Mark J. Mueller v. James H. Davis, Individually, James H. Davis D/B/A J.D. Minerals, and JDMI, LLC

ACCEPTED
06-14-00100-CV
SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
TEXARKANA, TEXAS
6/16/2015 10:25:46 AM
DEBBIE AUTREY
CLERK

No. 06-14-00100-CV

_________________________

IN THE SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS June 16, 2015
AT TEXARKANA
__________________________

MARK J. MUELLER,
Appellant

V.

JAMES H. DAVIS, Individually, and
JAMES H. DAVIS D/B/A J. D. MINERALS, and JDMI, LLC.,
Appellee
____________________________

Appealed from the 71st District Court
of Harrison County, Texas

_____________________________

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

_____________________________________________________________________________

BOB WHITEHURST
State Bar No. 21358100
whitehurstlawfirm@yahoo.com
WHITEHURST & WHITEHURST
5380 Old Bullard Road, Suite 600-363
Tyler, Texas 75703
(903) 593-5588
(214) 853-9382 (facsimile)

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

APPELLANT REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT
 IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

In accordance with Rule 38.1(a) of the TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE, Appellant, Mark J. Mueller provides the following list of all parties, and the
names and addresses of all counsel:

Appellant/Plaintiff: Mark J. Mueller

Counsel for Appellant: Bob Whitehurst
State Bar I.D. # 21358100
Whitehurst & Whitehurst
5380 Old Bullard Road, Suite 600-363
Tyler, Texas 75703
Telephone: (903) 593-5588
Facsimile: (903) 297-1992

Appellee/Defendant: James H. Davis, Individually, and James H.
Davis d/b/a J.D. Mineral and JDMI, LLC.

Counsel for Appellee: Douglas D. McLallen
State Bar I.D. # 00788025
1001 Third Street, Ste. 1
Corpus Christi, Texas 78404
Telephone: (361) 884-4981
Facsimile: (361) 884-1286

ii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Identity of Parties and Counsel................................................................................... ii

Table of Contents........................................................................................................ iii

Index of Authorities.................................................................................................... vi

Statement of the Case................................................................................................. x

Issues Presented.......................................................................................................... 7

Issue No. 1: The conveyances are void as a matter of law because the
property descriptions are not legally sufficient pursuant to the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds.

Issue No. 2: It was improper to hold that the Mother Hubbard or “Catch-
all“ clause could convey substantial property interest.

Issue No. 3: A material question of fact remains as to what property was
conveyed.

Issue No. 4: A material question fact remains due to the ambiguity
surrounding the discord over what property was conveyed in the
conveyance..

Issue No. 5: Material questions of fact concerning the possession and
control of the mineral interests exist based upon the discrepancies between
the judicially admitted documents provided by Appellee and the
subsequently sworn Affidavit by Appellee.

Issue No. 6: Questions of material fact concerning the possession and
control of the mineral interests exist based upon the discrepancies between
the official Harrison County documents and the subsequently sworn
Affidavit by Appellee.

Issue No. 7: A material question of fact remains due to the cumulative
nature of Appellee’s prior bad acts.

Statement of Facts...................................................................................................... 1

Summary of the Argument......................................................................................... 8

iii
Argument and Authorities.......................................................................................... 10

1. The conveyances are void as a matter of law because the property
descriptions are not legally sufficient pursuant to the requirements of
the Statute of Frauds....................................................................................... 10

2. It was improper to hold that the Mother Hubbard or “Catch-all”
clause could convey substantial property interest.......................................... 12

3. A material question of fact remains as to what property was
conveyed......................................................................................................... 16

4. A material question fact remains due to the ambiguity surrounding
the discord over what property was conveyed in the lease............................. 18

5. Material questions of fact concerning the possession and control
of the mineral interests exists based upon the discrepancies between
the judicially admitted documents provided by Appellee and the
subsequently sworn Affidavit by Appellee.................................................... 19

6. Material questions of fact concerning the possession and control
of the mineral interests exist based upon the discrepancies between
the official Harrison County documents and the subsequently sworn
Affidavit by Appellee..................................................................................... 23

7. A material question of fact remains due to the cumulative nature
of Appellee’s prior bad acts........................................................................... 24

Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 33

Prayer.......................................................................................................................... 33

Certificate of Compliance........................................................................................... 33

Certificate of Service.................................................................................................. 34

Appendix.................................................................................................................... 35

Deed from Ms. Cope/Mitchell to Appellee................................................................ Tab A

Deed from James H. Mills to Appellee...................................................................... Tab B

iv
Answers to Admissions by Appellee........................................................................... Tab C

Letter to James H. Mills from Appellee about one year term royalty........................ Tab D

Deed from Ms. Cope/Mitchell to Charles B. Horne................................................... Tab E

Deed from Charles B. Horne to Appellant................................................................. Tab F

Letter from Appellee to Ms. Cope/Mitchell withdraw offer...................................... Tab G

Proposal by Appellee to Ms. Cope/Mitchell to convey minerals.............................. Tab H

Letter from Appellee to James H. Mills dated November 26, 2007.......................... Tab I

Wagner & Brown letter.............................................................................................. Tab J

Permission from Ms. Cope/Mitchell to Appellee in 2008......................................... Tab K

Letter to Ms. Cope/Mitchell from Appellee withdrawing offer................................. Tab L

Letter from Appellee claiming 100% of all interest................................................... Tab M

Letter from Wagner & Brown to parties keeping proceeds in suspense.................... Tab N

Deed from James H. Mills to Appellant..................................................................... Tab O

Deed from Charles B. Horne to Appellant................................................................. Tab P

Deed from Ms. Cope/Mitchell to Appellant............................................................... Tab Q

Memo from Appellee that Ms. Cope/Mitchell had sold all her interest..................... Tab R

County Clerk Records regarding conveyance from Cope and Mills.......................... Tab S

Tax documents............................................................................................................ Tab T

Affidavit of Appellee.................................................................................................. Tab U

v
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
AIC Mgmt. v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2008). 10

Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortg. Corp., 74 S.W.3d 444(Tex. App.-- 22
Dallas 2002, no pet.).

Bosque Asset Corp. v. Greenberg, 19 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. App.--Eastland, 16
2000);.

Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W.2d 587 18
(Tex. 1996).

Denton v. Big Spring Hospital Corporation, 998 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. App.-- 17
Eastland 1999 no pet'n).

Dixon v. Amoco Prod. Co., 150 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App.--Tyler 2004, pet. 10, 12
denied).

Douglass v. Texas-Canadian Oil Corp., 141 Tex. 506, 174 S.W.2d 730 12
(1943).

Durbin v. Dal-Briar Corp., 871 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 24
1994, writ denied).

El Chico Corporation v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987). 17

Fears v. Texas Bank, 247 SW3d 729 (App. Texarkana 2008). 11

Grant v. Southwestern Electric Power Company, 20 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. 17
App.--Texarkana, 2000)

J. Hiram Moore, Ltd. v. Greer, 172 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. 2005). 10, 14, 18-19

Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, no 16-17
pet'n).

Jones v. Carver, 59 Tex. 293 (1883). 12

Jones v. Colle, 727 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1987). 14

vi
Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. 1981). 10

Marshall v. Vise, 767 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. 1989). 23

Matney v. Odom, 147 Tex. 26, 210 S.W.2d 980 (1948). 11

McAfee, Inc. v. Agilysys, Inc., 316 S.W.3rd 820 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2010, 16
no pet.).

Mediacomp, Inc. v. Capital Cities Communication, 698 S.W.2d 207, 212 24-25
(Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).

Moon Royalty, Llc, v. Boldrick Partners, 244 S.W.3d 391 (Tex. App.-- 16
Eastland, 2007, no pet.).

Moore v. K Mart Corporation. 981 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 17
1998, no pet'n).

Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. 1972). 10-11

National Farmers Organization v. Smith, 526 S.W.2d 759 (Civ. App.-- 22
Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).

Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985). 16

Pacesetter Corp. v. Barrickman, 885 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1994, 24
no writ).

Peacock v. Schroeder, 846 S.W.2d 905 (Civ. App. San Antonio, 1993). 13

Pfeiffer v. Lindsay, 66 Tex. 123, 1 S.W. 264 (1886). 12

Pick v. Bartel, 659 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. 1983). 10

Reid Road Municipal Utility Dist. No. 2 v. Speedy Stop Food Stores, Ltd., 22
337 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. 2011).

Republic Bankers Life Insurance Co. v. Wisdom, 488 S.W.2d 470 (Civ. 22-23
App.--Fort Worth 1972, ref. n.r.e.).

Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas v. Stetson, 390 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. 1965). 11, 12

vii
Smith v. Allison, 157 Tex. 220, 301 S.W.2d 608 (1956). 13-14, 15, 17

Smith v. Sorelle, 126 Tex. 353, 87 S.W.2d 703 (1935). 12

Stekoll Petroleum Co. v. Hamilton, 152 Tex. 182, 255 S.W.2d 187 (1953). 11

Sun Oil Co. v. Bennett, 125 Tex. 540, 84 S.W.2d 447 (1935). 13, 14

Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549, 84 S.W.2d 442 (1935). 13

Tidwell v. Cheshier, 153 Tex. 194, 265 S.W.2d 568 (1954). 11

Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150 (1945). 11

Windsor v. Loyd, 191 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App.--Texarkana 1945, writ 13
ref'd).

RULES

Vernon’s Texas Codes Annotated, Business and Commerce Code, Section 8, 10
26.01

Vernon’s Texas Codes Annotated, Texas Property Code Section 13.001(b) 22

TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a 16

TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.7 9, 22, 25

TEX. R. CIV. P 198 22

TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 404(b) 9, 24

TEX. R. EVID. 406 24

TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(2) 22

Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 12.001 et. seq. 4

Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 37.001, et. seq. 4

1 H. Williams & C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law §221 (1992). 13

viii
 No. 06-14-00100-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT TEXARKANA

MARK J. MUELLER
Appellant

v.

JAMES H. DAVIS, Individually, JAMES H. DAVIS D/B/A J.D. MINERALS AND JDMI, LLC.

Appellee

ON APPEAL FROM
ST
THE 71 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
HARRISON COUNTY, TEXAS

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS:

Appellant, Mark J. Mueller files this Brief of Appellant. In this brief, Appellant will be

referred to as Appellant. Appellee James H. Davis, individually, James H. Davis d/b/a J.D.

Minerals and JDMI, LLC will be referred to as Appellee. The 2015 Clerk’s Record will be

referenced as “(CLR”), being the Clerk’s Record Volume 1, Supplemental 2(A). The

Supplemental Clerks’ Record will be referenced as “(Supp. CLR)”, being the Clerk’s Record

Supplemental 1(A).

ix
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the case:
This case arises from a suit to quiet title to certain oil and gas properties, by Appellant
Mark J. Mueller, located in Harrison County, Texas. This is an appeal from a summary
judgment granted in favor of Appellee James H. Davis Individually, and James H. Davis
Individually, and d/b/a J. D. Minerals and JDMI, LLC. Appellant Mark J. Mueller owns
said properties as a result of conveyances from James Hammond Mills, Charles Horne,
and Virginia Mills Mitchell Cope. (CLR at 30, Tab O, CLR at 34, Tab P, and CLR at 38,
Tab Q) Appellee is claiming title through a Mother Hubbard Clause (catch-all clause),
found in small print in alleged conveyances in 1991. (CLR at 18, Tab A, and CLR at 21,
Tab B)

Trial Court:
71st Judicial District Court of Harrison County, Texas, Cause No. 11-0858, the Honorable
Judge Brad Morin presiding.

Disposition:
Trial court granted summary judgment to Appellee, shortly before trial.

Requested Relief on Appeal:
Appellant asks this court to reverse the trial court’s summary judgment and render
judgment in favor of Appellant on the basis that the Mother Hubbard Clause (catch-all
clause) is only meant to convey small strips of adjoining property pursuant to J. Hiram
Moore, Ltd. v. Greer, 172 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex. 2005). In the alternative, Appellant
asks this court to reverse the trial court’s Summary Judgment and render judgment in
favor of Appellant on the basis that the conveyances do not comply with the Statue of
Frauds. In the alternative, Appellant request the court to reverse the trial court’s summary
judgment and remand the trial court on the basis that there are issues of fact to be
decided by the trier of fact.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

Pursuant to the provisions of TEX. R. APP. P. 39, Appellant Mueller hereby requests oral

argument of this cause. Appellant believes that oral argument will be useful to the Court of

Appeals in explaining the issues that have been raised.

x
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about September 25, 1991, Virginia Rose Mitchell executed that certain Mineral

and Royalty Conveyance, as grantor, to J. D. Minerals as grantee, recorded in Volume 1287,

Page 331 of the Deed Records of the County Clerk's Office in Harrison County, Texas. (CLR at

18, Tab A) Appellee has admitted that this conveyance does not contain a metes and bounds

description, and does not contain a volume and page reference to a prior document that was filed

in the County Clerk’s office of Harrison County, Texas. (CLR at 845, 851, No. 34 and No. 35,

Tab C)

On or about October 6, 1991, James Hammond Mills executed that certain Mineral and

Royalty Conveyance, as grantor, to J. D. Minerals as grantee, recorded in Volume 1287, Page

530 of the Deed Records of the County Clerk's Office in Harrison County, Texas. (CLR at 21,

Tab B) Appellee has admitted that this conveyance does not contain a metes and bounds

description, and does not contain a volume and page reference to a prior document that was filed

in the County Clerk’s office of Harrison County, Texas. (CLR at 845, 851, No. 34 and No. 35).

