I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, because I do not find ambiguity in the statute involved. Because there is no ambiguity in the statute, we should not give deference to the Board in its interpretation of the INA. See Mondragon-Gonzalez v. Att'y Gen. , 884 F.3d 155 , 158 (3d Cir. 2018). The Board concludes that the stop-time rule applies to the physical presence of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of the application for cancellation of removal but does not apply to the petitioner's requirement of being a person of good moral character during the same continuous 10-year period. That conclusion follows logic but it does not follow the statute. A decision that the stop-time rule for both physical presence and good moral character is 10 years before the application is a windfall for an applicant like Mejia-Castanon, for the acts in this case which would preclude him from being eligible for a cancellation of removal would allow him to "beat the system."
However, the plain language of the statute provides otherwise, and Congress has had an opportunity to amend the statute, as recited in the majority opinion. Thus, the current statute reads:
The Attorney General may cancel removal of ... an alien who is inadmissible or deportable ... if the alien--
(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application; [and]
(B) has been a person of good moral character during such period ....
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)-(B).
I realize, as the majority indicates, that two other circuits have ruled otherwise. See Rodriguez-Avalos v. Holder , 788 F.3d 444 , 453 (5th Cir. 2015) ; Duron-Ortiz v. Holder , 698 F.3d 523 , 527 (7th Cir. 2012). The Board ruled likewise. See In re Ortega-Cabrera , 23 I. & N. Dec. 793 , 796-97 (B.I.A. 2005). However, in reading the plain language of the statute, I cannot agree. Therefore, I would grant the petition for review.