J. Coleman v. Parkland S.D.

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jarrett Coleman, :
Appellant :
:
v. :
: No. 1416 C.D. 2022
Parkland School District : Argued: September 11, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY FILED: November 8, 2023

Jarrett Coleman (Coleman) appeals from the Lehigh County Common
Pleas Court’s (trial court) November 17, 2022 order granting Parkland School
District’s (District) Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion) relative to Coleman v.
Parkland School District, Case No. 2021-C-2666 (Case No. 2666), and denying the
Motion relative to Coleman v. Parkland School District, Case No. 2021-C-2990
(Case No. 2990). Coleman presents three issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether
the trial court erred as a matter of law by granting summary judgment in the District’s
favor and against Coleman under the Sunshine Act;1 (2) whether the trial court erred
by not invalidating the September 1, 2022 to August 31, 2025 collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) between the District and the Parkland Education Association
(Association), where the District violated the Sunshine Act by voting to approve it;
and (3) whether the trial court erred by not awarding attorney’s fees and/or costs in
Coleman’s favor. After review, this Court affirms in part and reverses in part.

1
65 Pa.C.S. §§ 701-716.
 Background
The parties do not dispute the facts. Coleman is a District resident. On
or about October 25, 2021, the District issued a public notice which stated that the
Parkland School Board (School Board) would conduct a meeting on October 26,
2021,2 and published the agenda therefor, which did not include the School Board’s
consideration of the CBA. However, the School Board’s October 26, 2021 meeting
minutes reflect:

[School Board member Lisa] Roth [(Mrs. Roth)] made a
motion to add the following agenda item, seconded by Mr.
Kennedy,[3] to approve and authorize the School Board
President to execute[,] and the School Board Secretary to
attest[,] the [CBA].
Mrs. Roth explained that this agenda item was not
previously listed on the agenda for tonight’s meeting
because the [CBA] had not yet been voted upon by the []
Association until today[,] when the teachers voted to
approve [it]. To list the [CBA] on the [School] Board’s
agenda prior to the teacher’s [sic] vote would have been
premature and inappropriate.

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 174a; see also R.R. at 37a-38a. Thereafter, a majority
of the School Board voted to authorize the School Board President to execute the
CBA, and the School Board Secretary to attest it. See R.R. at 178a.
On November 2, 2021, Coleman filed a Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment and Injunctive Relief for Violation of the Sunshine Act in the trial court
relative to Case No. 2666 challenging the School Board’s October 26, 2021 action
(Case No. 2666 Complaint). Therein, Coleman asked the trial court to: (1) declare
that the District violated Section 712.1(e) of the Sunshine Act, 65 Pa.C.S. § 712.1(e),

2
According to Coleman, “[t]he October 26, 2021 meeting[] happened to be the last meeting
prior to the November 2, 2021 Municipal Election in which four seats on the [School] Board were
up for election.” Coleman Br. at 10.
3
Mr. Kennedy’s full name does not appear in the record before this Court.
2
by voting to amend the agenda at the October 26, 2021 School Board meeting and
approve the CBA; (2) declare the CBA invalid; (3) permanently enjoin the District
from taking official action concerning matters involving the expenditure of funds or
entering into contracts that are not listed on a publicly posted agenda at least 24
hours in advance of a public meeting; and (4) award Coleman reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs.4 The District filed an answer and new matter to the Case No. 2666
Complaint asserting a counterclaim for attorney’s fees and costs.
At its November 16, 2021 meeting, after providing public notice
thereof, the School Board voted to ratify its October 26, 2021 action on the CBA.
On December 6, 2021, Coleman filed a complaint in the trial court relative to Case
No. 2990 related to the Board’s November 16, 2021 ratification (Case No. 2990
Complaint).5 The District filed an answer and new matter to the Case No. 2990
Complaint asserting a counterclaim for attorney’s fees and costs.
On January 24, 2022, the trial court consolidated Coleman’s actions for
the limited purpose of discovery and trial. On September 1, 2022, the District filed
the Motion, which Coleman opposed on September 28, 2022. On November 17,
2022, the trial court granted the Motion with respect to Case No. 2666, but denied
the Motion concerning Case No. 2990. By separate order, the trial court denied

4
The District filed preliminary objections to Coleman’s Case No. 2666 Complaint, which
the trial court overruled on April 11, 2022.
5
Therein, Coleman alleged that the District: (1) violated Section 710.1(a) of the Sunshine
Act, 65 Pa.C.S. § 710.1(a) (relating to public participation), by taking official action to vote on
two motions that arose during the November 16, 2021 meeting without first allowing for public
comment; (2) violated Section 710.1(c) of the Sunshine Act, 65 Pa. C.S. § 710.1(c), by ruling
Coleman out of order and preventing him from raising a perceived Sunshine Act objection during
the meeting; and (3) violated Section 712.1(e)(1) of the Sunshine Act, 65 Pa.C.S. § 712.1(e)(1),
by failing to post an amended agenda within one business day of the November 16, 2021 meeting
to include two motions that were voted upon during the meeting that were not listed on the posted
agenda. The District filed preliminary objections to Coleman’s Case No. 2990 Complaint, which
the trial court overruled on April 11, 2022.
3
Coleman’s cross-motion for summary judgment in Case No. 2990. On November
18, 2022, Coleman discontinued Case No. 2990.
On December 16, 2022, Coleman appealed to this Court, challenging
the grant of summary judgment in the District’s favor in Case No. 2666.6 The
Pennsylvania NewsMedia Association (PNA) filed an amicus curiae brief in support
of Coleman’s position. On January 10, 2023, the trial court issued a statement
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), adopting the
reasoning set forth in its November 17, 2022 order.7

Discussion
Initially,

[s]ummary judgment may be granted only in those cases
where the record clearly shows that there are no genuine
issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. P.J.S. v. [Pa.] State Ethics
Comm[’n], . . . 723 A.2d 174, 176 ([Pa.] 1999). On a

6
The standard of review of the grant of summary judgment is de novo.
See, e.g., Pyeritz v. Commonwealth . . . , . . . 32 A.3d 687, 692 ([Pa.]
2011). []The scope of review over an order granting summary
judgment is “limited to a determination of whether the trial court
abused its discretion or committed an error of law.” Bowles v. [Se.]
[Pa.] Transp[.] Auth[.], . . . 581 A.2d 700, 702-03 ([Pa. Cmwlth.]
1990).
Texiera v. Commonwealth, 284 A.3d 1279, 1283 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). In addition, this Court’s
scope of review in cases presenting questions of law involving statutory interpretation is plenary
and the standard of review is de novo. See Commonwealth v. Koger, 295 A.3d 699 (Pa. 2023).
On January 6, 2023, the District filed a motion to quash Coleman’s appeal as premature
because the trial court did not dispose of all claims (i.e., the District’s counterclaims for attorney’s
fees). On January 20, 2023, Coleman opposed the motion to quash. After argument, on March
21, 2023, this Court denied the motion to quash on the basis that the trial court unambiguously
denied the District’s counterclaim for attorney’s fees. This Court further concluded in its March
21, 2023 Memorandum Opinion that the trial court’s ruling relative to Case No. 2666 is the only
matter currently before this Court on appeal.
7
The trial court did not order Coleman to file a concise statement of errors complained of
on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b).
4
 motion for summary judgment, the record must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all
doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact must be resolved in his favor. Id.

Texiera v. Commonwealth, 284 A.3d 1279, 1283 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022).

1. Statutory Interpretation
Here, the parties’ sole challenge is whether the District was entitled to
judgment in its favor as a matter of law relative to Case No. 2666. Specifically, they
offer contradictory interpretations of Section 712.1 of the Sunshine Act.
The backdrop for the parties’ disagreement is Section 702(b) of the
Sunshine Act, in which the General Assembly “declares it to be the public policy of
this Commonwealth to insure the right of its citizens to have notice of and the right
to attend all meetings of agencies at which any agency business is discussed or acted
upon as provided in this chapter.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 702(b). To that end, Section 709 of
the Sunshine Act requires, in pertinent part:

(a) Meetings.—An agency shall give public notice of its
first regular meeting of each calendar or fiscal year not less
than three days in advance of the meeting and shall give
public notice of the schedule of its remaining regular
meetings. An agency shall give public notice of each
special meeting or each rescheduled regular or special
meeting at least 24 hours in advance of the time of the
convening of the meeting specified in the notice. Public
notice is not required in the case of an emergency meeting
or a conference. . . .
(b) Notice.—With respect to any provision of this chapter
that requires public notice to be given by a certain date, the
agency, to satisfy its legal obligation, must give the notice
in time to allow it to be published or circulated within the
political subdivision where the principal office of the
agency is located or the meeting will occur before the date
of the specified meeting.
65 Pa.C.S. § 709.

5
 In Senate Bill 554 (SB 554), S.B. 554, 205th General Assembly,
Regular Session (Pa. 2021-2022), the General Assembly amended Section 709 of
the Sunshine Act to add subsection (c.1), effective August 30, 2021, which
mandates, in relevant part:

Notification of agency business to be considered.--
(1) In addition to any public notice required under this
section, an agency shall provide the following
notification of agency business to be considered at a
meeting as follows:
(i) If the agency has a publicly accessible Internet
website, the agency shall post the agenda, which
includes a listing of each matter of agency business
that will be or may be the subject of deliberation
or official action at the meeting, on the website no
later than 24 hours in advance of the time of the
convening of the meeting.[8]

65 Pa.C.S. § 709(c.1)(1)(i) (text emphasis added).
Section 712.1 of the Sunshine Act, also added in SB 554, effective
August 30, 2021, states:

(a) Official action.--Except as provided in subsection
(b) [(relating to emergency business)], (c) [(business
arising within 24 hours before the meeting)], (d) [(relating
to business arising during the meeting),] or (e) [(relating
to agenda changes)], an agency may not take official
action on a matter of agency business at a meeting if
the matter was not included in the notification
required under [S]ection 709(c.1) [of the Sunshine Act]
(relating to public notice).
(b) Emergency business.--An agency may take official
action at a regularly scheduled meeting or an emergency
meeting on a matter of agency business relating to a real
or potential emergency involving a clear and present
8
The agency must also post the agenda at the meeting location and the agency’s principal
office, and make copies thereof available to the public at the meeting. See Section 709(c.1)(1)(ii),
(iii), 65 Pa.C.S. § 709(c.1)(1)(ii), (iii).
6
danger to life or property regardless of whether public
notice was given for the meeting.
(c) Business arising within 24 hours before meeting.--
An agency may take official action on a matter of agency
business that is not listed on a meeting agenda if:
(1) the matter arises or is brought to the attention
of the agency within the 24-hour period prior to
the meeting; and
(2) the matter is de minimis in nature and does
not involve the expenditure of funds or entering
into a contract or agreement by the agency.
(d) Business arising during meeting.--If, during the
conduct of a meeting, a resident or taxpayer brings a
matter of agency business that is not listed on the
meeting agenda to the attention of the agency, the agency
may take official action to refer the matter to staff, if
applicable, for the purpose of researching the matter for
inclusion on the agenda of a future meeting, or, if the
matter is de minimis in nature and does not involve the
expenditure of funds or entering into a contract or
agreement, the agency may take official action on the
matter.
(e) Changes to agenda.--
(1) Upon majority vote of the individuals present
and voting during the conduct of a meeting, an
agency may add a matter of agency business to
the agenda. The reasons for the changes to the
agenda shall be announced at the meeting before
any vote is conducted to make the changes to the
agenda. The agency may subsequently take
official action on the matter added to the
agenda. The agency shall post the amended
agenda on the agency’s publicly accessible
Internet website, if available, and at the agency’s
principal office location no later than the first
business day following the meeting at which the
agenda was changed.
....

7
 (f) Minutes.--If action is taken upon a matter of agency
business added to the agenda under this section, the
minutes of the meeting shall reflect the substance of the
matter added, the vote on the addition[,] and the
announced reasons for the addition.

65 Pa.C.S. § 712.1 (bold text and underline emphasis added).
The issue before this Court is whether by including the phrase, “Except
as provided in subsection (b) [(relating to emergency business)], (c) [(business
arising within 24 hours before the meeting)], (d) [(relating to business arising during
the meeting),] or (e) [(relating to agenda changes),]” 65 Pa.C.S. § 712.1(a)
(emphasis added), the General Assembly intended there to be three or four
exceptions to the general prohibition against agency action on matters that do not
appear on a timely posted pre-meeting agenda.
Coleman argues that the School Board amended its agenda at the
October 26, 2021 meeting, and took action on the CBA, despite that the CBA did
not meet the criteria of any of the three exceptions: (1) emergency business; (2) de
minimis business not involving fund expenditure or entering into a contract that
arises within the 24 hours preceding the meeting; or (3) de minimis business raised
by a resident/taxpayer during the meeting that does not involve fund expenditure or
entering into a contract. Coleman contends that Section 712.1(e) of the Sunshine
Act merely states the procedure by which the School Board could amend its agenda
when one of the three exceptions applied. Coleman asserts that, “[a]s the Sunshine
Act does not provide a mechanism to amend an agenda to take official action outside
of Section 712.1(e) [of the Sunshine Act], the word ‘or’ should be read as ‘and’ in
Section 712.1(a) [of the Sunshine Act] based on the plain language in the
surrounding context.” Coleman Br. at 24.
The District retorts that the connector or in Section 712.1(a) of the
Sunshine Act signals that the statutory elements are met when any one is satisfied

8
and, thus, that provision contains four exceptions to the general rule: (1) emergency
business; (2) de minimis business not involving fund expenditure or entering into a
contract that arises within the 24 hours preceding the meeting; (3) de minimis
business raised by a resident/taxpayer during the meeting that does not involve fund
expenditure or entering into a contract; or (4) changes to the agenda - and the School
Board complied with the latter on October 26, 2021. The District asserts that “[a]ny
other interpretation requires the Court to re-write the statute by changing the word
‘or’ to ‘and.’”9 District Br. at 18.
The trial court agreed with the District, concluding that a plain reading
of Section 712.l(a) of the Sunshine Act’s text allows only one reasonable
interpretation of the statute - that “use of [the] conjunctive ‘or’ between subsections
(d) and (e) indicates subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of [Section] 712.1 [of the
Sunshine Act] shall be used alternatively to one another.” Trial Ct. Op. at 3.
The law is well settled:

As in all matters of statutory interpretation, the Statutory
Construction Act of 1972 ([SCA]), 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-
1991, guides our analysis. The [SCA] provides that the
object of all statutory interpretation “is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.”
[Section 1921(a) of the SCA,] 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).
Generally, the best expression of the General Assembly’s
intent “is found in the statute’s plain language.”
Commonwealth v. Howard, . . . 257 A.3d 1217, 1222 ([Pa.]
2021). “When the words of a statute are clear and free
from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded

9
The District cites the Washington County Common Pleas Court’s Schmid v. Ringgold
School District (C.P. Wash. No. 2022-1028, filed Dec. 9, 2022) decision, see District Br. at 16,
wherein that court held: “[Section] 712.1 [of the Sunshine Act] is properly read to include four []
circumstances where any agency may take official action on a matter that was not posted or
distributed according to [Section] 709(c.1) [of the Sunshine Act].” District Br. App. A, slip op. at
11. Although they may be cited for their persuasive value, “[this] Court is not bound by decisions
of a court of common pleas[.]” William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 243 A.3d 252, 266 n.7
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (Cohn Jubelirer, J., single-Judge op.).
9
 under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” [Section 1921(b)
of the SCA,] 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Moreover, “we should
not insert words into [a statute] that are plainly not there.”
Frazier v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bayada Nurses,
Inc.), . . . 52 A.3d 241, 245 ([Pa.] 2012). Only in instances
of ambiguous statutory language “may courts consider
statutory factors to discern legislative intent.” Howard,
257 A.3d at 1222. Additionally, “[w]ords and phrases
shall be construed according to rules of grammar and
according to their common and approved usage,” though
“technical words and phrases and such others as have
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning or are defined
in [the SCA] shall be construed according to such peculiar
and appropriate meaning or definition.” [Section 1903(a)
of the SCA,] 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). “We also presume that
‘the General Assembly does not intend a result that is
absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable,’ and that
‘the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be
effective and certain.’” Berner v. Montour Twp. Zoning
Hearing Bd., . . . 217 A.3d 238, 245 ([Pa.] 2019) (quoting
[Section 1922(1)-(2) of the SCA,] 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1)-
(2)).

Commonwealth v. Coleman, 285 A.3d 599, 605 (Pa. 2022). Accordingly, “[courts]
will only look beyond the plain meaning of the statute where the words of the statute
are unclear or ambiguous.” Commonwealth v. Diodoro, 970 A.2d 1100, 1106 (Pa.
2009).
In Section 712.1(a) of the Sunshine Act, the connector or clearly
precedes the reference to Section 712.1(e) of the Sunshine Act, and this Court
acknowledges that or is ordinarily intended in statutes to be disjunctive. See Elite
Indus., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 832 A.2d 428 (Pa. 2003). This Court also
agrees that there is no statement in Section 712.1 subsections (b), (c), and (d) of the
Sunshine Act requiring those exceptions to be conditioned upon following the
procedure set forth in subsection (e). However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has explained:

10
 By way of further explanation on the inclusive or
exclusive nature of the word “or,” we offer the following:
The word “or” can be construed as exclusive or
inclusive, leading to confusion about which
variant of “or” applies in a given context. Legal
sources differ on which meaning of “or” is
authoritative. In the realm of symbolic logic, the
exclusive “or,” otherwise known as the exclusive
disjunction, means that only one of the
propositions or terms joined by the disjunction can
be true. “Jim is eight or nine years old” is
exemplary of an exclusive disjunction because
only one proposition in the disjunction can be true.
On the other hand, an inclusive disjunction
assumes that either one or both of the terms or
propositions on either side of the disjunction are
true. A sentence like, “X will call or email Y,”
does not necessarily denote an exclusive
disjunction, but rather, it leaves open the
possibility that X could call and email Y.
Essentially, an inclusive disjunction allows the
possibility of either option, or both, which is also
the literal meaning of and/or. The difficulty with
competing versions of a disjunction is that when
used in plain English, a reader must dissect what
type of disjunction it is, leaving more room for
confusion.
Ira P. Robbins, “And/or” and the Proper Use of Legal
Language, 77 M[D]. L. R[EV]. 311, 318-19 (2018)
(footnotes omitted).

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 207 A.3d 827, 832 n.4 (Pa. 2019). Our Supreme Court
has further declared: “[T]he conjunction ‘or’ must be given its ordinarily
disjunctive meaning unless such a construction would lead to an absurd result.”
Elite Indus., Inc., 832 A.2d at 431 (emphasis added).

Moreover, guided by the presumption that the General
Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective, we
must read statutory provisions in context, construing
various sections in conjunction with and by reference
to one another. [See Section] 1922(2) [of the SCA].

11
 Unless the statute expressly indicates that one section
nullifies another, we must not interpret it in such a manner.
Id.; see Kegerise v. Delgrande, . . . 183 A.3d 997, 1006
([Pa.] 2018).

City of Harrisburg v. Prince, 219 A.3d 602, 610 (Pa. 2019) (emphasis added).
Further, this Court “cannot assume that the legislature intended any words to be mere
surplusage.” City of Phila. Fire Dep’t v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sladek), 195
A.3d 197, 207 (Pa. 2018). Finally, “if we can reconcile seemingly inconsistent
provisions, we must do so.” Commonwealth v. Gurung, 239 A.3d 187, 192 (Pa.
Super. 2020).
Here, because the term or in Section 712.l(a) of the Sunshine Act is
capable of two meanings, this Court must look beyond the statute’s words to
determine the General Assembly’s intent. See Diodoro. Reading the General
Assembly’s “or (e)” reference in Section 712.l(a) of the Sunshine Act as disjunctive,
as the District argues, would lead to an absurd result. Namely, the General Assembly
intended with the Sunshine Act’s pre-meeting posting mandate, see 65 Pa.C.S. §
709(c.1)(1), “to insure the right of its citizens to have notice of . . . all meetings of
agencies at which any agency business is discussed or acted upon . . . .” 65 Pa.C.S.
§ 702(b).
In his March 17, 2021 Memorandum, State Senator Patrick J. Stefano
(Senator Stefano) represented to “[a]ll Senate members[,]” that he would be
introducing legislation

[t]o strengthen the Sunshine Act’s intent and ensure
that the public can be fully informed when following
governmental proceedings, this legislation . . . will
require that agencies make their meeting agendas
available to the public. Further, once the agenda has
been finalized and posted for the public the agency may
not take any official action on any item that is not listed

12
 on the notice, except in emergency situations or to
consider matters that are de minimis in nature.[10]

R.R. at 40a (bold and underline emphasis added). Senator Stefano thereafter
introduced SB 554, entitled: “An Act amending Title 65 (Public Officers) of the
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, in open meetings, further providing for public
notice and providing for notification of agency business required and exceptions.”11

10
This Court has held:
Although lawmakers’ statements during debate are generally not
dispositive of legislative intent, they may properly be considered as
part of the contemporaneous legislative history. Arneson v. Wolf,
117 A.3d 374, 384 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth.), aff’d, . . . 124 A.3d 1225
([Pa.] 2015); see also B[d.] of Revision of Taxes[, City of Phila.] v.
City of Phila[.], . . . 4 A.3d 610, 624 n.10 ([Pa.] 2010) (noting that
although legislators’ statements during floor debate are not
dispositive, they can be instructive to our analysis and persuasive
evidence of the General Assembly’s intent).
POM of Pa., LLC v. Dep’t of Rev., 221 A.3d 717, 734 n.16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019); see also Phila.
Fed’n of Teachers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 109 A.3d 298, 315 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), aff’d on other
grounds sub nom. Phila. Fed’n of Teachers, AFT, Local 3, AFL-CIO v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 144
A.3d 1281 (Pa. 2016) (“[W]hile statements made by legislators during the enactment process are
not dispositive of legislative intent, they may be properly considered as part of the
contemporaneous legislative history.” Wash[.] v. Baxter, . . . 719 A.2d 733, 738 ([Pa.] 1998)
(citation omitted)”); DeLellis v. Borough of Verona, 660 A.2d 25, 31 n.11 (Pa. 1995) (“[T]he floor
remarks of [the act’s] sponsor is nonetheless instructive to our analysis and persuasive evidence
that [Coleman’s] argument more closely indicates the General Assembly’s intent that [Section
712.l(a) of the Sunshine Act contains three exceptions, not four].” “Here, the legislative history is
persuasive and serves to confirm our reading of the statute’s language.” Bd. of Revision of Taxes,
4 A.3d at 625 n.10.
11
See 2021 Senate Legislative Journal at 595-96,
www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/SJ/2021/0/Sj20210608.pdf#page=5 (last visited Nov. 7, 2023).
On June 9, 2021, Senator Stefano described:
[SB 554] amends the Sunshine Act to further increase government
transparency. . . . As the public is becoming increasingly more
interested in government, I believe [it has] a right to know in
advance what is to be considered at a public meeting so [it has] an
opportunity to engage in the issues that matter most to [it].
2021 Senate Legislative Journal at 623-24,
www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/SJ/2021/0/Sj20210609.pdf#page=9 (last visited Nov. 7, 2023).

13
 Consistent with Senator Stefano’s statement in the March 17, 2021
Memorandum, Section 712.1 subsection (b) of the Sunshine Act addresses
“emergency situations,” and subsections (c) and (d) expressly refer to “matters that
are de minimis in nature” and do not involve the expenditure of funds or entering
into a contract. R.R. at 40a. Subsection (e) differs in that it does not reference either
“emergency situations” or “matters that are de minimis in nature” and does not
involve the expenditure of funds or entering into a contract. Id.
Section 712.1 subsections (b), (c), and (d) of the Sunshine Act differ
from subsection (e) in that each of the former specify that an “agency may take
official action” when the circumstances in subsections (b), (c), and (d) arise, 65
Pa.C.S. § 712.1(b), (c), (d), without mandating how the agency must go about
amending the agenda to include those changes. Conversely, subsection (e) describes
how the agency may add agency business to the agenda at a meeting, without in any
way limiting the situations in which an agency may do so. See 65 Pa.C.S. § 712.1(e).
In addition, subsection (e) specifies the procedure an agency must follow to amend
the agenda during the meeting, making it akin to subsection (f), which specifies the
procedure an agency must follow relative to an agenda change after the meeting, i.e.,
requiring inclusion of the amendment in the meeting minutes. See 65 Pa.C.S. §
712.1(f).
Finally, interpreting Section 712.1(e) of the Sunshine Act as a fourth
exception would allow Section 712.1(e) of the Sunshine Act to swallow the entire
rule that the agency shall post the agenda 24 hours in advance of a meeting. Section
712.1(e) of the Sunshine Act would allow an agency, without advance public notice,
to amend its agenda and take official action on any matter - including those that are

