Because I believe that Ewell v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 491 S.E.2d 721 (1997), controls the outcome of this case, I would hold that the trial court erred in denying Raab’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Reasonable, articulable suspicion to support an investigative detention must be based on objective facts, Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 611, 363 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988), and whether a police officer had a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting that the person seized was engaged in some form of criminal activity is considered in light of the totality of the circumstances. Ewell, 254 Va. at 217, 491 S.E.2d at 723.
In Ewell, the Virginia Supreme Court held that an off-duty police officer working as a security guard in an apartment complex was not justified in stopping and detaining the operator of a vehicle leaving the complex’s parking lot. The officer testified that, “he was familiar with most of the complex’s residents and their automobiles,” and “was concerned because it was very early [in the morning] and the car was parked in an area suspected of ‘high narcotics’ trafficking.” Id. at 216, 491 S.E.2d at 722. “Additionally, the operator of the car attempted to leave the parking lot immediately upon [the officer’s] arrival in his marked vehicle.” Id. And because the *647officer recognized neither Ewell nor her vehicle, he stopped the vehicle “to inquire whether its operator was trespassing.” Id. The Court held that the officer’s perceptions and suspicions were no more than a hunch, falling short of the reasonable, articulable suspicion required for a stop. Id. at 217, 491 S.E.2d at 723. Moreover, the Court found that Ewell “acted as any other person might have acted under similar circumstances.” Id.
In the present case, the officer spotted three vehicles in the parking lot of a restaurant at 12:40 a.m. The restaurant “appeared” to be closed for the evening, and had a “patrons only/towing enforced” sign posted. The officer testified that he pulled into the lot to inquire why the individuals were in the parking lot after hours. As the officer pulled in to the parking lot, “[he] scanned the parking lot real quick and [Raab’s] vehicle was backing out from the spot where he was.” The officer then pulled up and parked perpendicular to Raab’s vehicle to prevent him from exiting the lot.5 The Commonwealth argues,6 and the majority holds that these facts are sufficient to support the claim that the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that Raab was engaged in *648criminal activity. Because of the precedent set forth in Ewell, I must disagree.
In my view, appellate courts have occasionally blurred the distinction between probable cause to support an arrest or search, and the much lesser standard of reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur, thereby constitutionally justifying a brief detention and investigation. Nonetheless, Ewell is binding on this Court and the distinction advanced by the majority, in my view, is one without a difference. In essence, the majority holds that because an apartment complex like that in Ewell does not close, and a restaurant does, it is more reasonable to assume that Raab was not lawfully in the parking lot. In other words, Raab’s mere presence in the parking lot of a closed restaurant is a sufficient “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting that Raab was engaged in some form of criminal activity, specifically trespassing. The majority reasons that because “[n]o facts suggested Raab was a patron,” and because “a restaurant closed to patrons cannot be patronized ... [i]t reasonably follows that Raab was likely a non-patron subject to the restaurant’s patrons-only restriction on access to the parking lot.” Although this may well be true, this singular fact, applied against the precedent set forth in Ewell, is insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.
In Ewell, the officer conducting the stop was familiar with most of the residents in the complex, as well as their vehicles. He also knew that the area in which the car was parked was a high drug-trafficking area. Moreover, when the officer pulled into the complex, Ewell attempted to leave. Because of this knowledge, and the attendant circumstances, the officer had reason to believe that Ewell was not a resident, and thus, detained Ewell long enough to investigate his suspicion that Ewell was trespassing on private property. However, the Virginia Supreme Court found that these facts were insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that Ewell was engaged in criminal activity, specifically trespassing. Said differently, the Court found that these facts, without more, *649amounted to a mere “hunch” that Ewell was unlawfully on the property.
In this case, the only fact even remotely supporting the assertion that Raab was unlawfully on the premises, or otherwise engaged in criminal activity, is that fact that the restaurant appeared to be closed. However, there were two other vehicles in the lot at the time of the seizure. Moreover, the record does not indicate what time the restaurant closed, or that the officer had that information available to him. As such, it is equally likely, in viewing the totality of the circumstances, that Raab could have been the restaurant’s owner, an employee, or a late departing patron and thus, was lawfully on the premises. And even though reasonable suspicion “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct,” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277, 122 S.Ct. 744, 753, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), the facts available to the officer at the time of the stop must still give rise to more than an “inchoate and unpartieularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ ” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Because an officer’s familiarity with the residents of a complex, and the presence of drug-trafficking, coupled with the defendant’s attempt to leave the complex upon the officer’s arrival, is insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion, see Ewell, 254 Va. 214, 491 S.E.2d 721, I do not believe that the facts in this case rise any higher than a similar “hunch.” Accordingly, I would hold that under the holding in Ewell, the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress, and I would reverse and remand for a new trial if the Commonwealth be so advised.
. The other vehicles left while the officer was conducting the stop of Raab’s vehicle.
. The Commonwealth maintains that the objective facts available to the officer, taken in their entirety, support the trial court's conclusion that the stop was lawful. Citing United States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705 (11th Cir.1991), the Commonwealth makes much of the fact that Raab was parked in the lot of a business that appeared to be closed. However, in Briggman, the fact that the defendant was parked in a closed lot was only one of many factors suggesting that criminal activity was afoot. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit found that, because Briggman "was parked in a parking lot at 4:00 a.m. in a high crime area, when commercial establishments served by the lot were closed for the night,” and because "in departing the parking lot, Briggman attempted to evade the officer,” the stop was justified. Id. at 709. Thus, Briggman’s mere presence alone was not the basis for the court’s holding. Rather, Brigmann’s presence, the location, the time of night, and Brigmann’s attempt to evade the officer, were sufficient to find that the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot.