Amendment’s plain text
covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.
The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent
with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court
conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s
‘unqualified command.’ ” (Id. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 2129–2130].) The court
observed that 43 states issue licenses based on objective criteria, but that New York was
one of six states in which “the government further conditions issuance of a license to
carry on a citizen’s showing of some additional special need.” (Id. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at
p. 2122].) The court thus held that New York’s licensing framework violates the Second
Amendment by requiring an applicant to show “a special need for self-defense . . . .”
(Ibid.)
The Bruen court, however, stated that an individual’s right to carry firearms
outside the home is still “subject to certain reasonable, well-defined restrictions.”
(Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 2156].) The court recognized that the
analysis to determine whether a restriction is consistent with the nation’s historical
tradition of firearm regulation under the Second Amendment is not a “regulatory
straightjacket,” and it repeated its assurance from an earlier decision that the Second
Amendment does not protect a right to “ ‘keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any

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manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.’ ” (Id. at pp. ___ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 2128,
2133].) In his concurring opinion, Justice Kavanaugh (joined by Chief Justice Roberts)
wrote “to underscore . . . the limits of the Court’s decision.” (Id. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p.
2161] (conc. opn. of Kavanaugh, J.).) Justice Kavanaugh observed that the court’s
decision “does not prohibit States from imposing licensing requirements for carrying a
handgun for self-defense.” (Ibid.)
C. California’s Firearms Licensing Statutes
California restricts the ability to carry firearms in public places. (§§ 25850,
subd. (a), 26350.) Under the statute defendant was convicted of violating, carrying a
concealed firearm in a vehicle or on the defendant’s person is punishable if: (1) the
firearm is loaded, or if both the firearm and the unexpended ammunition are in the
immediate possession of the person or readily accessible to that person; and (2) the
person is not listed as the registered owner of the firearm. (§ 25400, subds. (a) & (c)(6).)
However, a person may apply for a license to carry a concealed weapon. (§§ 26150,
subd. (a), 26155, subd. (a).) Under the concealed carry license statutes, the sheriff or
chief of police may issue a license to the applicant upon proof of all of the following:
(1) the applicant is of good moral character; (2) good cause exists for issuance of the
license; (3) the applicant resides or works in the city or county; and (4) the applicant has
completed a course of training. (§§ 26150, subd. (a), 26155, subd. (a).) However, the
Attorney General asserts that the day after the Bruen decision, the Attorney General
issued an alert recognizing that the good cause requirement was unconstitutional under
Bruen and instructing local officials not to enforce the good cause requirement and to
continue applying and enforcing all other requirements to obtain a license. Defendant
does not contest this assertion.

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 D. Bruen’s Impact on California’s Licensing Statutes
Post-Bruen, courts – including this one – have concluded that California’s firearms
licensing statutes do not violate individuals’ Second Amendment rights. In D.L., the
Court of Appeal rejected a minor’s contention that “section 25850 must be
unconstitutional on its face as a result of its relationship to California’s laws for obtaining
a license to carry a concealed weapon.”2 (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 147.) The
D.L. court first concluded that the minor had standing to raise a facial challenge to
section 25850. (D.L., supra, at p. 148.) The Court of Appeal held that the good cause
requirement of California’s firearms licensing laws “is severable from the balance of
California’s concealed carry licensing framework,” and it held that “[i]t remains
constitutional to punish someone without a license for carrying a loaded gun in public.”
(Ibid.)
Additionally, this court rejected a facial challenge to section 25850 in In re
T.F.-G. (Aug. 24, 2023, H050112) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2023 Cal.App.LEXIS 639]
(T.F.-G.).) This court first rejected the Attorney General’s contention that the minor
lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 25850 unless he could show
that he would have been able to obtain a license but for the unconstitutional provision.
(T.F.-G., supra, at p. ___ [2023 Cal.App.LEXIS 639 at pp. 25–26].) This court noted
that California’s good cause requirement contains the same deficiency that the United
States Supreme Court in Bruen found in New York’s law. (T.F.-G., supra, at p. ___
[2023 Cal.App.LEXIS 639 at pp. 26–27].) However, this court noted that the challenges
in Bruen and other United States Supreme Court Second Amendment decisions were not
facial challenges, while T.F.-G. challenged “neither the application of a licensing
requirement to unconstitutionally infringe his right to bear arms nor the imposition of

Section 25850 provides: “A person is guilty of carrying a loaded firearm when
2

the person carries a loaded firearm on the person or in a vehicle while in any public place
or on any public street in an incorporated city or in any public place or on any public
street in a prohibited area of unincorporated territory.” (§ 25850, subd. (a).)

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criminal penalties against him as a consequence of such requirement, but instead the
state’s authority to impose criminal penalties on any individual who carries a loaded
handgun in public in violation of the state’s licensing regime, regardless of whether the
noncompliance stemmed from a constitutionally sound requirement.” (T.F.-G., supra, at
p. ___ [2023 Cal.App.LEXIS 639 at p. 28].) This court concluded: “To hold that
section 25850, the enforcement mechanism of the licensing regime, is facially
unconstitutional, we would need to find that section 25850 has no significant application
in constitutionally valid circumstances—i.e., that it is unconstitutional in at least the
generality or great majority of cases. [Citation.] Although we can identify two
theoretical pathways to such a conclusion, neither is available here, because the
constitutional defect is severable from the broader licensing regime, and the state retains
authority to regulate firearm possession via licensure.” (Id. at p. ___ [2023
Cal.App.LEXIS 639 at pp. 31–32].)