The House State Government Committee read a summary of SB 554 during its June 22,
2021 meeting. See www.pahousegop.com/Video/State-Government/Page-7, at minutes 5:02 to
6:00 (last visited Nov. 7, 2023). The Committee did not clarify whether there were three or four
exceptions.
14
not de minimis and involve the expenditure of funds and/or entering into a contract
- at any meeting, as long as the agency majority agrees. There would be no reason
for the General Assembly to have included subsections (b), (c), and (d) in Section
712.1 of the Sunshine Act; they would be mere surplusage. Moreover, such a result
would be absurd in light of the specificity the General Assembly included in Section
712.1(b), (c), and (d) of the Sunshine Act, and the General Assembly’s clear
intention to generally prohibit last-minute agenda changes so that the public has
proper advance notice and the opportunity to attend meetings where decisions on
fund expenditures and/or contracts are made.
Based on this Court’s reading, Section 712.1 of the Sunshine Act offers
three exceptions to the general prohibition that allow agency action on matters not
previously listed in the meeting agenda - in cases of (1) emergency business, (2) de
minimis business not involving fund expenditure or entering into a contract that
arises within the 24 hours preceding the meeting, and (3) de minimis business raised
by a resident/taxpayer during the meeting that does not involve fund expenditure or
entering into a contract. See 65 Pa.C.S. § 712.1(b)-(d). Like Section 712.1(f) of the
Sunshine Act, Section 712.1(e) of the Sunshine Act is a procedural mechanism
instructing the agency about how to go about publicly amending a meeting agenda
when one of the three exceptions in Section 712.1 of the Sunshine Act applies.
Unless one of the three listed exceptions applied, the School Board could not vote
on the CBA at the October 26, 2021 meeting.
Because the CBA became ripe for the School Board’s action within the
24 hours that preceded the October 26, 2021 meeting, the exception in Section
712.l(c) of the Sunshine Act applied. However, under Section 712.l(c)(2) of the
Sunshine Act, the School Board could only take official action if “the matter [was
also] de minimis in nature and [did] not involve the expenditure of funds or entering
into a contract or agreement by the agency.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 712.1(c)(2). The District’s
15
October 26, 2021 press release declared that the CBA included a 2.9% salary
increase for approximately 680 Association members, plus stipend salaries for
certain positions, which the District admitted constituted fund expenditure. See R.R.
at 37a; see also Original Record (O.R.) Item 16 (Coleman Br. in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment), Ex. A (Coleman Request for Admissions) ¶ 6; O.R. Item
16, Ex. B (District Answer to Coleman Request for Admissions) ¶ 6. Because the
School Board’s approval of the CBA involved expenditure of significant funds
and/or entering into a contract without prior public notice, the School Board violated
Section 712.1(c) of the Sunshine Act at its October 26, 2021 meeting. Accordingly,
the trial court erred as a matter of law by granting summary judgment in the District’s
favor and against Coleman under Section 712.1(e) of the Sunshine Act.

2. The CBA
Coleman also asserts that the trial court erred by not invalidating the
CBA because the District violated the Sunshine Act in voting to approve it on
October 26, 2021. He claims that the School Board cannot retroactively approve an
official action taken before public notice was provided.
Section 713 of the Sunshine Act provides, in relevant part:

Should the court determine that the meeting did not meet
the requirements of this chapter, it may in its discretion
find that any or all official action taken at the meeting shall
be invalid. Should the court determine that the meeting
met the requirements of this chapter, all official action
taken at the meeting shall be fully effective.

65 Pa.C.S. § 713 (emphasis added). Failure to comply with the Sunshine Act does
not automatically render the CBA null and void. Rather, “a court’s decision to
invalidate an agency’s action for violation of the Sunshine Act is discretionary, not

16
obligatory.” Baribault v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Haverford Twp., 236 A.3d 112, 120
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2020).
Moreover, this Court has held: “[S]hort of fraud . . . , most any Sunshine
Act infraction could [be] cured by subsequent ratification at a public meeting.
Otherwise, governmental action in an area would be gridlocked with no possible
way of being cured once a Sunshine Act violation was found to have occurred.”
Lawrence Cnty. v. Brenner, 582 A.2d 79, 84 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (citation omitted);
see also Picone v. Bangor Area Sch. Dist., 936 A.2d 556, 563 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007)
(“[T]his Court has repeatedly held that official action taken at a later, open meeting
cures a prior violation of the Sunshine Act.”).
Here, Coleman did not claim that the School Board’s actions were in
any way fraudulent.12 In addition, based on objections to the School Board’s action
on the CBA at the October 26, 2021 meeting, the School Board provided timely pre-
meeting public notice that it would again vote on the CBA at its November 16, 2021
meeting.13 See R.R. at 43a, 86a; see also O.R. Item 16 (Coleman Br. in Support of

12
Coleman’s concerns regarding the CBA stemmed from his perception of a potential
conflict of interest for School Board members whose family members stood to benefit from the
CBA. See O.R. Item 16 at 8.
13
See November 16, 2021 School Board agenda, which reflected:
To clarify any concern that the School Board did not comply with
the Sunshine Act when it added an agenda item at the time of its
public meeting on October 26, 2021, by majority vote of the School
Board without posting the agenda item at least 24 hours before the
meeting, the School Board has posted this agenda item at least 24
hours before this meeting and hereby takes official action to ratify
and confirm its official action previously taken on October 26, 2021,
where the Board approved and authorized the School Board
President to execute and School Board Secretary to attest the [CBA].
Although this official action to ratify and confirm its previous vote
is being taken herein, the School Board believes that the addition of
the agenda item at the time of its meeting on October 26, 2021, and

17
Motion for Summary Judgment) at 6 (the School Board posted the November 16,
2021 meeting agenda on November 15, 2021). At its November 16, 2021 meeting,
the School Board afforded the public, including Coleman, the chance to comment
on the CBA and, thereafter, reaffirmed its October 26, 2021 vote on the CBA. See
R.R. at 85a-87a; see also O.R. Item 16 at 6-8.14 Under such circumstances, the
School Board’s November 16, 2021 reaffirmation vote, at a regularly scheduled
meeting after public notice, cured its October 26, 2021 Sunshine Act violation
relating to the CBA.15 Accordingly, the trial court did not err by refusing to
invalidate the CBA.

3. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Coleman finally contends that the trial court erred by not awarding him
attorney’s fees and/or costs.
Section 714.1 of the Sunshine Act declares:

If the court determines that an agency willfully or with
wanton disregard violated a provision of this chapter, in
whole or in part, the court shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney fees and costs of litigation or an
appropriate portion of the fees and costs. If the court finds
that the legal challenge was of a frivolous nature or was
brought with no substantial justification, the court shall
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees and
costs of litigation or an appropriate portion of the fees and
costs.

65 Pa.C.S. § 714.1.

the official action taken to approve the CBA was in full compliance
with the Sunshine Act.
go.boarddocs.com/pa/parkland/Board.nsf/Public (last visited Nov. 7, 2023).
14
See also www.youtube.com/watch?v=alXARwBjaCY at minutes 22:08 to 24:00, 24:27
to 26:00, 26:33 to 28:03 (last visited Nov. 7, 2023).
15
This Court disagrees with Coleman’s claim that Section 712.1 of the Sunshine Act
abrogates prior case law permitting agencies to ratify and confirm past actions.
18
 Here, Coleman provided no evidence that the District’s legal challenge
was made in willful or wanton disregard of the law or was frivolous. Rather, the
District raised an issue of first impression related to the interpretation of a new
statutory provision, which justified the District filing the Motion. Accordingly, the
trial court did not err by declining to award Coleman attorney’s fees and costs.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, this Court affirms the portions of the trial
court’s order denying the CBA’s invalidation and attorney’s fees and costs. This
Court reverses the portion of the trial court’s order granting the Motion in the
District’s favor and against Coleman based on the trial court’s erroneous
interpretation of Section 712.1 of the Sunshine Act.

_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

19
 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jarrett Coleman, :
Appellant :
:
v. :
: No. 1416 C.D. 2022
Parkland School District :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2023, the portions of the Lehigh
County Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) November 17, 2022 order denying
Jarrett Coleman’s (Coleman) requests relative to Coleman v. Parkland School
District, Case No. 2021-C-2666 (Case No. 2666), that the trial court invalidate the
September 1, 2022 to August 31, 2025 collective bargaining agreement between the
Parkland School District (District) and the Parkland Education Association, and for
related attorney’s fees and costs are AFFIRMED.
The portion of the trial court’s order granting the District’s Motion for
Summary Judgment relative to Case No. 2666 in the District’s favor and against
Coleman based on the trial court’s interpretation of Section 712.1 of the Sunshine
Act, 65 Pa.C.S. § 712.1, is REVERSED.

_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jarrett Coleman, :
Appellant : No. 1416 C.D. 2022
:
v. : Argued: September 11, 2023
:
Parkland School District :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: November 8, 2023

Although I concur with the Majority’s thoughtful opinion to the extent
that it affirms, in part, the November 17, 2022 order of the Lehigh County Court of
Common Pleas (trial court), see Coleman v. Parkland School District (Pa. Cmwlth.,
No. 1416 C.D. 2022, filed November 8, 2023) (Majority), I respectfully cannot agree
with the Majority’s partial reversal of the trial court based on what I believe is the
Majority’s incorrect interpretation of Section 712.1 of the Sunshine Act,1 65 Pa. C.S.
§ 712.1. To that portion of the Majority’s holding, I must respectfully dissent.
Because this case requires us to discern the meaning of a statute, we
begin with general principles of statutory interpretation. “The plain language of a
statute is the best indication of the General Assembly’s intent, and where the
statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to the plain
language thereof.” Philadelphia Gas Works v. Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission, 249 A.3d 963, 970 (Pa. 2021). Pursuant to the Statutory Construction
Act of 1972 (SCA), 1 Pa. C.S. §§ 1501-1991, “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear

1
65 Pa. C.S. §§ 701-706.
and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext
of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b). Only where a statute’s words are not
explicit may we consider the several indicators of legislative intent enumerated in
Section 1921(c) of the SCA, including legislative history. See 1 Pa. C.S. §
1921(c)(7).
The issue before us involves certain exceptions to the public notice
requirements of Subsection 709(c.1) of the Sunshine Act, 65 Pa. C.S. § 709(c.1).2
Those exceptions reside in Section 712.1 of the Sunshine Act, which aptly is titled
“Notification of agency business required and exceptions.” 65 Pa. C.S. § 712.1.
The exceptions in Section 712.1 delineate when an agency may take official action

2
Subsection 709(c.1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(c.1) Notification of agency business to be considered.--
(1) In addition to any public notice required under this section,
an agency shall provide the following notification of agency
business to be considered at a meeting as follows:
(i) If the agency has a publicly accessible Internet website,
the agency shall post the agenda, which includes a listing of
each matter of agency business that will be or may be the
subject of deliberation or official action at the meeting, on
the website no later than 24 hours in advance of the time of
the convening of the meeting.
(ii) The agency shall post the agenda, which includes a
listing of each matter of agency business that will be or may
be the subject of deliberation or official action at the
meeting, at the location of the meeting and at the principal
office of the agency.
(iii) The agency shall make available to individuals in
attendance at the meeting copies of the agenda, which
include a listing of each matter of agency business that will
be or may be the subject of deliberation or official action at
the meeting.
....
65 Pa. C.S. § 709(c.1).