On December 10, 1991, Appellee, sent a certified letter to James Hammond Mills, stating in part

“as agreed, enclosed please find a Bank Money Order in the amount of $55.00 as consideration

for a year primary term Royalty Conveyance. . . .” (CLR at 1132, Tab D) Appellee has admitted

that this document was sent. (CLR 845, 849, Tab C, No. 19)

On or about October 1, 1994, Virginia Rose Mills Cope executed that certain Mineral

Deed, as grantor, to Charles B. Horne as grantee, recorded in Volume 1373, Page 285 of the

Deed Records of the County Clerk's Office in Harrison County, Texas. (CLR at 24, Tab E)

On or about December 2, 1996, Charles B. Horne executed that certain Mineral Deed, as

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
1 of 35
grantor, to Mark J. Mueller as grantee, recorded in Volume 1586, Page 339 of the Deed Records

of the County Clerk's Office in Harrison County, Texas. (CLR at 27, Tab F)

On June 16, 2005, Appellee forwards correspondence to Virginia Rose Mills Cope,

stating in part “upon further review of title, we have found you have previously sold this interest

to another party. Therefore at this time we are retracting our offer and will not be resubmitting

another offer to you.” (CLR 358, Tab G) Appellee has admitted that this document was sent.

(CLR 845, 848, Tab C, No. 9)

On November 21, 2005, Appellee forwards correspondence to Virginia Mills Cope

regarding the purchase of mineral or royalty interest, and a conditional draft. (CLR 359, Tab H)

Appellee has admitted that this document was sent. (CLR 845, 849, Tab C, No. 10)

On November 26, 2007, Appellee forwards correspondence to James Hammond Mills

withdrawing an offer to purchase certain mineral and royalties interest due to an error. (CLR 364,

Tab I) Appellee has admitted that this document was sent. (CLR 845, 850, Tab C, No. 22)

On or about May 9, 2008, Appellant received a letter from Wagner Brown, Ltd., placing

his interest in certain minerals in suspense. (CLR at 932, Tab J)

On September 15, 2008, Virginia Rose Mills Cope was forwarded a document giving

Appellee permission to obtain any information as to all the mineral and royalties she owned in

Harrison County, Texas. (CLR 361, Tab K). Appellee has admitted that this document was sent.

(CLR 845, 849, Tab C, No. 14)

On October 31, 2008, Appellee withdraws its offer pay Virginia Rose Mills Cope,

$7,250.00. (CLR 362, Tab L) Appellee has admitted that this document was sent. (CLR 845,

849, Tab C, No. 16)

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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 On February 23, 2011, Appellee sent out a letter to Appellant and others that he had

purchased 100% of all the interest in Harrison County, Texas of Virginia Rose Mitchell and

James Hammond Mills. (CLR at 356, Tab M)

On or about March 2, 2011, Appellant received a letter from Wagner Brown, Ltd., stating

that they had concerns about the construction of the deed as to the Mother Hubbard clause. (CLR

at 938, Tab N)

On or about May 26, 2011, James Hammond Mills executed that certain Mineral and

Royalty Deed, as grantor, to Mark J. Mueller as grantee, recorded in 2011-000006112 of the

Deed Records of the County Clerk's Office in Harrison County, Texas. (CLR at 30, Tab O)

On or about June 29, 2011, Charles B. Horne executed that certain Mineral Deed, as

grantor, to Mark J. Mueller as grantee, Said purpose being to clarify any illegible print in the

document recorded in Volume 1586, Page 339, recorded in 2011-000007507 of the Deed

Records of the County Clerk's Office in Harrison County, Texas. (CLR at 34, Tab P)

On or about July 1, 2011, Virginia Rose Mills Cope, a/k/a Virginia Rose Mitchell a/k/a

Virginia Rose Purvis Cope, executed that certain Mineral and Royalty Deed, as grantor, to Mark

J. Mueller as grantee, recorded in 2011-000007941 of the Deed Records of the County Clerk's

Office in Harrison County, Texas. (CLR at 38, Tab Q)

On July 19, 2011, Appellee prepared a document stating in part, “it doesn’t really matter

because she sold all her interest to another company.” (CLR at 363, Tab R) Appellee has

admitted that this document was sent. (CLR 845, 849, Tab C, No. 15)

Appellant initiated the action against Appellee on October 12, 2011, as a Suit to Quiet

Title, relating to oil and gas properties that Virginia Rose Mitchell and James Hammond Mills

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
3 of 35
had conveyed to Appellant. (CLR at 12)

Appellant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on July 20, 2012. (CLR at 366)

Appellee filed his Motion for Summary Judgment and Objection to Plaintiff’s Summary

Judgment Evidence on or about July 30, 2012. (CLR at 392)

Appellant filed his Third Amended Original Petition on August 10, 2012. (CLR at 638)

Appellant filed his Response to Motion for Summary Judgment on or about August 23,

2012. (CLR at 868)

Appellant filed his Supplemental Response to Motion for Summary Judgment on

February 11, 2013 (CLR at 969), along with the Motion for Leave to File Supplemental

Response to Motion for Summary Judgment. (CLR at 974)

Appellant filed his Second Supplemental Response to Motion for Summary Judgment on

or about March 25, 2013(CLR at 981), along with the Motion for Leave to File Second

Supplemental Response to Motion for Summary Judgment. (CLR at 978)

Appellant filed his Third Supplemental Response to Motion for Summary Judgment on

April 15, 2013. (CLR at 997)

Appellee filed his Supplemental Motion for Traditional and No-evidence Motion for

Summary Judgment and Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Evidence,

on or about April 18, 2013. (CLR at 1015)

Appellant filed his First Supplemental Petition on May 20, 2013. (CLR at 1110)

Appellee filed his Second Partial Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s

Declaratory Judgment Claim, Claims under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section

37.001, et. seq. and 12.001 et. seq., and Attorneys’ Fees thereunder or Alternatively, Motion in

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
4 of 35
Limine on May 16, 2013. (CLR at 1156)

Appellee filed his Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Second Motion for

Summary Judgment on May 23, 2013. (CLR at 1193)

Appellee filed his Counterclaim against Appellant on June 3, 2013. (CLR at 1252)

Appellant filed his Answer and Special Exceptions to Counterclaim on June 10, 2013

(CLR at 1273)

The Court denied Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Appellant’s

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on September 10, 2013. (CLR at 1295)

Appellee filed his Second Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to

Reconsider on September 4, 2014. (CLR at 1796)

Appellant filed his Amended Answer and Special Exception to Counterclaim by

Defendant on September 5, 2014. (CLR at 1628)

Appellant filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on Counterclaim on September 16,

2014. (CLR at 1676-1684, CLR SUPP 5-44)

Appellant filed his Second Amended Answer and Special Exception to Counterclaim on

September 16, 2014. (CLR at 1685-1693)

Appellant filed his Response to Defendant’s Second Supplemental Motion for Summary

Judgment and Motion to Reconsider on September 22, 2014. (CLR at 1695-1771)

Appellant filed Notice of Business Record Affidavit on September 25, 2014. (CLR at

1902)

Appellant filed his Fourth Amended Petition on September 26, 2014. (CLR at 1927, CLR

SUPP at 223-288)

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
5 of 35
 Appellee filed his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Limitations Subject to

Appellee’s Motion to Strike Plea in Intervention on September 27, 2014. (CLR at 1939)

Appellant filed his Supplemental Response to Motion for Summary Judgment on October

1, 2014 (CLR at 2023, CLR SUPP at 45-51), along with the Motion for Leave to File

Supplemental Response to Motion for Summary Judgment. (CLR at 2021)

Appellant filed his Second Supplemental Response to Motion for Summary Judgment on

October 2, 2014 (CLR at 2026, CLR SUPP at 53-58), along with the Motion for Leave to File

Second Supplemental Response to Motion for Summary Judgment. (CLR at 2028)

Appellee filed his Motion to Shorten Time for Plaintiff and Intervenor to Respond to

Motion for Summary Judgment on Statute of Limitation on October 3, 2014. (CLR at 2031) The

date requested for the hearing being October 10, 2014. (CLR at 2032)

Appellee filed his Objections to Appellant Late Filed Summary Judgment Response

Attached to the Second Supplemental Response on October 3, 2014. (CLR at 2034)

Appellee filed his response to Appellant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on

Counterclaim on or about October 3, 2014. (CLR at 2041)

The trial court granted Final Summary Judgment for Appellee on October 8, 2014. (CLR

at 2064)

Appellant filed his Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Limitations on

October 9, 2014. (CLR at 2070, SUPP CLR at 59-136)

Appellant filed his Motion for Rehearing and Motion for New Trial on October 20, 2014.

(CLR at 2116, SUPP CLR at 289-388)

Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on December 17, 2014. (CLR at 2137)

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
6 of 35
 ISSUES PRESENTED

Issue No. 1: The conveyances are void as a matter of law because the property descriptions are
not legally sufficient pursuant to the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.

Issue No. 2: It was improper to hold that the Mother Hubbard or “Catch-all“ clause could
convey substantial property interest.

Issue No. 3: A material question of fact remains as to what property was conveyed.

Issue No. 4: A material question fact remains due to the ambiguity surrounding the discord
over what property was conveyed in the lease.

Issue No. 5: Material questions of fact concerning the possession and control of the mineral
interests exists based upon the discrepancies between the judicially admitted
documents provided by Appellee and the subsequently sworn Affidavit by
Appellee.

Issue No. 6: Material questions of fact concerning the possession and control of the mineral
interests exist based upon the discrepancies between the official Harrison County
documents and the subsequently sworn Affidavit by Appellee.

Issue No. 7: A material question of fact remains due to the cumulative nature of Appellee’s
prior bad acts.

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
7 of 35
 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

According to Section 26.01, of the Business and Commerce Code, Vernon’s Texas Codes

Annotated, the Statute of Frauds (formerly Art. 3995), property descriptions must contain

adequate information so that the identity of the property conveyed can be reasonably ascertained.

During the oil boom of the 1930's, in order to cover small strips of land which were inadvertently

left out of property descriptions in both oil and gas leases and mineral and royalty deeds.

Conveyances began to include a blanket conveyance clause, commonly referred to as the ‘Mother

Hubbard Clause.’ According to Texas case law, the inherent or specific purpose of the Mother

Hubbard Clause is to prevent the leaving of small unleased pieces or strips of land, which may

exist without the knowledge of one or both of the parties by reason of incorrect surveying,

careless location of fences, or other mistakes. The use of a general and vague ‘catch-all’ phrases

to include larger tracts of land is not upheld. In the documents Appellee prepared, hidden in

small print at the end of a paragraph, he used a sweeping reference which he claims conveyed

title to all the oil and gas properties that Ms. Cope and Mr. Mills owned in Harrison County,

Texas. Appellant asserts that the language in question was meant to convey only small strips of

land, and not the large tracts of land now claimed by Appellee. The trial court improperly held

that the documents in question conveyed all of Grantors’ mineral interests in Harrison County.

The court erred when it did not hold that the conveyances from Ms. Cope and Mr. Mills

to Appellee in 1991, which do not contain legally sufficient property descriptions, are void as a

matter of law. The Appellee has admitted in admissions that the conveyances do not contain a

metes and bound description, nor a Volume and Page reference to a prior document that was filed

in County Clerk’s office of Harrison County, Texas. According to the Statute of Frauds, these

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
8 of 35
deeds are void as a matter of law.

Additional language in the conveyances themselves, stating that “Grantor agrees to

execute any supplemental instrument requested by Grantee for a more complete description of

said land” reflects there never was an intent to convey all of Cope and Mills interest.

The documents that were produced in discovery are self authenticating under rule 193.7

of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and raise a question of fact for the trier of fact, since these

documents indicate that Appellee did not own the minerals in Harrison County, Texas.

The trial court should not have granted Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgement

because a question of fact remains as to the issue of whether Appellee ever had possession of the

mineral interests. Although Appellant now claims ownership of all mineral interests, there is

substantial evidence that Ms. Cope and Mr. Mills had retained ownership for more than twenty

years. The evidence was provided in the form of official tax records and numerous mineral

leases and other conveyances signed by Cope and Mills. Other documents include

correspondence from the Appellee seeking to buy and/or lease other minerals interests from Cope

and Mills.

The trial court improperly refused to consider the evidence of Appellee’s prior bad acts.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 404(b) permits the admission of evidence of the habit of a person,

or of the routine practice of an organization, if the evidence is relevant to prove that the conduct

of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine

practice. In his Responses to Admissions, Appellee admitted to the existence of numerous prior

bad acts. These acts reveal that Appellee had a pattern of questionable business dealings.

