(dissenting). I dissent. I cannot accept the conclusion upon which the majority opinion is premised, that the appeal board employed the proper legal standard in denying benefits to plaintiff. The board made the following findings:
"We find that the unrebutted testimony of plaintiff establishes an injury date of April 6, 1970. However, after considering that plaintiff worked at two jobs full time prior to December 29, 1970, and his reason for leaving on that date was, by the majority of lay testimony, because he was not keeping proper work hours with defendant, not because of back pain, we do not find he suffered an injury on that last day worked. Plaintiff did not meet his burden of proof in establishing disability as a result of the April 6, 1970, injury. He should, however, be reimbursed for medical expenses paid as a result of that injury, and unpaid medical bills related to that injury should be paid.”
I cannot conclude from these findings, as does *576the majority, that the board found: " * * * that plaintiffs wage-earning capacity was unimpaired”. Rather, it appears that the board’s conclusion that plaintiff did not meet his burden of proving disability was premised on two factors. First, that plaintiff continued to work at two jobs, after the date of the injury and, second, that plaintiff was subsequently discharged for cause. We must accept these factual determinations by the board, as they are supported by evidence on the record. However, if the board’s conclusion that plaintiff had failed to prove a disability was premised on these two factors alone, as their opinion suggests, then their conclusion was based on an erroneous legal standard and new findings are required. The board’s findings suggest that the determination which was made below was that plaintiff had suffered no wage loss as a result of the injury. However, the relevant inquiry, as ably stated in the majority opinion, was whether plaintiff had suffered a loss of wage-earning capacity as a result of the injury.
In Pulley v Detroit Engineering & Machine Co, 378 Mich 418, 423; 145 NW2d 40 (1966), the Supreme Court stated:
" * * * Presumably and actually, an employee can be injured, disabled to a degree, and yet suffer no weekly wage loss because he is shown to be able to earn an amount equal to or greater than that which he was earning at the time of his injury. In many instances from the highest motives of desire to rehabilitate the employee and restore him as a wage-earning member of society, some employers have retained injured employees in new jobs within their capacity to perform. It is not difficult to perceive, however, that an ill-intentioned employer desirous of avoiding compensation payments could rehire an injured and disabled employee, establish his capacity to earn as much or more than before his injury and terminate his employment. Then, *577if the bare elements of proof of what the employee was paid were construed as establishing his 'earning capacity’ the whole purpose of the act would be vitiated.”
Medacco v Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co, 48 Mich App 217; 210 NW2d 360 (1973), involved an analogous issue. There the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board had found that the claimant had suffered a compensable injury to his hand as well as a noncompensable heart condition, had continued to work for a time, and eventually quit his job because of his heart condition. The board found:
" 'A careful review of the record leads us to the inescapable conclusion plaintiffs non-compensable heart condition and not his hand problem accounts for his wage loss and that the referee erred in finding that plaintiff is totally disabled as a result of his 1964 hand injury.’ ” Medacco, supra, p 220. (Emphasis in Court of Appeals opinion omitted.)
On appeal, this Court reversed the board’s decision denying the claimant continuing compensation based on the hand injury, and remanded for further factual findings. This Court said:
" * * * The Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board found that plaintiffs wage loss was due to his noncompensable heart condition, but made no specific finding as to the effect of the hand injury on plaintiffs earning capacity, other than implying that since there was no apparent wage loss until the heart attack, there could be no compensable disability from the hand injury. The board’s legal reasoning was erroneous. It apparently felt that because there was no wage loss there was no 'impairment of his earning capacity in the employment in which he was working at the time of the injury’. MCLA 412.11; MSA 17.161. While an actual wage earning differential may be considered evidence of capacity, *578it cannot alone be considered determinative. For were it otherwise, if an employee somehow adjusted and mitigated the effect of an injury to continue working at his full pre-injury performance level, he would be punished by a denial of compensation for his injury since he had suffered no wage loss. In short, by the reasoning of the appeal board, an injured worker who quits his job or seeks easier work at less pay from his employer could get compensation, but a stalwart employee who adjusts to the injury and stays on his job is left without a remedy for his condition. We cannot see how such reasoning would be consistent with the policy objective behind the wage-earning capacity proviso of MCLA 412.11; MSA 17.161. 'The proviso was adopted to relieve the employer of the payment of compensation pro tanto, if and while the employee has capacity to earn sufficient wages in the same or another occupation.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Markey v SS Peter & Paul’s Parish, 281 Mich 292, 298; 274 NW 797, 800 (1937). Medacco seeks compensation for an injury of a character, according to the referee, that is totally disabling. His post-injury earnings do not necessarily determine the fact of his disability.” Medacco, supra, pp 221-222.
Similarly, in this case, the board has made no specific finding as to the effect of the plaintiff’s back injury on his earning capacity, other than the implication that there could be no compensable disability because plaintiff suffered no apparent wage loss until he was forced by defendant to resign his job for reasons not relating to his back injury. If this was the board’s reasoning, it was erroneous. I would conclude that further findings as to plaintiff’s capacity to earn wages are needed.
I do not dispute the majority’s conclusion that the record contained evidence which could have supported a board finding that plaintiff suffered no. loss of wage-earning capacity. This record would support such a finding, if made pursuant to the correct legal standard, as it would support a find*579ing that plaintiff is entitled to benefits. But here it appears that the board’s conclusion that plaintiff had not proved the disability followed only from their finding that the plaintiff had been fired for cause, a finding which does not establish that plaintiff suffered no loss of wage-earning capacity. I would remand for further findings.