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on a matter that was not, in advance of an agency meeting, published in an agenda.
By virtue of the title of Section 712.1 itself, it is clear that the legislature foresaw the
need to provide exceptions to this notice requirement to permit an agency to take
swift official action in certain enumerated circumstances. Section 712.1 provides as
follows:
712.1. Notification of agency business required and
exceptions
(a) Official action.--Except as provided in subsection
(b), (c), (d) or (e), an agency may not take official
action[3] on a matter of agency business at a meeting if the
matter was not included in the notification required under
[Subs]ection 709(c.1) (relating to public notice).
(b) Emergency business.--An agency may take official
action at a regularly scheduled meeting or an emergency
meeting on a matter of agency business relating to a real
or potential emergency involving a clear and present
danger to life or property regardless of whether public
notice was given for the meeting.
(c) Business arising within 24 hours before meeting.--
An agency may take official action on a matter of agency
business that is not listed on a meeting agenda if:
(1) the matter arises or is brought to the attention of the
agency within the 24-hour period prior to the meeting;
and

3
“Official Action” is defined in Section 703 of the Sunshine Act as follows:
“Official action.”
(1) Recommendations made by an agency pursuant to statute,
ordinance or executive order.
(2) The establishment of policy by an agency.
(3) The decisions on agency business made by an agency.
(4) The vote taken by any agency on any motion, proposal,
resolution, rule, regulation, ordinance, report or order.
65 Pa. C.S. § 703.
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 (2) the matter is de minimis in nature and does not
involve the expenditure of funds or entering into a
contract or agreement by the agency.
(d) Business arising during meeting.--If, during the
conduct of a meeting, a resident or taxpayer brings a
matter of agency business that is not listed on the meeting
agenda to the attention of the agency, the agency may take
official action to refer the matter to staff, if applicable, for
the purpose of researching the matter for inclusion on the
agenda of a future meeting, or, if the matter is de minimis
in nature and does not involve the expenditure of funds or
entering into a contract or agreement, the agency may take
official action on the matter.
(e) Changes to agenda.--
(1) Upon majority vote of the individuals present and
voting during the conduct of a meeting, an agency may
add a matter of agency business to the agenda. The
reasons for the changes to the agenda shall be
announced at the meeting before any vote is conducted
to make the changes to the agenda. The agency may
subsequently take official action on the matter added to
the agenda. The agency shall post the amended agenda
on the agency's publicly accessible Internet website, if
available, and at the agency's principal office location
no later than the first business day following the
meeting at which the agenda was changed.
(2) This subsection shall not apply to a conference or a
working session under section 707 (relating to
exceptions to open meetings) or an executive session
under section 708 (relating to executive sessions).
(f) Minutes.--If action is taken upon a matter of agency
business added to the agenda under this section, the
minutes of the meeting shall reflect the substance of the
matter added, the vote on the addition and the announced
reasons for the addition.

65 Pa. C.S. § 712.1 (emphasis added).

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 Subsection 712.1(a) is an overarching provision that, except as
provided in Subsections 712.1(b), (c), (d) or (e), precludes an agency from taking
official action on a matter unless advance public notice is given in accordance with
Subsection 709(c.1) of the Sunshine Act. We assume that the General Assembly
intended what it said, choosing here to use the word “or” in a natural, disjunctive
sense that gives independent effect to the distinct purposes that the General
Assembly wrote into the plain language of each of Subsections 712.1(b)-(e).
Subsection 712.1(b) is an exception for emergencies, real or potential,
that present a clear and present danger to life or property. It permits an agency to
take official action at a regularly scheduled or emergency meeting, regardless of
whether public notice was given, on any matter presenting a clear and present
danger to life or property. Subsection 712.1(b) says nothing else about notice,
compliance with Subsection 712.1(e), or a requirement that such emergent matters
be added to the agency agenda prior to official action. It simply says that an agency
“may take official action” on such a matter. Practically speaking, requiring
compliance with Subsection 712.1(e) as a prerequisite to official action in this
context would be undesirable at best, and dangerous at worst. It is unthinkable that
the Sunshine Act would authorize the calling and conducting of an emergency
meeting without any prior notice to the public4 and then hamstring the agency’s
ability to act on emergency matters if a majority of the members present at the
meeting do not agree to methodically add each of the emergency matters to the
meeting agenda prior to taking any official action.
Subsection 712.1(c) permits official action on agency business that (1)
arises or is brought to the agency’s attention within 24 hours prior to a meeting,

4
An agency may call an emergency meeting without prior public notice. See 65 Pa. C.S.
§ 709(a).
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(2) is not listed on an agency agenda, (3) is de minimis in nature, and (4) does not
involve the expenditure of agency funds or entry into a contract. Subsection
712.1(c), like Subsection 712.1(b), says nothing about notice, Subsection 712.1(e),
or any requirement that the item of business be added to the agency’s agenda prior
to the taking of official action. It simply says that the agency “may take official
action” if the above criteria are satisfied, expressly where the item is not listed on
an agenda. The Majority’s added requirement of compliance with Subsection
712.1(e) prior to any official action thus would render both the purpose and language
of this exception meaningless.
Subsection 712.1(d) pertains to matters brought to the agency’s
attention during a meeting by a resident or taxpayer, but not by an agency member.
It once again addresses matters that are not listed on the agenda and states that the
agency “may take official action” on such matters in two respects: (1) the agency
may take official action to refer such matters to agency staff for research or inclusion
on a future agenda; or (2) the agency may take official action on the substance of
the matter if it is (a) de minimis and (b) does not involve the expenditure of agency
funds or the agency’s entry into a contract or agreement. Again, Subsection
712.1(d) says nothing about notice, Subsection 712.1(e), or amendments to the
agenda prior to official action. It plainly is intended to permit quick and efficient
action on extemporaneous matters raised by the attendees at a meeting. The
Majority’s requirement that each and every such matter be added to the agency’s
agenda at the meeting before it could be even referred to staff for inclusion on the

PAM-6
agenda of a future meeting would grind agency meetings to a halt. Such an
unreasonable result could not have been intended by the General Assembly.5
Subsection 712.1(e), which does not reference any of the exceptions
in Subsections 712.1(b)-(d), provides that an agency “may take official action” on
a matter that is added to the agenda by majority vote of all the agency members
present at the meeting. The reasons for the amendment must be announced prior
to any vote on the amendment and, if the amendment is successful, the revised
agenda must be posted on the agency’s website and at the agency’s office the day
after the meeting. Subsection 712.1(e) is drafted in permissive, not mandatory,
terms, and it does not require an item of proposed business to first satisfy the criteria
under one of the exceptions in Subsections 712.1(b)-(d). It is a standalone,
remedial exception that permits the agency to correct whatever caused an item of
business to be omitted from the agenda published in accordance with Subsection
709(c.1).
Finally, under Subsection 712.1(f), if an agenda is amended during
an agency meeting and the agency acts on the added items of business, the agency
must publish the amended agenda by the next business day, and the minutes must
reflect “the substance of the matter added, the vote on the addition, and the
announced reasons for the addition.” 65 Pa. C.S. § 712.1(f). Subsection 712.1(f),
by its plain language, is not a prerequisite to official action under Subsections
712.1(b)-(d). It imposes after-the-fact requirements for when an agency both
amends its agenda and takes official action on the amendments, which can only

5
When interpreting statutes, we presume that the General Assembly did not intend absurd
or unreasonable results, and we accordingly must read them “in the light of reason and common
sense.” Vellon v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 292 A.3d 882, 890
(Pa. 2023).