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
9 of 35
 ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

This case on appeal involves both questions of law for the trial court and material

questions of fact for the trier of fact. The first two issues concern questions of law. First,

whether the trial court decided the legal sufficiency of the property descriptions found in the

conveyances as required by the Statute of Frauds. Second, whether the trial court, followed

proper legal precedence when it considered the application of the Mother Hubbard clause. The

remaining issues involve questions of fact concerning the consideration and admissibility of prior

bad acts and the actual possession of the mineral interests.

I.
As a matter of law, the conveyances are void because the property
descriptions are not legally sufficient pursuant to the requirements of the
Statute of Frauds.

According to Section 26.01, of the Business and Commerce Code, Vernon’s Texas Codes

Annotated, the Statute of Frauds (formerly Art. 3995), property descriptions must contain

adequate information so that the identity of the property conveyed can be reasonable ascertained.

An instrument conveying land must contain a legally sufficient description or the instrument is

void under the statute of frauds. Dixon v. Amoco Prod. Co., 150 S.W.3d 191, 194 (App.--Tyler

2004, pet. denied) It is well established that in order for a property description to be held legally

sufficient “the writing furnishes within itself or by reference to some other writing, the means or

data to identify the particular land to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty.”

AIC Mgmt. v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. 2008) See also, Pick v. Bartel, 659 S.W.2d

636, 637 (Tex.1983); Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Tex. 1981) (citing Morrow v.

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Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. 1972); Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150, 152

(1945).

The purpose of a written land description is not merely to identify the property, but also

to provide an actual means of identification. Fears v. Texas Bank, 247 SW3d 729, 736 (App.

Texarkana 2008) The Fears court held that, “The legal description in the conveyance must not

only furnish enough information to locate the general area, as in identifying it by tract survey and

county, it need contain information regarding the size, shape, and boundaries.” Id. P.736; See

also, Morrow, 477 S.W.2d at 539; Matney v. Odom, 147 Tex. 26, 210 S.W.2d 980, 982 (1948)

The conveyances subject to this appeal contain the following statement, “Grantor hereby conveys

to Grantee all of the minerals, royalty, overriding royalty interest owned by Grantor in Harrison

County, whether or not same is herein above correctly described.” (CLR at 18, Tab A and CLR at

21, Tab B) Established case law provides us with examples of legally insufficient property

descriptions. In each of the following cases, cited in Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas v. Stetson,

390 S.W.2d 257, 263 (Tex. 1965), the property descriptions were held to be insufficient to satisfy

the Statute of Frauds because they did not furnish the means to identify the land:

"the following described property lying and situated in the County of Ellis, State of
Texas, being approximately 154.63 acres of land in Ellis County, Texas, in two tracts,
being out of the Benjamin Monroe Survey, W. J. Ely Survey, F. E. Witherspoon
Survey" Tidwell v. Cheshier, 153 Tex. 194, 265 S.W.2d 568 (1954);

"4,000 of the 5,000 acre block No. 2 hereinabove referred to, said 4,000 acres to be
selected by Buyer leaving Sellers 1,000 acres equitably checkerboarded . . ." Stekoll
Petroleum Co. v. Hamilton, 152 Tex. 182, 255 S.W.2d 187 (1953);

"four (4) acres out of the East end of a ten-acre block on the P. Chireno Survey about 2
miles East from the courthouse of the city of Tyler, Smith County, Texas, located on the
North side of the Kilgore highway." Matney v. Odom, 147 Tex. 26, 210 S.W.2d 980,
982 (1948);

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 "37.1 acres of land in Wood County, Texas," Douglass v. Texas--Canadian Oil Corp.,
141 Tex. 506, 174 S.W.2d 730 (1943);

"100 acres out of Blocks 8 and 9 of the subdivision of Jose Maria Pineda Survey, which
was patented to Adolphus Stern . . ." Smith v. Sorelle, 126 Tex. 353, 87 S.W.2d 703
(1935);

"fifty acres of the J. M. Moss survey, abstract No. 462, situated near the town of
Burlington, in Montague County, Texas" Pfeiffer v. Lindsay, 66 Tex. 123, 1 S.W. 264
(1886); and,

"a piece of land supposed to be forty acres" Jones v. Carver, 59 Tex. 293 (1883).

The property descriptions subject to this appeal are not specific and are even less descriptive

than the preceding descriptions. If a conveyance of an interest in real property does not

sufficiently describe the land to be conveyed, it is void and unenforceable under the statute of

frauds, Stetson, at 261. The descriptions are legally insufficient and the conveyances are void

as a matter of law. The sufficiency of the legal description in any instrument transferring a

property interest is a question of law and subject to a de novo review. Dixon v. Amoco Prod.

Co., at 194.

This Honorable Court should reverse and render judgment in favor of Appellant, in that

as a matter of law the conveyances are void under the statute of frauds.

II.
The trial court erred when it held that the Mother Hubbard or “Catch-all“
clause could convey substantial property interest.

During the oil boom of the 1930's, in order to cover small strips of land which were

inadvertently left out of property descriptions in oil and gas leases, mineral and royalty deeds,

and other documents began to include a blanket conveyance clause, commonly referred to as

the ‘Mother Hubbard Clause.’ Texas courts have continued to uphold the validity of Mother

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Hubbard clauses but only as they pertain to small adjacent strips. The court in Peacock v.

Schroeder, 846 S.W.2d 905, 911 (Civ. App. San Antonio, 1993) affirmed the long line of

decisions when it held, “The purpose of a Mother Hubbard, or catch-all, clause is merely to

prevent the leaving of small unleased pieces or strips of land . . . which may exist without the

knowledge of one or both of the parties by reason of incorrect surveying, careless location of

fences, or other mistake." Sun Oil Co. v. Bennett, 125 Tex. 540, 84 S.W.2d 447, 452 (1935);

See also, 1 H. Williams & C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 221 (1992). These clauses make

evident the intention of the grantor to include within the lease not only the land described by

metes and bounds, but also any adjoining land mistakenly excluded. Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125

Tex. 549, 84 S.W.2d 442, 444 (1935); Windsor v. Loyd, 191 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. Civ. App.-

-Texarkana 1945, writ ref'd) In a letter dated March 2, 2011(CLR at 938, Tab N) Wagoner &

Brown, the oil and gas producer of the mineral interests subject to this appeal, wrote that even

after consulting an independent law firm, they continued to have concerns regarding the

validity of the conveyance. The letter stated that the vague descriptions did not properly

identify or describe the land. It also stated that the wording that conveyed all interests in

Harrison County was not adequate to do so “since the courts have held that Mother Hubbard

Clauses which are in fine print, may only apply to small adjacent strips.” (CLR at 938, Tab N)

It is a well-established tenet that a Mother Hubbard clause is not intended to be used to an

interest that is not adequately described in the conveyance. In Smith v. Allison, 157 Tex. 220,

301 S.W.2d 608, 611 (1956), the court held that a deed was considered ambiguous when a

“catch-all” clause conveyed a substantially greater interest than the specific grant and when the

amount paid for that conveyance appeared to relate only to the mineral interest specifically

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described. Accordingly, the court noted that "the deed under question contain[ed] material

inconsistent provisions that render[ed] it uncertain as to the property conveyed." Id at 612.

This rule effectively prohibiting such "cover-all" clauses from conveying substantial property

interest continues to be affirmed by the courts. In Jones v. Colle, 727 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex.

1987) the court upheld the longstanding position that “a Mother Hubbard clause would only

serve to cover property not described in the deed when the other property consists of small

unleased piece or strips of land which may exist without the knowledge of one or both of the

parties.” Id at 263. Referring back to the 1935 case of Sun Oil Co. v. Bennett, [125 Tex. 540]

84 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. 1935) the court in Colle reiterated:

We have found no other case in which this Court has applied any other rule or has
construed such a clause to convey large bodies of land in addition to that
specifically described and surely not so where the clause was held to convey
considerably more land than that specifically described.

In J. Hiram Moore, Ltd. v. Greer, 172 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. 2005) the court continued to affirm its

prior rulings that “catch-all” language could not in effect convey substantial interests in

property not appropriately described in a conveyance. The Greer court, citing Colle, ruled that:

“the longstanding rule in Texas that a [catch-all] clause, like the one at issue
here, can only convey small interests that are clearly contemplated within the
more particularly described conveyance, and they are not effective to convey a
significant property interest not adequately described in the deed or clearly
contemplated by the language of the conveyance.” Greer at 613

The fact situation in Greer is analogous to the case now before this court. As in Greer, Mr.

Mills and Ms. Cope contend they had no intention of conveying all of the property interest

(CLR at 971 and 983) now claimed by Appellee by virtue of the Mother Hubbard language

(catch-all language) (CLR at 394) In both his Motion for Summary Judgment (CLR at 392)

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and his Second Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment (CLR at 1796), Appellee argued

that the Mother Hubbard clause entitled him to all the property interest he now claims. In the

conveyances, this cover all language is found in extremely small print and states “Grantor

hereby conveys to Grantee all of the minerals, royalty, overriding royalty interest owned by

Grantor in Harrison County, whether or not same is herein above correctly described.” (CLR at

18, Tab A and CLR at 21, Tab B) The belief that a Mother Hubbard clause can convey a

substantial interest is erroneous, especially when the conveyance in question contains property

descriptions. The argument found in the concurring opinion of Justice McCall in Smith v.

Allison at 616, is especially instructive in our case. Justice McCall wrote:

When such a "Mother Hubbard" provision is used alone in an instrument, it
conveys all the land owned by the grantor within the designated survey, county,
city or other area. But when such a provision follows the description of a specific
tract or tracts, it is ordinarily the purpose of such provision to bring within the
conveyance small strips of land bordering the described tract or tracts which may
not be included because of faulty description or may have been acquired by adverse
possession. Under these circumstances the "Mother Hubbard" provision should be
considered as supplemental to the specific description of the particular tract which
is the primary subject of the conveyance, and such provision should not be
regarded as an independent description of any tract wholly separate and distinct
from the particularly described tract unless the parties have clearly indicated in the
instrument that such was their intention.

Not only does Appellee rely upon the mistaken premise that the Mother Hubbard Clause can

convey large interests but he also attempted to use the small print and language to secure a

greater interest than that what was conveyed, which is impermissible.

The prevailing view that a Mother Hubbard clause should only serve to cover property

not described in the deed when that omitted property consists of small unleased pieces or strips

of land which may exist without the knowledge of one or both of the parties. Using it

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otherwise is in violation of this well established course of law.

This Honorable Court should reverse and render judgment in favor of Appellant, in that

pursuant to the case law set forth above the Mother Hubbard/catch all/blanket clause was not

meant to convey large tracts of land.

III.
There is a material question fact as to what property was conveyed.

Appellant and Appellee disagree over what mineral interests were conveyed. Appellee

argues that Cope and Mills conveyed everything they owned in Harrison County; however,

Appellants argue that was never their intent. The trial court erred when it granted Appellee’s

Motion for Summary Judgement because a question of fact exists. The standard for review for

a summary judgment is well established. See Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2nd 546,

548 (Tex. 1985); McAfee, Inc. v. Agilysys, Inc., 316 S.W.3rd 820, 825 (Tex. App.--Dallas

2010, no pet.). In deciding whether a disputed material fact exists precluding summary

Judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true. Id, 690. When reviewing

the issues presented, the appellate court "must consider all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmovant, indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant, and

determine whether the movant proved that there were no genuine issues of material fact and

that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Moon Royalty, Llc, v. Boldrick Partners,

244 S.W.3d 391, 393-94 (Tex. App.-- Eastland, 2007, no pet.), (citing Nixon v. Mr. Prop.

Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) The standard of review for TEX. R. CIV P. 166a(i) is

one in which the court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and

disregarded all contrary evidence. Bosque Asset Corp. v. Greenberg, 19 S.W.3d 514 (Tex.

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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App.--Eastland, 2000); Grant v. Southwestern Electric Power Company, 20 S.W.3d 764 (Tex.

App.--Texarkana, 2000); Denton v. Big Spring Hospital Corporation, 998 S.W.2d 294 (Tex.

App.--Eastland 1999 no pet'n); Moore v. K Mart Corporation. 981 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. App.--

San Antonio 1998, no pet'n); Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. --Austin 1998,

no pet'n). The courts accept as true evidence in favor of the nonmovant and indulge every

reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmovant. El Chico Corporation

v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987) Evidence is apparent that there is a disputed material

fact as to what land, if any was actually conveyed.

First, as set out in the affidavits of Mr. Mills and Ms. Cope, it was never their intent to

convey everything they owned in the county. (CLR at 971 and 983) Second, the conveyances

themselves reflect that there never was an agreement to convey all the interests of Mills/Cope

to Appellee. The conveyances found at (CLR at 18 and CLR at 21), state in part “Grantor

agrees to execute any supplemental instrument requested by Grantee for a more complete

description of said land.” If it was not the intent of the parties to convey only what they had

specifically described, why would they have included a provision like this? In the alternative,

if they had intended to convey everything they owned, a provision requesting supplementation

would have been superfluous. In reference to a similar provision, the court in Smith v. Allison,

at 618, asks, “How would the need for the correction of the particular description ever come

about if the parties did not intend to contract only with respect to the lands particularly

described?”

