with whom Barrow, J., Benton, J., and Elder, J., join, dissenting.
This is not a difficult or complicated case. The essential facts are not in dispute and our review is guided by well established principles.
As a general rule in a criminal prosecution, evidence that shows the defendant has committed other crimes is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the defendant committed the crime charged, even though the other crimes are of the same nature. E.g., *638Donahue v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 145, 155, 300 S.E.2d 768, 773 (1983); Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970). However, well established exceptions to that rule allow evidence of other crimes to be admitted if it is connected with the charged offense or if “it tends to prove any relevant element of the offense charged,” such as intent or motive. Kirkpatrick, 211 Va. at 272, 176 S.E.2d at 805; accord Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 527, 323 S.E.2d 572, 577 (1984); Donahue, 225 Va. at 155, 300 S.E.2d at 773; Barber v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 172, 179-80, 360 S.E.2d 888, 892 (1987). These exceptions are qualified by the test of whether “ ‘the legitimate probative value [of the other crimes evidence] outweighs the incidental prejudice to the accused.’ ” Hawks v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 244, 247, 321 S.E.2d 650, 652 (1984) (quoting Lewis v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 497, 502, 303 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1983)); Barber, 5 Va. App. at 180, 360 S.E.2d at 892.
Satterfield was arrested after the narcotics agents searched him and found .78 grams of cocaine on his person. He subsequently gave an oral confession admitting that he had purchased the cocaine and intended to resell it. Satterfield does not challenge the legality of the search, the arrest, or his confession. He was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. At trial he pled not guilty.
Because of Satterfield’s plea of not guilty, the majority correctly notes that the Commonwealth had to prove both the possession and the intent to distribute the cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence available to the Commonwealth did not make that a difficult task. On brief, the Commonwealth points out that Satterfield’s possession of the cocaine “was not in question.” The evidence establishes Satterfield’s possession of the cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, in what the majority denotes as the “unobjectionable” portion of Satterfield’s confession, he admits that “he purchased the three packets of cocaine ... for twenty dollars each . . . [and] he was going to resell them for twenty-five dollars each.” Satterfield did not object to this evidence and it provides the necessary proof of his intent to distribute the cocaine he possessed.
The Commonwealth, however, did not rest its case with this evidence. Rather, over Satterfield’s objection, the Commonwealth introduced the remaining or “objectionable” portion of Satterfield’s *639confession, which disclosed that he had sold cocaine at some unspecified time in the past. There was no evidence or contention that Satterfield’s prior drug dealings and the present offense were a part of a scheme or otherwise connected. They were unrelated except for his source of the cocaine. The majority acknowledges that the evidence of Satterfield’s other crimes was “not inextricably linked” with the offense for which he was on trial. Moreover, Satterfield’s confession was readily separable into distinct parts: one part that established Satterfield’s guilt of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute without evidence of other crimes; the other part that would produce the same result but included prejudicial evidence of other crimes.
Despite the rather straightforward factual scenario involved in this case and the lack of any necessity for evidence involving other crimes to prove the present offense, the majority undertakes an analysis of what Satterfield meant by parts of his confession, what his trial “strategy” was, and whether the jury would have been “misled” by hearing only a portion of the confession that did not include evidence of other crimes. While I do not disagree with all of that analysis, a complete discussion of my view of that analysis is not useful here. Ultimately, the majority concludes that pursuant to the holding in Scott, 228 Va. 519, 323 S.E.2d 572, an exception to the Kirkpatrick general rule applies and, thus, evidence of Satterfield’s past drug sales was admissible to prove that he intended to sell the cocaine involved in the present offense. It is with this conclusion that I disagree.