E. Analysis
We hold, consistent with the decisions in D.L. and T.F.-G., that defendant’s
Second Amendment challenge to the state’s firearms licensing statutes fails. In light of
defendant’s concession that his challenge is a facial one rather than a challenge as applied
to the facts of his case, we assume without deciding that defendant has standing to bring
his constitutional challenge. Assuming defendant has standing, his challenge fails for the
reasons outlined in D.L. and T.F.-G. In defendant’s opening brief, he not only challenges
the good cause requirement but also the “may issue” and “good moral character”
language. However, this language does not violate the Second Amendment because
Bruen imposed no prohibition against such provisions, as the court in D.L. recognized.
(D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) The state is permitted to keep in place a
reasonable licensing framework. The only provision in New York’s licensing framework
that the Supreme Court invalidated that has an analogue in California law is California’s

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good cause requirement. The day after the Bruen decision was issued, the Attorney
General instructed local officials not to enforce the good cause requirement but to
continue to apply the remaining licensing prerequisites. Defendant does not take issue
with the Attorney General’s assertion that this instruction has occurred and has been
carried out, and defendant does not oppose the Attorney General’s contention that the
good cause provision is severable from the remaining portions of California’s firearms
licensing framework. Instead, defendant rests his argument on the notion that “fixing an
unconstitutional provision does not go back in time and make the statute as it was
construed at the time of Mr. Alvarez’s conduct constitutional.” Defendant relies on
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham (1969) 394 U.S. 147 (Shuttlesworth), and Staub v. City of
Baxley (1958) 355 U.S. 313 (Staub) for this position.
Although California’s firearms licensing framework contained a constitutionally
invalid requirement at the time of defendant’s offense, Shuttlesworth and Staub do not
support the position that defendant’s conviction must be overturned. In Staub, the
defendant was convicted of violating a city ordinance that required a permit before
organizing factory workers for union activity. (Staub, supra, 355 U.S. at pp. 314–316.)
The state argued that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the ordinance because she made no attempt to secure a permit under the ordinance. (Id.
at p. 319.) The United States Supreme Court rejected the lack of standing argument,
holding that “the failure to apply for a license under an ordinance which on its face
violates the Constitution does not preclude review in this Court of a judgment of
conviction under such an ordinance.” (Ibid.) The court then found the ordinance
unconstitutional and reversed the conviction, and the decision did not discuss any
possibility of rewriting the ordinance to make it constitutionally permissible. (Id. at
p. 325.)
In Shuttlesworth, the defendant was convicted for violating an ordinance which
proscribed participating in any public demonstration without first obtaining a permit from

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the city. (Shuttlesworth, supra, 394 U.S. at p. 148.) The court, citing Staub, held that the
ordinance was “squarely” unconstitutional under longstanding First Amendment
precedent, holding that a requirement to obtain a permit that officials could grant or
withhold at their discretion was an unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of speech.
(Shuttlesworth, supra, at pp. 150–151.) The court also noted that “a person faced with
such an unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it and engage with impunity in the
exercise of the right of free expression for which the law purports to require a license.”
(Id. at p. 151.) The Alabama Supreme Court attempted to rewrite the ordinance to make
it an “objective and even-handed regulation of traffic,” a transformation the United States
Supreme Court characterized as “a remarkable job of plastic surgery upon the face of the
ordinance.” (Id. at pp. 153–155.) The United States Supreme Court held that “[i]t would
have taken extraordinary clairvoyance for anyone to perceive that this language meant
what the Supreme Court of Alabama was destined to find that it meant more than four
years later; and, with First Amendment rights hanging in the balance, we would hesitate
long before assuming that either the members of the [city] or the petitioner possessed any
such clairvoyance at the time of [the defendant’s arrest].” (Id. at p. 156.) Thus, the court
reversed the judgment in the defendant’s case. (Id. at p. 159.)
Shuttlesworth and Staub are distinguishable from the instant case. Staub merely
held that the failure to apply for a permit did not mean the defendant lacked standing.
Here, we have analyzed defendant’s Second Amendment challenge assuming that he has
standing. In Shuttlesworth, the permitting ordinance was wholly invalid, and it could be
saved only with extensive rewriting by the Alabama Supreme Court to make it neutral
and thus constitutionally permissible. The defendant in Shuttlesworth was permitted to
ignore the ordinance because its existence constituted an improper prior restraint on
protected First Amendment activity. Likewise, in Staub, the constitutional problem was
the existence of the permit requirement, not one isolated requirement for obtaining a
license among several valid requirements. In the instant case, even with the removal of

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the good cause requirement, Californians are still required to obtain a license to carry a
concealed firearm in public, and numerous valid requirements remain for a person to
obtain such a license. Post-Bruen, the state retains the ability to impose a requirement to
obtain a license for concealed carry of a firearm in public. Defendant was not free to
ignore the state’s still-constitutional licensing requirements and engage with impunity in
carrying a concealed firearm in public without a license. Thus, Shuttlesworth and Staub
do not mean defendant’s conviction must be reversed when the majority of the licensing
requirements survive Bruen and the offending requirement is severable.
Post-Bruen, the state maintains constitutionally permissible concealed carry
licensing requirements. The only licensing requirement that Bruen held is
constitutionally impermissible – the good cause requirement – is severable and is no
longer being required. Because defendant did not comply with the licensing
requirements, defendant’s conviction for carrying a concealed firearm without a license
does not violate the Second Amendment.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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 BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

GREENWOOD, P.J.

WILSON, J.

People v. Alvarez
H050620