A question of fact remains concerning the existence of an agreement to convey all the

interest of Appellant to Appellee and this Honorable Court should remand the case to the trial

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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court for a trial on the facts.

IV.
A question of fact remains due to the ambiguity surrounding the dispute
over what property was conveyed in the conveyance.

The parties disagree as to what the legal description is of the land conveyed. The

conveyances before this court contain traditional property descriptions that are found following

the words, “All of those certain tracts or parcels of land out of the following surveys in Harrison

County, Texas described as follows: . .. .” Typically, the property descriptions follow

immediately after this wording. In this case, the deeds follow customary practice and reference

several sections of land. There is also a modified Mother Hubbard clause. In addition to the basic

clause, Appellee included the words “Grantor hereby conveys to Grantor all of the mineral,

royalty, and overriding royalty interest owned by Grantor in Harrison County, whether or not same

is herein above correctly described.” (CLR at 18, Tab A and CLR at 21, Tab B) The latter

description contains a substantially greater interest in property. Rather than refining the primary

property descriptions, the Mother Hubbard clause has added a conflicting property description.

According to Appellee, the documents only contain one property description, which is located in

the Mother Hubbard clause and it conveys total interest in Harrison County. He also claims it was

the intent of the Grantors to convey their entire interest in Harrison County. However, Mr. Mills

and Ms. Cope stated in their affidavits that it was not their intent to convey everything they owned

in the county. (CLR at 971 and 983) If a deed is subject to two or more reasonable

interpretations, it is ambiguous. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940

S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. 1996) The proper use of the “catch-all” language which Appellee relies

upon was discussed supra. (Referencing J. Hiram Moore, Ltd. v. Greer) The court indicated that

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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if there is an ambiguity, then a jury should hear evidence and determine the intent of the parties.

Greer, at 614. In addition, it is odd that the controlling property description would be buried

amongst legal jargon in small print, rather be located in large print at the top center of the

document. Obviously, a question exists as to which is the proper land description.

The trial court erred in granting Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgement because it is

unclear as to what property was actually conveyed; thereby a question of fact remains. The case

should be reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits.

V.
Questions of material fact exist concerning the actual possession and control of
the mineral interests based upon the discrepancies between the judicially
admitted documents provided by Appellee and the subsequently sworn
Affidavit by Appellee.

Several questions of material fact were raised by the documents produced by the Appellee

during the discovery process and the affidavit executed by James H. Davis. (CLR 463-466) In

Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgement, Davis claimed that “JD Minerals and/or JDMI, LLC

has been in actual, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile and adverse possession of interests made the

basis of this lawsuit, claiming under deeds registered since 1991.” (CLR 465) In other words,

Appellee swore under oath, in an Affidavit, that he had complete possession of the interests since

1991.

Noteworthy is Exhibit “A” of the Declaration of Unit, Moore # 1 Gas Unit which listed the

names of the individuals included in said unit. (CLR at 916-918) On the third page of the

document, it specifies: 1)the name of James Hammond Mills who leased to W. M. Beasley, Jr. on

October 3, 1999; and, the name of Virginia Rose Mitchell Cope who also leased to W. M.

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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Beasley, Jr. on October 18, 1999. (CLR at 918) This Declaration of Unit stated in part,

“Winchester Production Company et al is the owner of the legal and/or equitable and beneficial

title to oil, gas and mineral leases . . . .” (CLR at 916) This Unit of Declaration was produced by

Appellee in his Response to Discovery is Bates stamped: DAVIS 92, 93, 94. (CLR at 916-918)

This document affirmatively listed Mills and Cope as mineral owners which controverts the

statement that Appellee had total possession of the mineral interests.

On February 23, 2011, Appellee sent out a letter to several individuals including

Appellant, stating in part “JD Minerals purchased 100% of all the interest located in Harrison

County, Texas held in the names of Dan G. Capers, Virginia Rose Mitchell, and James Hammon

Mills.” (CLR at 356, Tab M) At that time, Appellee failed to disclose certain crucial facts

concerning the true ownership of the mineral interest. For instance, Appellee did not reveal that

he had sent a letter on June 16, 2005 to Virginia Rose Mills Cope a/k/a Virginia Rose Mitchell

informing her that they were withdrawing their offer to pay $250.00 per net mineral acre, because

upon further review of the title, they found that she had previously sold her interest to another

party. (CLR 358, Tab G) At that time, Appellee also failed to disclose that he had sent a letter to

Virginia Rose Mills Cope a/k/a Virginia Rose Mitchell on November 21, 2005, “offering to buy

her mineral or royalty interest by identifying your interest, preparing the paperwork and paying

you up front.” (CLR 359, 360, Tab H) Attached to the November 21, 2005 letter was a

Conditional Draft in the amount of $45.00. A closer review of this document reveals that, “This

draft is drawn to pay for that certain Universal, County-Wide Sale, Conveyance and Assignment

of Mineral and Royalty Interests (the “Conveyance”), covering all of Grantor’s royalty interests in

HARRISON County, Texas.” (CLR 359, Tab H) Enclosed with this letter was a document

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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entitled “Universal County-Wide Sale, Conveyance, and Assignment of Mineral and Royalty

Interests. This document specified that it included “all (100%) of the oil, gas and other minerals,

in, on and under, and may be produced, severed, sold and/or marketed from any and all lands”

which included all mineral interests and royalty interests. (CLR 360, Tab H) The first document,

to the landowner, states it is a royalty interest and the second document, to be filed with the

County Clerk, claims it is a mineral and royalty interest. This is exactly the pattern and practice

that Appellee has used over the years. Note the letter and draft are both signed by James H.

Davis.

In the letter of February 23, 2011, and at times subsequent, Appellee also failed to disclose

that they had sent several other documents to Virginia Rose Mills Cope a/k/a Virginia Rose

Mitchell indicating that Appellee was operating under the belief that she still owned mineral

interests in Harrison County, Texas:

Letter/form dated September 15, 2008, asking permission to obtain information as to
all the mineral and royalty interest she owned in Harrison County, Texas. (CLR at 361,
Tab K);

Letter dated October 31, 2008, withdrew Appellee’s offer to pay $7,260.00. Stating, “in
reviewing title information, JDMI, L.L.C. found you have sold your mineral and royalty
interest prior to date.” (CLR at 362, Tab L); and,

Letter dated July 19, 2011, admitting knowledge that she had already sold all her interest
already to another company. (CLR at 363, Tab R)

In the letter of February 23, 2011, Appellee also failed to disclose that on November 26, 2007,

they had sent a letter to James Hammond Mills stating they were purchasing his interest for

$4,817.43. (CLR 364, Tab I) These documents indicate that Appellee thought Cope and Mills

retained possession and control of their mineral interests in Harrison County.

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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 The documents set forth in Tab G, H, I, K, L, and R are all unrecorded instruments

because they were not filed with the County Clerk’s Office in Harrison County, Texas. Section

13.001(b) of the Texas Property Code, in regards to Validity of Unrecorded Instrument, states,

“The unrecorded instrument is binding on a party to the instrument, on the party's heirs, and on a

subsequent purchaser who does not pay a valuable consideration or who has notice of the

instrument.”

Appellee may argue that the above documents are not proper unrecorded instruments;

however, said documents were produced in discovery by the Appellee. Note the bate stamp at the

bottom of the document. A party’s production of a document in response to written discovery

authenticates the document for use against that party in any pretrial proceeding or at trial. See,

Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.7; Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortg. Corp., 74 S.W.3d 444, 451-52 (Tex.

App.--Dallas 2002, no pet.) These documents are an admission by a party-opponent, Tex. R.

Evid. 801(e)(2), and are not hearsay. Any statement by a party-opponent is admissible against that

party. Reid Road Municipal Utility Dist. No. 2 v. Speedy Stop Food Stores, Ltd., 337 S.W.3d 846,

858 (Tex. 2011)

In addition, these some of the documents were also automatically admitted due to

Appellee’s Responses to Admissions.(CLR 845, Tab C, No. 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 19, and 22.)

Admissions made under TEX. R. CIV. P. 198 are more than evidence of admitted matters. They

are judicial admissions of the admitted matters. As long as an admission stands unretracted, the

party making it is not permitted to introduce evidence to contradict the matter. National Farmers

Organization v. Smith, 526 S.W.2d 759, 765 (Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1975, no writ). Some

courts have noted that a fact admitted under the rules is of ''higher dignity'' than testimony and that

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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such an admission is the same as an admission made in the pleadings. Republic Bankers Life

Insurance Co. v. Wisdom, 488 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Civ. App.--Fort Worth 1972, ref. n.r.e.). An

admission once admitted is a judicial admission, and a party may not then introduce testimony to

controvert it. Marshall v. Vise, 767 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Tex. 1989) In Appellant’s Response to

Motion for Summary Judgment (CLR at 868-946), Appellant objected to the evidence of Appellee

based on the prior admissions by the Appellee and the documents produced by the Appellee. In

Appellant’s Response to Appellee’s Second Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment (CLR

at 1695-1771), Appellant objected to the evidence of Appellee based on the prior admissions by

the Appellee and the documents produced by the Appellee. The court should sustain any timely

made objection made to evidence which attempts to controvert the admitted fact. Marshall, at 699

The trial erred when it permitted the admission of Appellee’s Affidavit because it had evidence

that directly contradicted the facts Appellee had admitted in his Responses to Admission.

This Honorable Court should remand the case to the trial court in that there are questions

of fact, to be decided by the trier of fact, based on the prior admissions of the Appellee, and the

documents that were produced by the Appellee in discovery.

VI.
Questions of material fact concerning possession and control of the mineral
interests exist based upon the discrepancies between the official Harrison
County documents and the subsequently sworn Affidavit by Appellee.

As referenced above, Appellee signed an affidavit stating that he has been

possession of the minerals since 1991. In Appellant’s Response to Appellee’s Second

Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment (CLR at 1695-1772), he included records from the

Harrison County Clerk which provided evidence that both James Hammond Mills and Virginia

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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Cope have issued numerous conveyances including oil and gas leases and mineral deeds for more

than twenty (20) years. (CLR 1732, 1733, 1735, Tab S) In these records, it is also shows

conclusively that Mills and Cope have regularly paid taxes on the minerals of said property. (CLR

at 1744-1753, Tab T) This is in direct conflict with the affidavit of Appellee and as such raises a

material issue of fact as to the actual ownership of the minerals.

This Honorable Court should remand the case to the trial court in that there are

questions of fact, to be decided by the trier of fact, based on the affidavit of the Appellee, and the

documents from the County Clerk and Tax Assessor of Harrison County, Texas.

VII.
A material question of fact remains due to the cumulative nature of Appellee’s prior bad
acts.

Rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence states that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or

acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity

therewith. TEX. R. CIV. EVID 404(b) The rule, however, does allow such evidence to be

admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id.

The rules of evidence allow the admission of evidence of the habit of a person, or of the

routine practice of an organization, if the evidence is relevant to prove that the conduct of the

person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine

practice. See TEX. R. EVID. 406; see also Durbin v. Dal-Briar Corp., 871 S.W.2d 263, 268 (Tex.

App.--Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied) For testimony of the routine practice of an organization

to be admissible, it must show a regular response to a repeated specific situation. Pacesetter Corp.

v. Barrickman, 885 S.W.2d 256, 263 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1994, no writ); Mediacomp, Inc. v.

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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Capital Cities Communication, 698 S.W.2d 207, 212 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no

writ) (stating that evidence of the routine practice of an organization is relevant to prove that the

conduct of the organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the routine practice).

In response to Appellant’s claim that the Appellee continued to make offers to lease the

mineral interests demonstrated that he did not believe he had possession of 100% interest,

Appellee stated in his Affidavit, paragraph 7 (CLR at 464), “It is not uncommon for employees to

mistakenly make offers to individuals from whom we have already purchased the same interests.”

This gives the impression that there was no deceit on the part of Appellee, but only a mistake.

The document found at (SUPP CLR 273) says in part, “The Division orders you signed are not

acceptable because of your alteration of the effective date.” This document was produced by the

Appellee, and is self-authenticated under TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.7. This would also appear to be

similar to the “one year primary term royalty term conveyance” found at (CLR 1132, Tab D)

which is in opposition to the Mineral Deed (CLR at 21, Tab B) which stated it was a Mineral

Deed. If Appellee would alter the effective date on a division order, could he not also

intentionally mislead the Grantors into believing that they were imparting a one year term royalty

conveyance instead of a mineral conveyance? There remains a question of fact and evidence of

Appellee’s routine practice is relevant to prove that the conduct of the organization on a particular

occasion was in conformity with the routine practice. Appellee has admitted the following in his

Responses to Admissions:

39. Attached hereto as Exhibit "25" is a copy of the Agreed Final Judgment that Defendant
entered into with the State of Texas.

Response: Admit. (CLR at 845, 852, No. 39, Tab C, CLR at 681-692)

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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40. Defendant signed the Agreed Final Judgment in Exhibit "25".

Response: Admit. (CLR at 845, 852, No. 40, Tab C, CLR at 171)

41. Defendant agreed that the entry of the judgment was in the pubic interest in Exhibit "25".

Response: Admit. (CLR at 845, 852, No. 41, Tab C, CLR at 160)
43. Defendants were in the business of buying and selling minerals and royalty when the deeds
were recorded from Virginia Rose Mitchell and James Hammond Mills as reflected in Exhibits
"1" and "2".

Response: Admit. (CLR at 845, 852, No. 43, Tab C)

45. Attached as Exhibit "26" is Plaintiffs Original Petition in Cause No. 00-030-B, Seeliger v. JD
Minerals.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 26 appears to be a petition from said lawsuit.
Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past lawsuits with different
factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence or
constitute admissible evidence in this case. (CLR at 845, 852, No. 45, Tab C) (CLR at
693-700)

46. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 26 is fraud.

Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made. (CLR at 845, 852, No. 46,
Tab C)

47. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 26 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties. (CLR at 845, 853, No. 47,
Tab C)

48. Attached as Exhibit 27 is Plaintiffs Original Petition in Cause NO. 10,702, Ratcliff v. JD
Minerals.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 27 appears to be a petition from said lawsuit.
Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past lawsuits with different
factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence or
constitute admissible evidence in this case. (CLR at 845, 853, No. 48, Tab C, CLR at 701-
703)

49. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 27 is fraud.

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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 Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made. (CLR at 845, 853, No. 49,
Tab C)

50. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 27 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties. (CLR at 845, 853, No. 50,
Tab C)

51. Attached as Exhibit 28 is Plaintiffs First Amended Original Petition in Cause No. 99V-114,
Gaydell Felcman v. James H. Davis d/b/a JD Minerals et al.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 28 appears to be a petition from said lawsuit.
Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past lawsuits with different
factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence or
constitute admissible evidence in this case. (CLR at 845, 853, No. 51, Tab C, CLR at 704-
707)

52. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 28 is misrepresentation and fraud.

Response: Admit that such claims or allegations were made. (CLR at 845, 853, No. 52,
Tab C)

53. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 28 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties. (CLR at 845, 853, No. 53,
Tab C)

54. Attached as Exhibit 29 is Plaintiffs Original Petition in Cause NO. 25,314A, Hansche v.
James Davis d/b/a JD Minerals.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 29 appears to be a petition from said lawsuit.
Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past lawsuits with different
factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence or
constitute admissible evidence in this case. (CLR at 845, 853, No. 54, Tab C, CLR at 708-
709)

55. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 29 is fraudulent representations.

Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made. (CLR at 845, 854, No. 55,
Tab C)

56. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 29 was settled by Defendant.

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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 Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties. (CLR at 845, 854, No. 56,
Tab C)

57. Attached as Exhibit 30 is Plaintiffs Original Petition in Cause No. 1999-1063-B, Shelton
v. James Davis d/b/a JD Minerals.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 30 appears to be a petition from said lawsuit.
Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past lawsuits with different
factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence or
constitute admissible evidence in this case. (CLR at 845, 854, No. 57, Tab C, CLR at 710-
713)

58. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 30 is bad faith.

Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made. (CLR at 845, 854, No. 58,
Tab C)

59. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 30 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties. (CLR at 845, 854, No. 59,
Tab C)

60. Attached as Exhibit 31 is Plaintiffs Original Petition in Cause No. 28,459, Anna Jones v.
James Davis d/b/a JD Minerals.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 31 appears to be a petition from said lawsuit.
Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past lawsuits with different
factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence or
constitute admissible evidence in this case. (CLR at 845, 854, No. 60, Tab C, CLR at 714-
726)

61. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 31 is fraudulent intent.

Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made. (CLR at 845, 854, No. 61,
Tab C)

62. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 31 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties. (CLR at 845, 854, No. 62,
Tab C)

63. Attached as Exhibit 32 is Plaintiff s Original Petition in Cause No. 26,678, Howard v. James
Davis d/b/a JD Minerals.

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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 Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 32 appears to be a petition from said lawsuit.
Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past lawsuits with different
factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence or
constitute admissible evidence in this case. (CLR at 845, 854, No. 63, Tab C, CLR at 727-
731)

64. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 32 is mistake on the part of Plaintiff.

Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made. (CLR at 845, 855, No. 64,
Tab C)

65. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 32 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties. (CLR at 845, 855, No. 65,
Tab C)

66. Attached as Exhibit 33 is Plaintiffs Original Petition in Cause No. C17,019-2000, Burns v.
James Davis d/b/a JD Minerals.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 33 appears to be a petition from said lawsuit.
Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past lawsuits with different
factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence or
constitute admissible evidence in this case. (CLR at 845, 852, No. 66, Tab C, CLR at 732-
736)
67. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 33 is fraud.

Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made. (CLR at 845, 855, No. 67,
Tab C)

68. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 33 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties. (CLR at 845, 855, No. 68,
Tab C)

69. Attached as Exhibit 34 is Plaintiffs Original Petition in Cause NO. 25, 783-B, Bates v.
James Davis d/b/a JD Minerals.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 34 appears to be a petition from said lawsuit.
Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past lawsuits with different
factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence or
constitute admissible evidence in this case. (CLR at 845, 855, No. 69, Tab C, CLR at 737-
742)

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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70. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 34 is fraud.

Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made. (CLR at 845, 855, No. 70,
Tab C)

71. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 34 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties. (CLR at 845, 855, No. 71,
Tab C)

72. Attached as Exhibit 35 is Plaintiffs Original Petition in Cause No. C17,019-2000, Knight
et al v. James Davis d/b/a JD Minerals.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 35 appears to be a petition from said lawsuit.
Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past lawsuits with different
factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence or
constitute admissible evidence in this case. (CLR at 845, 856, No. 72, Tab C, CLR at 743-
752)

73. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 35 is fraud.

Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made. (CLR at 845, 856, No. 73,
Tab C)

74. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 35 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties. (CLR at 845, 856, No. 74,
Tab C)

75. Attached as Exhibit 36 is Plaintiffs Original Petition in Cause No. 2001-515,078, Wiley v.
James Davis d/b/a JD Minerals.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 36 appears to be a petition from said lawsuit.
Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past lawsuits with different
factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence or
constitute admissible evidence in this case. (CLR at 845, 856, No. 75, Tab C, CLR at 753-
763)

76. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 36 is fraud.

Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made. (CLR at 845, 856, No. 76,
Tab C)

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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77. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 36 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties. (CLR at 845, 852, No. 77,
Tab C)

78. Attached as Exhibit 37 is Plaintiffs Original Petition in Cause No. 164814, Fitzhugh v.
James Davis d/b/a JD Minerals.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 37 appears to be a petition from said lawsuit.
Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past lawsuits with different
factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence or to
constitute admissible evidence in this case. (CLR at 845, 856, No. 78, Tab C, CLR at 764-
775)

79. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 37 was that Plaintiff was not competent and
inadequate consideration.

Response: Admit that such a claims or allegations were made. (CLR at 845, 856, No. 79,
Tab C)

80. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 37 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties. (CLR at 845, 857, No. 80,
Tab C)

81. Attached as Exhibit 38 is Plaintiffs Original Complaint in Cause No. WOOCA009, McLean
v. James Davis d/b/a JD Minerals.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 38 appears to be a petition from said lawsuit.
Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past lawsuits with different
factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence or
constitute admissible evidence in this case. (CLR at 845, 857, No. 81, Tab C, CLR at 776-
789)

82. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 38 was inadequate consideration.

Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made. (CLR at 845, 857, No. 82,
Tab C)

83. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 38 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties. (CLR at 845, 857, No. 83,
Tab C)

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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84. Attached as Exhibit 39 is Plaintiffs Original Petition in Cause No. 00-01622, Pearson v. JD
Minerals et al.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 39 appears to be a petition from said lawsuit.
Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past lawsuits with different
factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence or
constitute admissible evidence in this case. (CLR at 845, 857, No. 84, Tab C, CLR at 790-
821)

85. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 39 is fraud.

Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made. (CLR at 845, 857, No. 85,
Tab C)

86. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 39 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties. (CLR at 845, 857, No. 86,
Tab C)

87. Attached as Exhibit 40 is Plaintiffs Amended Original Petition in Cause No. GV003469,
State of Texas v. JD Minerals et al.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 40 appears to be a petition from said lawsuit.
Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past lawsuits with different
factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence or
constitute admissible evidence in this case. (CLR at 845, 857, No. 87, Tab C, CLR at 822-
844)

88. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 40 are fraud and violations of the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act.

Response: Admit that such a claims or allegations were made. (CLR at 845, 858, No. 88,
Tab C)

89. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 40 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties. (CLR at 845, 858, No. 89,
Tab C)

The prior acts of Appellee show there was at the very least a misunderstanding between

Appellee and the individuals that he dealt with over the years. As such there would be an issue

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
32 of 35
for the trier of fact to determine if Appellee followed his same course of conduct in dealing with

Mr. Mills and Ms. Cope. This Honorable Court should reverse and remand to the trial court, for

the issue to be decided by the trier of fact.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

The trial court committed reversible error by issuing its Order Granting Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment and Rending Final Summary Judgment. The Summary Judgment

should be reversed and rendered for Appellant, or in the alternative should be reversed and

remanded to the trial court, for issues of fact to be decided by the trier of fact.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

/s/Bob Whitehurst

Bob Whitehurst
5380 Old Bullard Road, Suite 600, #363
Tyler, Texas 75703
(903)593-5588
State Bar #21358100

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

In accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), Appellant certifies that

this brief contains 11846 words and therefore complies with the word limitation imposed by

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(B).

/s/Bob Whitehurst

Bob Whitehurst

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
33 of 35
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true copy of the above and foregoing instrument has been served on

all counsel of record in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure on this 16TH th day of June,

2015.

/s/Bob Whitehurst

Bob Whitehurst

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
34 of 35
 APPENDIX

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
35 of 35
 c
No. 11-0858

MARK J. MUELLER, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff, §
§
~ § 71~ JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
JAMES H. DAVIS D/B/A J.D. MINERALS §
Defendant § HARRISON COUNTY, TEXAS .

JAMES H. DAVIS D/B/A J.D. M!NEI{ALS' AMENDED
ANSWERS TO REOUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS

TO: Mark J. Mueller, by and through his attorney of record, Mr. Bob Whitehurst, 4828 S.
Broadway Avenue, #363, Tyler, Texas 75703.

COMES NOW, Defendant, James H. Davis d/b/a J.D. Minerals, and pursuant to the Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure, serves these Amended Answers to Plaintiffs Requests for Admissions.

ROBER ERSON
State Bar No. 01220800
DOUGLAS D. McLALLEN
Texas Bar No. 00788025
ANDERSON LEHRMAN BARRE & MARAIST, LLP
Gaslight Square
1001 Third Street, Ste. I
Corpus Christi, Texas 78404
(361) 884-4981
FAX: (361) 884-1286
Attorneys for Defendant,
James H. Davis d/b/a JD Minerals

Defendant, James H. Davis d/b/a J.D. Minerals' Amended Answers to Requests for Admissions

845
 0 0

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certifY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has been
forwarded to opposing counsel as per the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on tllis ----B._ day ofJuly,
2012, as follows:

Mr. Bob Whitehurst VIA CJM RRR#70113500 00012006 5041
Attorney at Law
4828 S. Broadway Ave., #363
Tyler, Texas 75703

Defendant, James H. Davis d/b/a J.D. Minerals' Amended Answers to Requests for Admissions 2

846
 c 0

REOPEST FOR ADMISSIONS

1. On or about September 25, 1991, Virginia Rose Mitchell executed that certain Mineral and
Royalty Conveyance, as grantor, to J.D. Minerals as grantee, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "l" and hereby made a part of this document. Said document is recorded in Volume 1287,
Page 331 of the Deed Records ofthe County Clerk's Office in Harrison County, Texas.

Response: Admit.

2. On or about October 6, 1991, James Hammond Mills executed that certain Mineral and
Royalty Conveyance, as grantor, to J.D. Minerals as grantee, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "2" and hereby made a part of this document. Said document is recorded in Volume 187,
Page 530 of the Deed Records of the County Clerk's Office in Harrison County, Texas.

Response: Admit.

3. On or abotit October 1, 1994, Virginia Rose Mills Cope executed that certain Mineral Deed,
as grantor, to Charles B. Home as grantee, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "3" and
hereby made a part of this document. Said document is recorded in Volume 1373, Page 285 of the
Deed Records of the County Clerk's Office in Harrison County, Texas.

