The State appeals from the order of the habeas corpus court granting relief to Petitioner. We find that the habeas court incorrectly ruled that the revocation of the full balance of Petitioner’s probation violated the provisions of OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c), and that under our ruling in Gearinger v. Lee,1 the trial court was authorized to revoke the full balance of Petitioner’s probation upon finding that he had both violated a special condition of probation and committed a felony. Therefore, we reverse. We also note that due to problematic language in OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c), the statute is highly susceptible to unintended results due to misapplication by well-intentioned courts, and we urge the legislature to reexamine the statute at its earliest opportunity.
Petitioner was convicted of two counts of selling cocaine, and parts of the sentences imposed were probated. As a special condition of such probation, Petitioner was ordered to pay both a court-imposed fine in equal periodic increments, and a monthly probation supervision fee.
In 1993, the balance remaining on Petitioner’s probated sentences was revoked, based upon the revocation court’s finding that Petitioner had (1) violated the special conditions imposed on his pro*858bation by failing to make payments as directed, or to make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay, and (2) violated a general condition of probation by committing the offense of felony theft by taking.2 The court ordered the revocation of the balance of petitioner’s probated sentence — approximately 23 years. Subsequently, the habeas court found that the revocation of the full balance of Petitioner’s probated sentences violated OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c), and ordered that the revocation sentence be limited to the maximum penalty for felony theft by taking — ten years.
1. The availability of habeas corpus relief is conditioned upon proof of a substantial denial of a petitioner’s rights under either the United States or Georgia Constitutions in the proceeding which resulted in conviction.3 We conclude that in this case, unlawful confinement under a sentence longer than that permitted by state statute would constitute a denial of liberty without due process of law.4 Moreover, such confinement would result from the administration of the sentence imposed by the trial court upon conviction. Accordingly, Petitioner may seek relief under the Great Writ.
2. OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c) provides that:
[At any probation revocation hearing], if the violation of probation or suspension alleged and proven by a preponderance of the evidence ... is the commission of a felony offense or the violation of a special condition issued pursuant to this Code section, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may revoke no more than the lesser of the balance of probation or the maximum time of the sentence authorized to be imposed for the crime constituting the violation of the probation.
As made clear by the statutory language quoted above, the revocation of probation under OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c) can result from two separate possibilities — the commission of a felony or the violation of a special condition.5 In those cases, the revocation court may revoke only the lesser of (1) the full amount of the probated sentence, or (2) the maximum sentence permitted for the felony offense committed.
In Gearinger v. Lee, we recently construed subsection 42-8-34.1 (c) to mean that where probation is revoked solely for the violation of a special condition, and not for a felony offense, the revocation court *859need not determine the lesser of the remaining probated sentence or the maximum penalty for the felony committed.6 In Gearinger, we held that when probation is revoked solely for the violation of a special condition, “the revocation court is authorized by section 42-8-34.1 (c) to revoke no more than the balance of a defendant’s probation.”7 This case is unlike Gearinger, though, because Petitioner’s probation was revoked due to both the violation of a special condition and the commission of a felony.
For that same reason, this case also is unlike the scenario contemplated by subsection 42-8-34.1 (c), because the statute discusses alternative bases for revocation (the commission of a felony or the violation of a special condition), rather than the dual bases that exist here (the commission of a felony and the violation of a special condition). We find that our decision in Gearinger, supra, authorizes a revocation court, when faced with a probationer who has both violated a special condition and committed a felony, to dispose of a probationer as having either violated a special condition or committed a felony. In the latter instance, when disposing of the probationer for the commission of a felony, the revocation court would be authorized to proceed as directed under OCGA § 42-8-34.1. In the former instance, when disposing of the probationer for having violated a special condition, the revocation court is authorized by our decision in Gearinger, supra, to revoke the balance of probation. Accordingly, the revocation court in this case, when faced with Petitioner, who both committed a felony and violated a special condition, did not err in revoking the balance of the probated sentence. It follows that the habeas court’s order reversing the revocation court was in error, and is hereby reversed.
To rule otherwise would lead to absurd results, and we cannot construe statutes in that manner.8 Were we to affirm the habeas court, we would rule that Petitioner, who in separate actions both committed a felony and violated a special condition, could only have ten years revoked from his 23 year probated sentence. On the other hand, under Gearinger, the probationer who merely violates a special condition, which can be as minor an infraction as using obscene words,9 is subject to having his entire probated sentence revoked, regardless of its length.
Hence, under the habeas court’s ruling, had Petitioner in this case merely failed to make court-ordered payments as directed, the revocation court would have been authorized to revoke his entire 23-year probated sentence; but because Petitioner also committed a fel*860ony, the revocation court could revoke only ten years of the 23-year probated sentence. Under such reasoning, the Petitioner actually benefits from having committed felony theft by taking, rather than simply violating a special condition. We cannot countenance such a nonsensical result, and our duty to construe all statutes so as to avoid absurd or unintended consequences prevents us from doing so here.
3. The situation discussed in the preceding paragraph highlights the fact that misapplications of OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c) are likely to result in consequences not intended by the legislature. Our ruling in Division 2 now prevents unintended and illogical results stemming from misapplication of the statute when a probationer commits a felony and violates a special condition, and the felony penalty is less then the balance of probation. However, the same unintended and illogical result as reached by the habeas court in this case still can occur when a probationer only commits a felony, and the remaining probated sentence is greater than the maximum felony penalty.
On the other hand, the probationer who commits a felony, whose remaining probated sentence is less than the maximum penalty for the felony, may only have the balance of his probation revoked under the statute. This last scenario would seem to be logical, as a revocation court has no authority to revoke more than the remaining probated sentence, and we believe that it was this situation that the legislature had in mind when it promulgated § 42-8-34.1 (c).
However, this single logical result is entirely inconsistent with the illogical results discussed above. It would seem that a logical statutory scheme regarding probation revocation might provide that the commission of a felony, standing alone, carries a greater penalty than the mere violation of a special condition, and a lesser penalty than the commission of a felony combined with the violation of a special condition. Accordingly, we urge the legislature to examine OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c) in all of its possible applications and misapplications, consider the unintended consequences that could result from such applications and misapplications, and to rectify the statute’s problematic aspects as soon as possible.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Benham, C. J., and Hunstein, J., who dissent.266 Ga. 167 (465 SE2d 440) (1996).
Petitioner was later convicted and sentenced for misdemeanor theft by taking.
OCGA § 9-14-42.
See Shoemake v. Whitlock, 226 Ga. 771, 772 (177 SE2d 677) (1970) (due process includes the administration of general laws according to established rules); Norman v. State, 171 Ga. 527 (156 SE 203) (1930) (same).
See Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167, 169 (465 SE2d 440) (1996).
Id., 266 Ga. at 170.
Id.
State of Ga. v. Mulkey, 252 Ga. 201, 204 (312 SE2d 601) (1984).
Gearinger, 266 Ga. at 168, n. 1.