NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 14 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BILLA SINGH, No. 20-70282
Petitioner, Agency No. A089-650-532
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 10, 2021**
Portland, Oregon
Before: WARDLAW, TALLMAN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Billa Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of an order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from a decision
of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) pretermitting his application for adjustment of
status and denying his application for protection under the Convention Against
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Torture (“CAT”). “We review findings of fact for substantial evidence and
questions of law de novo.” Cortez-Pineda v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th
Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we
deny the petition for review.
1. Singh’s petition for review fails to address how the BIA erred in
finding that he forfeited on appeal any challenge to the IJ’s decision that he had
failed to timely file all necessary documents in support of his application for
adjustment or prove he had paid the filing fee. In his opening brief, Singh merely
states that he “filed an attachment with Notice to Appeal, brief with the BIA[,] . . .
and supplemental brief with additional evidence that BIA failed to consider.”
Because Singh failed to “specifically and distinctly argue[]” the issue in his
petition for review, he has forfeited it. Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1048
(9th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up).
2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief
because Singh failed to show it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by
or with the consent or acquiescence of “a public official . . . or other person acting
in an official capacity” if returned to India. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.17(a),
1208.18(a)(1). Where the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision citing Matter of Burbano,
20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (B.I.A. 1994), “we review the IJ’s decision as if it were the
BIA’s.” Cortez-Pineda, 610 F.3d at 1121. Singh argues that the IJ erred by not
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considering that the police were unwilling to help him in the past and points to his
testimony regarding comments made by the police. However, the IJ considered all
the evidence in the record, found that Singh’s testimony was only “marginally
credible,” and noted that general country conditions reports did not indicate that
Singh would be tortured if returned to India. See Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d
915, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming the BIA when petitioner’s testimony was
found not credible and general reports did not compel the conclusion that the
petitioner “would be tortured if returned”). This record does not compel the
conclusion that Singh would be tortured if returned. See id. None of Singh’s other
arguments have merit.
Petitioner’s motion for stay of removal (Docket Entry No. 16) is denied
effective on the issuance of the mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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