Response: Defendant is currently without sufficient information, knowledge or belief to
admit or deny this request.

4. On or about December 2, 1996, Charles B. Home executed that certain Mineral Deed, as
grantor to Mark J. Mueller as grantee, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "4" and hereby
made a part of this document. Said document is recorded in Volume 1586, Page 339 of the Deed
Records of the County Clerk's Office in Harrison County, Texas.

Response: Defendant is currently without sufficient information, knowledge or belief to admit or
deny this request.

5. On or about May 26, 2011, James Hammond Mills executed that certain Mioeral Deed, as
grantor, to Mark J. Mueller as grantee, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "5" and hereby
made a part of this document. Said document is recorded in 2011-000006112 of the Deed Records
oft.lte County Clerk's Office in Harrison County, Texas.

Response: Defendant is currently without sufficient information, knowledge or belief to
admit or deny this request.

6. On or aboutJune 29, 20 II, Charles B. Home executed that certain Mineral Deed, as grantor,
to Mark J. Mueller as grantee, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "6" and hereby made
a part of this document. Said purpose being to clarifY any illegible print in the document recorded
in Volume 1586, Page 339. Said document is recorded in 2011-000007507 of the Deed ofRecords

Defendant. James H. Davis d/b/a J.D. Minerals' Amended Answers to Requests for Admissions 3

847
 0

of the County Clerk's Office in Harrison County, Texas.

Response: Defendant is currently without sufficient information, knowledge or belief to
admit or deny this request.

7. On or about July I, 2011, Virginia Rose Mills Cope, aka VirgjniaRose Mitchell aka Virginia
Rose Purvis Cope, executed that certain Mineral and Royalty Deed, as grnntor, to Mark J. Mueller
as grantee, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "7" and hereby made a part of this
document. Said document is recorded in 20 ll-000007941 of the Deed Records of the County
Clerk's Office in Harrison County, Texas.

Response: Defendant is currently without sufficient information, knowledge or belief to
admit or deny this request.

8. Prior to the conveyances set out in Exhibit 1-2 above in Request for Admission 1-2,
Defendants nor anyone associated with Defendants checked the deed records of the County Clerk
of Harrison County, Texas to determine the ownership of Virginia Rose Mitchell or James
Hammond Mills.

Response: Defendant is currently without sufficient information, knowledge or belief to
admit or deny this request-

9. On June 16, 2005, JDMf, L.L.C. withdrew its offer to purchaSe minerals from Virginia Rose
Mills Cope as set out in Exhibit "8" attached hereto.

Response: Admit.

10. On November 21,2005. JDMl, L.L.C. by James H. Davis, sent an offer to Virginia Rose
Cope as set out in Exhibit "9" attached hereto.

Response: Admit.

II. Attached as Exhibit "I 0" is the Universal. County-Wide, Sale, Conveyance and Assignment
of Mineral and Royalty Interests sent to Virginia Rose Cope by JDMf, L.L.C.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit "10" appears to be a conveyance sent to Ms.
Cope by JDMI, LLC, otherwise, denied.

12. Attached as Exhibit "II" is the letter dated November 30,2005 to Virginia Rose Cope from
JDMl, L.L.C.

Response: Admit

Defendant, James H. Davis d/b/a J.D. Minerals' Amended Answers to Requests for Admissions 4

848
 0 0

13. Attached as Exhibit "12" is a copy of the oil and gas lease from Virginia Rose Mills Cope
to Wagner & Brown, Ltd.

Response: Admit.

14. Attached as Exhibit "13" is a document signed by Virginia Rose Mills Cope granting JDMI,
L.L.C. permission to obtain information about all the mineral and royalties she owns in Harrison
County, Texas.

Response: Admit.

15. Attached as Exhibit "14" is a document stating in part that Virginia Rose Mills Cope had sold
all of her interest to another company.

Response: Admit.

16. Attached as Exhibit "15" is a document dated October 31, 2008 from JDMI, L.L.C. to
Virginia Rose Mills Cope stating in part that "JDMJ, L.L.C. found you to have sold your mineral and
royalty. interest prior to date."

Response: Admit.

17. JD Minerals sent James Hammond Mills an offer to purchase interest for $55.00, set out in
Exhibit "16" attached hereto.

Response: Admit

18. JD Minerals prepared a 45 day draft to James Hammond Mills in the amount of $55.00,
signed by James H. Davis, as set out in Exhibit "17" attached hereto,.

Response: Admit

19. JD Minerals sent a document to James Hammond Mills dated December I 0, 1991, for a one
year primary term Royalty Conveyance, as set out in Exhibit "18" attached hereto.

Response: Admit

20. JD Minerals sent a draft to James Hammond dated September 20, 1991, in the amount of
$55.00, signed by James H. Davis, as set out in Exhibit "19" attached hereto.

Response: Admit

21. N/A

Defendant, James H. Davis d/b/a J.D. Minerals' Amended Answers to Requests for Admissions 5

849
 0 0

22. JDMI, LLC., sent a document to James Hammond Mills dated November 26, 2007 regarding
mineral and royalties in Harrison County, Texas, as set out in Exhibit "20" attached hereto.

Response: Admit

23. JDMI, L.L.C., sent a document to James Hammond Mills dated December 21, 2007,
regarding a check in the amount of$4,81 7.43, as set out in Exhibit "21" attached hereto.

Response: Admit

24. Attached hereto as Exhibit "22" is a copy of the check in the amount of$4,817.43 paid to
James Hammond Mills.

Responses: Admit

25. JDMI, L.L.C. by James H. Davis forwarded James Hammond Mills a document dated
December 28, 2007 regarding in part a check in the amount of $507.07, as set out in Exhibit "23"
attached hereto.

Response: Admit

26. Attached hereto as Exhibit "24" is a copy of the check in the amount of$507.07 paid to
James Hammond Mills.

Response: Admit

27. Attached as Exhibit" I" and "2" are the Mineral and Royalty Conveyances that were prepared
by JD Minerals.

Response: Object to the extent that "prepared" is vagne. Otherwise, admit that J.D.
Minerals or its attorneys or representatives drafted some of the terms which
make up the instrument.

28. These document, Exhibit "I" and ''2", were not copied from the Texas Real Estate Manual.

Response: Defendant is currently without sufficient information, knowledge or belief to
admit or deny this request. Defendant may supplement his response at a later
date.

29. These documents, Exhibit "1" and "2", were not prepared by a lawyer.

Response: Defendant is currently without sufficient information, knowledge or belief to
admit or deny this request. Defendant may supplement his response at a later
date.

Defendant, James H. Davis dlh/a J.D. Minerals' Amended Answers to Requests for Admissions 6

850
 -- 0
c
30. These documents, Exhibit "1" and "2", contains print that is different size font.

Response: Admit

31. Defendant intended for certain language in the documents, Exhibit "1" and "2", to be of a
smaller font.

Response: Defendant cannot admit or deny because it is not clear what "certain language"
refers to. Otherwise, Deny.

32. Defendant intended for the language, "Grantor hereby conveys to Grantee all of the mineral,
royalty, and overriding royalty interest in Harrison County, whether or not same is herein above
accurately or correctly described," to be of a smaller font in the documents, Exhibit "1" and "2".

Response: Deny.

o o. Exhibit "1 " and "2" were the type ofdocuments that Defendant prepared in the normal course
of business.

Response: Admit.

34. Exhibit "I" and "2" attached hereto, do not contain a metes and bounds description.

Response: Admit

35. Exhibit "I" and "2" attached hereto, do not contain a Volume and Page reference to a prior
document that was filed in the County Clerk's office of Harrison County, Texas.

Response: Admit.

36. The language in the document after State of Texas. to-wit: 1) and 2) does not contain a
reference where the property can be found in Harrison County, Texas.

Response: Deny.

3 7. james H. Davis has a great deal ofknowledge and training regarding the purchase ofminerals
and royalties in the State of Texas.

Response: Defendant cannot admit or deny because "great deal of knowledge and
training" is vauge.

38. Exhibits" I " and "2" are identical in format to other deeds prepared by Defendant in Harrison
County from the years 1991 to 1999, as to the clause referred to in admission No. 32 above.

Defendant, James H. Davis d/b/a J.D. Minerals' Amended Answers to Requests for Admissions 7

851
 c
Response: Defendant is currently without sufficient information, knowledge or belief to
admit or deny this request. Defendant may supplement his response at a later
date.

39. Attached hereto as Exhibit "25" is a copy of the Agreed Final Judgment that Defendant
entered into with the State of Texas.

Response: Admit.

40. Defendant signed the Agreed Final Judgment in Exhibit "25".

Response: Admit.

41. Defendant agreed that the entry of the judgment was in the pubic interest in Exhibit "25".

Response: Admit

42. Virginia Rose Mitchell and James Hammond Mills were treated the same as other
prospective sellers of mineral and royalty that Defendant contacted.

Response: Defendant cannot admit or deny because the term "treated" is vague.

43. Defendants were in the business ofbuying and selling minerals and royalty when the deeds
were recorded from Virginia Rose Mitchell and James Hammond Mills as reflected in Exhibits "I"
and ~~2".

Response: Admit

44. Defendant did not pay adequate consideration for the interest of Virginia Rose Mitchell and
James Hammond Mills in Harrison County, Texas.

Response: Deny

45. Attached as Exhibit "26" is Plaintiffs Original Petition in Cause No. 00-030-B, Seeligerv.
JD Minerals.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 26 appears to be a petition from said
lawsuit. Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past
lawsuits with different factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated
to lead to admissible evidence or constitute admissible evidence in this case.

46. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 26 is fraud.

Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made.

Defendant, James H. Davis d/b/a J.D. Minerals' Amended Answers to Requests for Admissions 8

852
853
 0

55. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 29 is fraudulent representations.

Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made.

56. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 29 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties.

57. Attached as Exhibit 30 is Plaintiff's Original Petition in Cause No. 1999-1063-B, Shelton
v. James Davis d/b/a JD Minerals.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 30 appears to be a petition from said
lawsuit. Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past
lawsuits with different factual and legal aUegations are reasonably calculated
to lead to admissible evidence or constitute admissible evidence in this case.

58. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 30 is bad faith.

Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made.

59. The la':"suit reflected in Exhibit 30 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties.

60. Attached as Exhibit 3 I is Plaintiff's Original Petition in Cause No. 28,459, Anna Jones v.
James Davis d/b/a JD Minerals.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 31 appears to be a petition from said
lawsuit. Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past
lawsuits with different factual and legal allegations are reasonably ealculated
to lead to admissible evidence or constitute admissible evidence in this case.

61. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 31 is fraudulent intent.

Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made.

62. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 31 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties.

63. Attached as Exhibit 32 is Plaintiff's Original Petition in Cause No. 26,678, Howard v. James
Davis d/b/a JD Minerals.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 32 appears to be a petition from said

Defendant, James H. Davis d/b/a J.D. Minerals' Amended Answers to Requests ior Admissions 10

854
855
856
 0

80. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 37 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties.

81. Attached as Exhibit 38 is Plaintiffs Original Complaint in Cause No. WOOCA009, McLean
v. James Davis d/b/a JD Minerals.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 38 appears to be a petition from said
lawsuit. Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past
lawsuits with different factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated
to lead to admissible evidence or constitute admissible evidence in this case.

82. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 38 was inadequate consideration.

Response: Admit that such a claim or aUegation was made.

83. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 38 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties.

84. Attached as Exhibit 39 is Plaintiffs Original Petition in Cause No. 00-01622, Pearson v. JD
Minerals eta!.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 39 appears to be a petition from said
lawsuit. Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past
lawsuits with different factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated
to lead to admissible evidence or constitute admissible evidence in this case.

85. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 39 is fraud.

Response: Admit that such a claim or allegation was made.

86. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 39 was settled b)l Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties.

87. Attached as Exhibit 40 is Plaintiffs Amended Original Petition in Cause No. GV003469,
State of Texas v. JD Minerals eta!.

Response: Defendant admits that Exhibit 40 appears to be a petition from said
iawsuit. Defendant otherwise denies that claims or allegations from past
lawsuits with different factual and legal allegations are reasonably calculated
to lead to admissible evidence or constitute admissible evidence in this case.

Defendant. James H. Davis d/b/a J.D. Minerals' Amended Answers to Requests for Admissions 13

857
 0 0

88. Part of the allegations reflected in Exhibit 40 are fraud and violations of the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act.

Response: Admit that such a claims or allegations were made.

89. The lawsuit reflected in Exhibit 40 was settled by Defendant.

Response: Admit that the lawsuit was settled by both parties.

Defendant, James H. Davis d/b/a J.D. Minerals' Amended Answers to Requests for Admissions 14

858
 0 0
i
JD¢l
P.O. Box
_ , . , ,._, 75102-J!W
s
Office (903)-723-2922
i Fu (903)-723-2443
Mobile (903)-530-1633

CER'I1FIED MAIL
p 675 652 453

December 10. 1991 ,

JAMES HAMMOND MillS
IllS KIPRIL LANE
II
LONGWOOD FL 32779-5855 I
RE: VARIOUS ACRES OUT OF '!HE G.~ PET!'Y, ET AI.. SURVEY, A-582. ET
AL. HARRISON COUNTY, TEXAS. r
Oe&r Mr. Mills:

As agreed. enclosed please fiDd a Money Order in tbe amount of $55.00
as consideration for a one")'Cat primluy term ty Conveyance covering jnterest in the
above referenced land.

call.