In Scott, the defendant abducted the victim from her apartment in Bristol, Virginia, drove her to an apartment in Bristol, Tennessee, and raped her. In Virginia, he was charged with abduction with intent to defile (sexually molest). At trial, the defendant argued that it was error to admit evidence that, after abducting the victim in Virginia, he committed the crime of rape upon her in Tennessee. The essence of the defendant’s argument was that the evidence of the Tennessee crime inflamed the Virginia jury and, thus, he was punished for the Tennessee crime as well as the Virginia crime. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and noted that Scott’s course of criminal conduct was “continuous and interwoven, consisting of a series of related crimes” and, thus, the jury was “entitled to all of the relevant and connected facts, including those which followed the commission of *640the crime on trial, as well as those which preceded it; even though they may show the defendant guilty of other offenses.” Id. at 526-27, 323 S.E.2d at 577. In Scott, the evidence of the Tennessee rape immediately following the abduction in Virginia established the intent to defile element of the abduction charge. Thus, the decision in Scott is consistent with the general rule of Kirkpatrick excluding evidence of other crimes, which “extends only to crimes which are unrelated to those on trial, and which are offered solely for the purpose of showing that the accused was a person of such character as to be a likely perpetrator of the offense charged.” Id.
The present case is clearly distinguishable from Scott. Satterfield’s past drug dealings and the offense on trial were not shown to be a part of a continuous and interwoven criminal conduct. No evidence established when the past crimes occurred. In my view, Scott must be read in the context of the facts of that case, which involved a clear continuous and interwoven course of criminal conduct consisting of a series of related crimes. In addition, Scott does not provide authority for the introduction of evidence of other crimes to show the intent element of the offense on trial where, as here, that intent is shown from evidence not involving other crimes. In summary, I believe the majority reads Scott too broadly.
In contrast to the majority view, our Supreme Court has repeatedly found evidence of prior drug transactions inadmissible in cases concerning the sale of drugs or possession of drugs with the intent to sell. In Boyd v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 52, 189 S.E.2d 359 (1972), the Court found that the defendant’s heroin sales two days prior to the heroin sale for which he was on trial were unrelated. Therefore, the Court held that the evidence of the prior sales was inadmissible since it did not fall within an exception to the general rule announced in Kirkpatrick and its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. Id. at 53, 189 S.E.2d at 359-60. In Eccles v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 20, 197 S.E.2d 332 (1973), the Court, relying upon Boyd, held that it was reversible error to admit evidence of the defendant’s past criminal acts of smoking marijuana in his trial for selling marijuana. Finally, in Donahue, 225 Va. 145, 300 S.E.2d 768, a case similar to the present case, the defendant was convicted of possession of phencyclidine (PCP) with intent to distribute. The Commonwealth put on evidence of the defendant’s drug dealings from *641about a month and one-half earlier, including her confession that she had been selling PCP. The trial court gave the jury limiting instructions explaining that the evidence of the defendant’s prior drug dealings was admitted for the purpose of proving intent or knowledge but not to show she was guilty of the crime charged. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction after holding that none of the Kirkpatrick exceptions were applicable and that their decision in Boyd was controlling. The Court further stated: “ ‘Since we have no way of knowing the effect the court’s admission of testimony as to defendant’s prior criminal acts . . . had upon the minds of the jury, we cannot say that the error was not prejudicial.’ ” Id. at 156, 300 S.E.2d at 774 (quoting Eccles, 214 Va. at 22-23, 197 S.E.2d at 333).
In my view, Donahue controls the present case. Satterfield’s admitted prior drug dealings and the cocaine possession charge for which he was being tried were unrelated except for his source of the cocaine. The Commonwealth made no assertion that the crimes were a part of a scheme or otherwise connected. Since Satterfield admitted he intended to sell the cocaine, the probative value of the evidence of prior crimes is greatly diminished and was outweighed by the prejudicial effect of that evidence. Moreover, since there is no way of knowing the effect the court’s admission of testimony as to Satterfield’s prior criminal acts had upon the minds of the jury, it cannot be said that this error was not prejudicial.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse Satterfield’s conviction and remand for a new trial if the Commonwealth be so advised.