PAM-7
occur through the mechanism in Subsection 712.1(e). Thus, although Subsection
712.1(f) refers to amendments “under this section,” that language can plausibly
reference only Subsection 712.1(e). Where an agency takes official action under
Subsections 712.1(b)-(d), the agency technically need not thereafter comply with
Subsection 712.1(f). That does not mean, however, that there would be no record of
agency action taken under Subsections 712.1(b)-(d). Rather, the action would, as a
matter of course, be reflected in the agency minutes prepared and later approved for
that meeting. See Section 706 of the Sunshine Act, 65 Pa. C.S. § 706.6
Although the Majority acknowledges that we must read a statute to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly as encased in the
statute’s plain language, the Majority nevertheless concludes that the word “or” in
Subsection 712.1(a) is capable of more than one meaning and is, therefore,
ambiguous. (Majority, slip op. at 12.) The Majority bases its conclusion, in large
part, on an academic distinction between “exclusive” and “inclusive” disjunctions,
both of which the Majority concludes could be intended for the word “or” in
Subsection 712.1(a). The Majority then references a small excerpt of legislative
history to interpret “or” to actually mean “and,” which it concludes is necessary to

6
Section 706 provides as follows:
Written minutes shall be kept of all open meetings of agencies. The
minutes shall include:
(1) The date, time and place of the meeting.
(2) The names of members present.
(3) The substance of all official actions and a record by
individual member of the roll call votes taken.
(4) The names of all citizens who appeared officially and the
subject of their testimony.
65 Pa. C.S. § 706 (emphasis added).

PAM-8
further legislative intent and avoid absurd results. Id. But, as shown above, there is
no potential double meaning for “or” in Subsection 712.1(a) if the provisions of
Subsections 712.1(b)-(e) are parsed carefully and interpreted as they are
written. Each serves a distinct purpose, and the intent of the General Assembly in
enacting four separate exceptions to the public notice requirement is, I believe,
manifest.7 Only the interpretation and application of Section 712.1 as it is written,
and not as judicially modified, will express the intent of the General Assembly and
avoid results that could be viewed as absurd and nonsensical.8

7
Even if considered, the legislative history that exists for these amendments to the
Sunshine Act would not resolve any purported ambiguity in Subsection 712.1(a). Notably, the
comments from Senator Stefano quoted by the Majority reference, at most, only the exceptions in
Subsections 712.1(b) and (c). See Majority, slip. op. at 12-13. Senator Stefano refers to emergency
and de minimis matters and makes no reference to the exception in Subsection 712.1(d), which
permits an agency to act on matters raised by attendees at the meeting. This nondescript and
incomplete statement about Senator Stefano’s intention in sponsoring the amendments does not
help us in rightly interpreting the very specific as-enacted language of Subsections 712.1(a)-(e).
Further, there is contrary legislative history from the House State Government
Committee indicating that the amendments to Section 712.1 were intended to provide for four, not
three, exceptions to the agenda publication rule. See Video from the June 22, 2021 House State
Government Committee Meeting, minutes 5:02 to 6:00 (available at
https://www.pahousegop.com/Video/State-Government/Page-7) (last visited November 8, 2023).
The Majority indicates that the Committee “did not clarify” whether the amendments created three
or four exceptions to the agenda publication rule. (Majority, slip. op. at 13-14 n. 11.) However,
the language used to introduce the amendments refers to four exceptions in words far clearer than
those in Senator Stefano’s general comments. In any event, the irreconcilability of these two
pieces of legislative history only further enunciates why we should not, because we need not, resort
to considering it here.

8
The Majority also speculates that Subsection 712.1(e), if interpreted as a standalone
exception, would broadly “swallow” all of the other exceptions, dispense with the purpose of the
Sunshine Act, and, accordingly, lead to an absurd result. (Majority, slip. op. at 14-15.) But
Subsection 712.1(e) contains its own safeguards and requires an agency to comply with a very
specific procedure for amending agendas. Importantly, it provides no mechanism for drafting an
agenda during a meeting. If an agenda is not published in advance in accordance with Subsection
709(c.1), Subsection (e) cannot be utilized by an agency to create one in the first instance at the

PAM-9
 Clearly there are irregularities in how Section 712.1 has been drafted
and enacted by the General Assembly. The Majority offers what otherwise would
be a rational method of creating exceptions to Subsection 709(c.1)’s publication
requirements. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding that the Majority offers an
interpretation reflecting what the General Assembly might have intended, “[i]t is not
unknown for a statute to contain words which are contrary to legislative intent.
Where such text is clear and unambiguous, we are generally not at liberty to overlook
the plain wording in deference to what the [l]egislature clearly meant to say.”
Vellon, 292 A.3d at 894 (Mundy, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original). Accordingly, I would apply Subsections 712.1(a)-(e) of the Sunshine Act
as they are written and conclude that Appellee Parkland School District satisfied the
independent exception to the Subsection 709(c.1) publication requirement as enacted
by the General Assembly in Subsection 712.1(e). Because the District did not
violate the Sunshine Act, I would affirm the trial court in total.

_________________________________
PATRICIA A. MCCULLOUGH, Judge

meeting. The Majority’s fear that agencies would use Subsection 712.1(e) to surreptitiously hold
surprise meetings or meetings with many surprise items of business simply is not justified by
Subsection 712.1(e)’s language.
PAM-10