'
I
Jainc:s H. Davis
!HD/rgm
$enclosure I
I

II
i
I
I

DAVIS . ... - ... 133 .

1132
 Wagner & Brown, Ltd.
Oil & Gas Producers
1331 LAMAR S!REET
SUI1'E 137(1
HOUSTON. TEXAS nDIO
(713) 951-9200

May9, 2008

J D Minerals Mark J. Mueller •
P.O. Box 1540 P.O. Box 130954
Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 Tyler, Texas 757)3
Attn: Mr. James H. Davis

JEH Interests Dan G. Capers
-,.
P.O. Box 148 2300 Bill Owens #824
Uvalde, Texas 78802 Longview, Texas 75604
Attn: James E. Hopper

James Hammon Mills
1115 Koppril Lane
Longwood, Florida 32n9
-
Re: J. W. Harrison Estate Gas Unit No. I, 694.5 acres of land, more or
less, out of the G. W. Petty Survey, A-582, the G. W. Munden
Survey, A-856, and the G. W. Munden Survey, A-857, Hamson
County, Texas.

Gentleman:

By Gas Unit Designation dated Dcicember 10, 2007, as amended, effective December 12, 2007
(Volume 3779, Page 321 ofthe Official Records ofHarrison county, Texas), Wagner & Brown, Ltd.
et al created the J. W. Harrison Estate Gas Unit No. 1 (the "Captioned Unitj, comprising 694.5
acres out of the G. W. Petty Survey, A-582, the G. W. Munden Survey, A-856, and the G. W.
Munden Survey, A-857, Harrison County, Texas. Each ofyou own or claim mineral interests in Unit
Tract Two, comprising 283.917 acres out ofa 291.7 acre tract ofland, more or less. These interests
are currently covered by oil and gas leases in favor of Wagner & Brown, Ltd., which have been or
will be pooled into the Captioned Unit

Wagner & Brown, Ltd. bas drilled and completed the J. W. Harrison Estate Gas Unit No. I Well No.
I within the Captioned Unit, which produces from the Cotton Valley Sand Fonnatinn, and is in the
process of preparing division orders in order to begin payment of royalties on production from such
well. However, prior to making disbursement of proceeds of production attn"butable to the interests

932
owned or claimed by you in the Captioned Unit, certain title issues must be resolved.

By Declaration ofUnitdated March 12, 1979 (Volume 881, Page290), Amoco Production Company
et al created the 704 acre John Harrison "BH Gas Unit, which included Unit Tract Two of the
Captioned Unit; however, said unit only covered those deplbs from the surface down to the base of
the Travis Peak formation, which lies above the producing formation in the Captioned Unit.

By Minernl and Royalty Conveyance dated September 13, 1991 (Volume 1286, Page 169). Dan G.
Capers conveyed all of his mineral interest in 704 acres out of the G. W. Petty Survey, A-582 eta!,
known as the Amoco Producing Company-John Harrison "B" Unit, and other lands to J D Minerals
and JEH Interests.

By Mineral and Royalty Conveyauce dated September 25, 1991 (Volume 1287, Page 331 ), Virginia
Rose Mitchell conveyed all of her mineral interest in 704 acres out ofthe G. W. Petty Survey, A-582
el al, known as the Amoco Producing Company-John Harrison "B" Unit, and other lands to J D
Minerals.

By Mineral and Royalty Conveyance dated October 1, 1991 (Volume 1287, Page 530), James
Hammond Mills conveyed all ofhis mineral interest in the John Harrisoa "BH Unit and other land to
J D Minerals.

By Mineral Deed dated October21, 1994 (Volume373,PagcS8S), Virginia Rose Mills Cope, whom
we have presumed was one and the same person as Virginia Rose Mi$chell, conveyed her mineral
interest in Unit Tract Two of the Captioned Unit to Charles B. Home, who by Mineral Deed dated
Detemher4, 1996 (Volmne 1586, Page 339), conveyed said interest to Mark J. Mueller.

Because of the depth limitation applicable to the John Harrison "BH Unit, we have interpreted the
above-noted mineral and royalty conveyances in favor of J D Minerals and JEH Interests as being
limited to depths down to, but not below, the base ofthe Travis Peak formation. This being the case,
we have credited MarkJ. Mueller with ownership of deep rights byvirtueoftbeDecember4, 1996
Mineral Deed referenced above. In addition, we have credited Dan G. Capers and James Hammond
Mills with ownership ofdeep rights which they retained following theh- conveyances to J D Minerals
andJEH lnterestsintheSeptember 13,1991 DeedandtheOctoberl, 1991 Deedrefereocedabove.

We recognize that it is possible that the parties intended for said conveyances to apply to all depths.
Therefore, it is necessary that each ofyou enter into correction deeds or sjipulations ofinterest which
clearly reflect the intent of the parties to either convey or retain their interests in those depths below
the base of the Travis Peak formation. Any such correction deed or stipulation of interest should be
filed for record in Harrison County, Texas, and furnished to the undersigned. Until such correction
deeds or stipulations of interest have been executed, recorded aod furnished to the undersigned,
proceeds of production from the Captioned Unit attributable to the interests of James Hammond
Mills and Mark J. Mueller, as indicated below, will be placed in suspense.

In addition, until this matter is resolved, proceeds of production ~butable to the interest ofDan G.
Capers, as indicated below, will be placed in suspense, with that portion of his interest acquired

933
subsequent to September 13, 1991, not being placed in suspense.

The interest of James Hammond Mills which is to be suspended is as follows:

James Hammond Mills
(1/3 X l/3 X J/2 X J/2 X royalty X 283.9!7/694.5)

The interest of Mark J. Mueller which is to be suspended is as follows:

Mark J. Mueller
(1/3 X l/3 X l/2 X J/2 X royalty X 283.917/694.5)

The interest of Dan G. Capers which is to be suspended is as follows:
(1/3 X J/3 X 112 X 112 X royalty X 283.917/694.5)

Very truly yows,
Wagner & Brown, Ltd.

By: 71Wtf Jli
':-Mand::--:-ei:-Sel::--:ber:--,-=v-=;ce---=P::-rest-:-:.den:--t-of-=:Lan:---:-d---

RJN:tsclbcr41 .. -4SI-1013

3

934
 Wagner & Brown, L~d.
Oll & Gas Producers
! 33 f LA\-1/\R STRE.ET
SCiTE JFO
i-10'-!STO"!.lf-XA5 "t":fli:•

March 2, 2011

JD Minerals Mr. Mark Mueller
P.O. Box 1540 P.O. Box 130954
Corpus Christi. TX 78403-1540 Tyler, Texas 75713
Attn: Mr. Holly Williams

JEH Jnterests
P.O. Box 148
Uvalde. TX 78802

James Harmon Mills
Dan G. Capers
2300 Bill Owens #824
Longview, TX 75604 -
IllS Koppril Lane
Longwood. FL 32779

RE: J. W. Harrison Estate Gas Unit No. J; 694.5 acres of land
out of the G. W. Petty Survey, A-582, lhe G. W. Munden
Survey, A-856,and !be G. W. Munden Survey, A-857
Harrison County, Texas

Gentleman:

Please reference the Jetter dated May 9, 2008 from Wagner & Brown. Ltd. and the letter dated February 23.
2011 from JD Minerals.
Please be advised that we have carefully reviewed this matter again with the legal firm of Labanowski &
Associates of Houston. Texas. who examined title to the captioned tract on behalf of Wagner & Brown, Ltd. Their
concerns with the interpretation ofthe intent of the parties to the deeds and tbe lands actually covered by the deeds
in question, as set forth in our May 9 letter to you, still remain unchanged. The attorney for Labanowski &
Associates points out that they have a number of concerns relative to the intent of the panics to these deeds.
il'!cludir.g \'s:gue descriptions: .,,,hich do not spedfica!ly refcreD.::~ ao identifiable ur.it, Gr taGCl of land and the «:kpths
actuall),. conveyed. In addition, they question if the provision dealing with conveyjng everything in Harrison County.
is sufficient to do so. especially in view of the vague descriptions; since the courts have held that Mother Hubbard
clauses whicb are in the fine print, may only apply to small adjacent strips.
In view of the foregoing Wagner&. Brown, Ltd. intends to continue to hold the proceeds in suspense, as
noted in our May 9. 2008 letter until such time as the parties have furnished us with either correction deeds or a
stipulation of interest. which instruments must be acceptable to our examining attonley.

Sincerely.

a..,.)!.&.--
Omar L. Brown
Division Land Manager
cc; Evelyn Harris

938
 /

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1732
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1733
'-"-'s \s ":s::;;::&i ~-- ~\!;,'1\'1\.\) \).., \S\....1r'~"" C....v-"'~ ~~C§;:\ic \)~\i::ocJ.c....u~
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---- . ---~.;;;;;;;;-,;;;.:.;.;.,;~:1ii;;;;;,o;·
lo7/:)7f;!J:i:J!

~2/l+nrll'9
·--·-
: Cl'l V• Nl'"' li"'q IIIIIIIIIIIIIIID 11~11~11 Dllllllllllllllllllllll ~II on Amount Due $O.ooj
r1\:J G.J;._ •1 e h '-\. rrJ· IF PAID EN SEPTEMBER 201.4

This certifies that after checking the tax records of this office the following taxes,
penalties and interest, attorney fees and late fees are due for this property for the ()._);)
Fee=--~~--­
following taxing units.

G - nsomcer Date
9/16/2014
or Tax Certificate GF#·------

1747
Prlnt Date: 9/16/2014 Page 6- of 9
HARRISON COUNTY TAX OFFICE
!0: N010572994 TAX CERTIFICATE REF:

HARRISON COUNTY TAX OFFICE
POBOX967
Owner Information
MillS JAMES HAMMOND
I Amount Due
IF PAID IN SEPTEHBER 2014
$O.ooj
MARSHALL, TX 75671 1115 KOPRIL LN
PHONE: 903-935-8411 LONGWOOD, FL 32779~5855
Paid in Month *Addn Fees Tax Due
October 2014 0.00 0.00
November 2014 0.00 0.00
December 2014 0.00 0 .00

Mail MILlS JAMES HAMMOND
to 1115 KOPRIL LN IF THIS PROPERTY RECEIVED OR IS
LONGWOOD, FL 32779-5855 RECEIVING SPECIAL VALUATION
BASED ON ITS USE, AODinONAL
ROLLBACK TAXES MAY BECOME DUE AS
PROVIDED BY TAX CODE CHAPTER 23-

·-- ---- - --- - .. ·- - -- ·-· - ""· ··- -· -··
Market Values Summary
Property Information Legal Information
10: N010572994 LEGAL: PILOT 1 #6, SABINE OIL&. GAS LLC,
GEOID: P2250.0976350.RI WOODLAWN, 7.5 MLS SE JEFFERSON,
OWNER INTEREST: 0.000036 8396'FSwt& 1799'FSEL

Penattv•
Tax Year Taxln!jl Entities Base Tax Paid Balanc;e Interest Attorney Fee Other FeeS Total Due
2012 05 HARRISON COUNTY o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2012

2013
70 ESO #3
TOTAL FOR 2012
05 HARRISON COUNTY
o.oo
o.oo
o.oo
o.oo
o.oo
o.oo
0.00
o.oo
o.oo
0.00
o.oo
o.oo
....
0.00

0.00
0.00
o.oo
0.00
0.00
o.oo
0.00
2013 70 ESD #3 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00
TOTAL FOR2013 o.oo o.oo o.oo o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.00
o.oo o.oo o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Amount Due $0.001
IF PAID IN SEPTEMBER .20:t4

This certifies that after checking the tax records of this office the following taxes,

/_D_~_
penalties and interest, attorney fees and late fees are due for this property for the
following taxing units.
Fee: _ _ _
~~.2P- b~-----o-.-,.-9...::.-~-::..~2-~-~-4-fic-a-te___ GF#·-----

1748
Print Date: 9/16}2014 Page 7 of 9
HARRISON COUNTY TAX OFFICE
ID: N010573041 TAX CERTIFICATE REF;

HARRISON COUNTY TAX OFFICE
POBOX967
Ownet" Infol"mation
MilLS JAMES HAMMOND
I Amount Due
IF PAID IN SEPTEMBER ZOJ4
$0.001
MARSHALL, TX 75671 1115 KOPRJL LN
PHONE: 903-935-8411 LONGWOOD, FL 32779-5855
Taxoue
Paid in Month •Addn Fees
October 2014 0.00 0.00
November 2014 0.00 0.00
December 2014 0.00 0.00
Mail MILLS JAMES HAMMOND
to 1115 KOPRJL LN IF THIS PROPERTY RECEIVED OR IS
LONGWOOD, FL 32779-5855 RECEIVING SPECIAL VALUATION
BASED ON ITS USE, ADDmONAL
ROLLBACK TAXES MAY BECOME DUE AS
PROVIDED BY TAX CODE CHAPTER 23,

-= ------ - -- ·- -- - - ---· --.a ___

Market Values Summary
Property Information Legal Information
10: ND10573041 LEGAL: PILOT -7M, SABINE OIL & GAS LLC,
GEOID: P2255.0976350.RI WOODLAWN CV, R 0 WATKINS, RRC 246963
OWNER INTEREST: 0.000036

Penalty • i
Tax Year Taxing Entjties Base Tax PaKI Balance I....-.st Attorney Fee Other Fees Total Due
2012 05 HARRISON COUNlY o.oo 0.00 o.oo o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00
2012 70 ESD #3 o.oo 0.00 o.oo o.oo o.oa 0.00 0.00
TOTAL FOR 2012 0.00 0.00 o.oo o.oo o.oo 0.00 0.00
2013 05 HARRISON COUNTY 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 o.oo
2013 70 ESO #3 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00
TOTAL FOR 2013 o.oo o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.00
o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00

Qckk Uok~ 1111111111~ 11111111111111111111111111111 011111111 ~111111 Amount Due $0.00 t
,., JD l..>...-h ,'.{ « !,.._._,_/I I--- IF PAID IN SEFTE.HBER 20l4

0 c.<)

Fee=------~----­ t
Date of Tax Certificate GF#------

1749
Print Date : 9/16/2014 Page 8 of ~
HARRISON COUNTY TAX OFFICE
ID: N010573085 TAX CERTIFICATE REF:

HARRISON COUNTY TAX OFFICE owner Information Amount Due $o.ooj
PO BDX967 MILLS JAMES HAMMOND IF PAID IN SEPTEMBER 20J4
MARSHALL, TX 75671 1115 KOPRIL LN
PHONE: 903-935-8411 LONGWOOD, FL 32779-5855
Pakl in Month •Addn Fees Tax Due
October 2014 0.00 0.00
November 2014 0.00 0.00
December 2014 0.00 o.oo
Mail MILLS JAMES HAMMOND
to 1115 KOPRIL LN IF THIS PROPERTY RECEIVED OR IS
LONGWOOD, FL 32779-5855 RECEIVING SPECIAL VALUADON
BASED ON ITS US£, ADDIDONAL
ROLLBACK TAXES MAY BECOME DUE AS
PROVIDED BY TAX CODE CHAPTER 23.
.. ·-· - - ····-· ---- .. ···-· ···-· --·-
Market Values Summary
Property Information Legal Information Mineral 130 Total Market 130
Total Assessed 130
ID: N010573085 LEGAL: PILOT- BH-, SASINE OIL & GAS LLC,
GEOID: P2260.0976350.RI WOODLAWN OJ, R 0 WATKINS
OWNER INTEREST: 0.000036

Penalty &
Tax Year Taxing Entities Base Tax Paid Balance IntO ' / IF PAID IN SEPTEMBER 20J4

This certifies that after checking the tax records of this office the following taxes,
penalties and interest, attorney fees and late fees are due for this property for the
following taxing units. I lJ v~J
Cc,
Signatur
9/16/2014
Fee:-------
GF#·------
ns Officer Date of Tax Certificate

1750
Priot Date : 9/16/2014 Page 9 of 9
HARRISON COUNTY TAX OFFICE
JD: N010573132 TAX CERTIFICATE REF:

HARRISON COUNTY TAX OFFICE
POBOX967
Owner Information
MlUS JAMES HAMMOND
I Amount Due
IF PAID IN SEPTEMBER 2014
$O.oo 1

MARSHALL, TX 75671 11 LS KOPRILLN
PHONE: 903-935-8411 LONGWOOD, FL 32779·5855
Tax Due
Paid in Month *Addn Fees
October 2014 0.00 0.00
November 2014 0.00 0.00
December 2014 0.00 0.00
Mall MILLS JAMES HAMMOND
to 1115 KOPRIL LN IF THIS PROPERTY RECEIVED OR IS
LONGWOOD, FL 32779·585S RECEIVING SPECIAL VAWATION
BASED ON ITS USE, ADDITIONAL
ROLLBACK TAXES MAY BECOME DUE AS
PROVIDED BY TAX CODE CHAPTER 23.

-· ------ - .. - -- - -- - --·- -· ....

Market Values summary
Property Information Legal Information Mineral 100. Total Market 100
Total Assessed 100
ID: N010573132 LEGAL: PilOT -09H-, SABINE OIL&. GAS LLC,
GEOID: P2265.D976350.RI WOODlAWN, R 0 WATKINS, RRC 252778
OWNER INTEREST: 0.000036

Penalty•
Tax Year Taxing Entities Base Tax Paid Balance Interest Attorney Fee other Fees Total Due
2012 OS HARRISON COUNTY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo
2012 70 ESD #3 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00
TOTAL FOR 2012 0.00 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 o.oo
2013 05 HARRISON COUNTY o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo o.oo 0.00
2013 70 ESD #3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00
TOTAL FOR 2013 0.00 o.oo o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00
o.oo o.oo o.oo o.oo o.oo o.oo 0.00

Qukk Uok'1101111111 lmllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll \- Amount Due $0.00[
(3 o6 W \.-.. '..-\ < k,_~ .-r IF PAID IN SEPTEMBER 20~4

This cettifies that after checking the tax records of this office the following taxes,
penalties and interest, attorney fees and late fees are due for this property for the
following taxing units.
Fee:---1-/_O
__
9/16/2014
Date of Tax Certificate GF#'-----

1751
 HARRISON COUNTY
Taxing Ceiling Ex.mption Toucable Tax
Exemptions/
Account Numbw I Log a I Ptd Addn Coding ll!ntltiP Ve•r Granted Values Duo
Description value
Name and Addr... 0 100 Q.l~
100 MIN MKT Gl DATE: 1/111900 OS HARRISON COUNTY
JACKSON WE .6, SPAMERICA. 70 ESD •3 0 100 0.10
MII.LS HY\.A B 100 TOTAL MICT NBH: MULTI
8230 TOWNS
PROOUcnON, WOODLAWN, 2.6 ML$
SE WOODLAWN 100 ASSESSED
OALI.AS, TX ?5243
OWNER INTEREST 0.000404 RI DIVIDED ACRES: .000

IC:N010398132/ 2013
GEO :JO 160. 0976200.RI Total Tax Due 0.42
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABST: 442 H MCNUTT, V 18,640 LNC NON HS • E DATE: 8/16/2012 OS HARRISON COUNTY 0
0
18,640
18,640
59.07
18.64
MILLS IDA 18,640 TOTAL MKT NBH: 35,04 77 ESD 16
958 OXBOW LN SITUS: FM 134 KAR
18,640 ASSESSED
CALLAS, TX 75241
ACRES: 2,243
ID:R0000020B5 I 201l AERIAL: 22 A
GE0:00442.0D370.00000.000000 MAP NUM: 11 Total Tax Due 77.71

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MILLS IVAN A&. MELBA WllUAMS UNIT I 1A, FOAEST OIL
DATE: 1/1/1900 OS HARRISON COUNTY
71 ESD 14
0
0
0.00
0.00
NBH: 36,LESS500,MULT1
UNKNOWN COfi.PORAllON", BlOCKER, 0 P 73 ESD 12 0 0.00
, 00000 GILLESPIE SUR, WELL 11·A
OWNER INTEREST 0.000318 Rl SITUS: MAR

JO:N002028737 I 2013 OMOEO ACRES: .000
GEO:W3040.0976250.RI
AGT: XX o.oo Total Tall Due

MIL.LsivAN-,.-a;eLBA---------m~t7,.;SGU;a~ro-aESr-o7L------------------------o~;e~;:;~~9oo--------os~,;;iso;co~NiY-------o--------------------------o.~~
UNKNOWN CORPORATION, BLOCKER, 0 P NBH: LESSSOO,MULit 71 ESO 1:<4 0 0.00
Q~~~~OINTEREST 0.000318 Rl g~~~~~~CRES:
73 2
.000 ESO * O 0.00

ID:N010406915 /2013
GEO: WZ820. 09 76250 .RI
AGT:XX
Total Tax Du• o.oo
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MILLS J H lANE WtLUAM H #2, PEAK ENERGY DATE: 1(1/1900 OS HARRISOK COUN'N 0 0.00
o.oo
957 BRIAR WOOD CORPORAnO, GOOCH, 5 T WATTS NBH: MULTI 79 ESD #8 0
ALTA MONTE SPRI, Fl32701 SUR., R.RC 68104
OWNER INTEREST 0.000399 Rl DIV10EO ACRES: ,000

to:N010462980 /20t3
GEO:L0400.0976300.RI
Total Tax Due 0.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MILLS J H LANE WILLIAM H 11:3, PEAK ENERGY DATE: 1(1/1900 05 HARRISON COUNTY 0 0.00
957 BRIARWOOD CORPORATIO, GOOCH, J 5 BELL SUR, NBH: MULTI 13 ESD .-2 0 0.00
ALTA MONTE SPRI, FL32701 RRC 74702
OWNER INTEREST 0.0004 Rl DIVIDED ACRES: .000
AERIAL: 0
lD:N000$30899/ 2013
GEO:L0480.09763DO.RI
Total Tall Due 0.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MILLS JAMES HAMMOND LANE WJLLIAM H "A", PEAK ENERGY DATE: 1/1/1900 OS HARIUSON COUNTY 0 0.00
1115 KOPRIL LN CORPORA110, GOOCH, ETL ST WATTS NBH: MUL'I1 79 ESD #.8 0 0.00
LONGWOOD, Fl 32779·5855 ETLSUR. WELL .tZ·C
OWNER INTEREST 0.000399 Rl SITUS: HAR
ID:N000508353/ 2013 DIVIDED ACRES: .000
GEO:L0320.09763SO.IU A.EII.IA.l: 0
Total Tax Due 0.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~-----

1752
 10/16/2013 2:15:21 PM
a •••-• •
2013 TAXROLL
HARRISON COUNTY
•• • • • Page 2655

Account Number l
Name and Address
.....,
Description value
l~eemptiont
Pld Addn COding
I Ta~Ung
Entitles
ceiling
Vear
Ex.mption
Grant.d
Taw.able
Values
Tax
Duo
MILlS JAMES HAMMOND PILOT· 8H·, SABINE: OIL 6. G.AS LLC, 1JO MINMKT G1 DAT!:l/1/1900 OS HAARISON COUNl'Y 0 130 o.oo
1115 KOPP.IL LN WOODLAWN CV, R 0 WA11<1NS 130 TOTAL MKT NBH: MULll 70 ESP t3 0 130 o.oo
LONGWOOD, FL 32179·5!155 DIVIDED ACRES: .000 130 ASSESSED
OWNER INTEREST0.000036 RI

ID:N010573085/ 2013
GEO:P2260.0976JSO,fl.l
Tobll T•x Due o.oo
MILLS JAMES HAMMOND PILOT 12, SASINE OIL&. GAS LLC, DATI!:: 1/l/1900 OS HARRISON C:OUNT'I' 0 o.oo
1115 KOJ'Ril LN WOODlAWN, JOEL CRAIN NBH: MULTI 70 'ESP '3 0 0.00
lOfiiGWOOP, Fl :32779·5855 DIVIDED ACRES: ,000
OWNER Ir1TEP.EST 0.000036 Rl

IO:N010572859/ 2013
GEO: P2150.0976350.Rl
Total T•Jt Due 0.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MILLS JAMES HAMMOND EMMITT 1 .f:t, SABINE OIL & GAS UC, OATE: 1/1/1900 o.oo
OS HARRISON COUNiY 0
1115 KOPRlL LN WOODLAWN, ETAL J e. CRAIN ETAL NBH: MULTI 70 ESC #3 0 o.oo
LONGWOOD, FL 32779·5855 SUR, WELL 11U R
OWNER lNTERESi 0.000036 Rl OIVlOED ACRES: .000

1D:N01056489) I 2013
GEO:E2590.097635D.RI
TotiiiT•Jt Due o.oo
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MILLS JAMES HAMMOND PILOT 1 #6, SABINE OIL &.. GAS LLC, DATE: 1/1/1900 OS HARRISON COUNTY' 0 0.00
1115 KOPRllLN WOODLAWN, 7,5 MLS SE JEFFERSON, NBH: MUlTI 70 ESO 13 0 0.00
LONGWOOD, FL 32779·5855 8396'FSWLl1799'FSEL
OWNER INTEREST 0.000036 Rl DIVIDED ACRES: .000

lO:N010S729, FL .3277~-!;SSS
NBH: MULTI 70 ESD 13 0 0.00
DIVIDED ACRES: .000
OWNER INT!R.EST 0.000036 R.l
10:N010572921/2013
GEO: P2200. 0976350 .Al

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