State v. Popescu

No. 88-546 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1989 STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- GEORGE R. POPESCU, Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f Chouteau, The H o n o r a b l e Chan ~ t t i e n ,J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Moses Law F i r m ; C h a r l e s F. Moses, B i l l i n g s , Montana F o r Respondent: Hon. Marc ~ a c i c o t ,A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana George Schunk, A s s t . A t t y . G e n e r a l , Helena Thomas J . S h e e h y , C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , F o r t B e n t o n , Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : May 11, 1989 Decided: J u n e 6 , 1989 P Filed: .- <.' ,) ! Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e L. C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f the Court. D e f e n d a n t Popescu was c o n v i c t e d o f two c o u n t s o f f e l o n y a s s a u l t , one c o u n t o f i n t i m i d a t i o n , and one c o u n t o f c r i m i n a l endanqerment i n a iury t r i a l i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r t h e T w e l f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Chouteau County. He appeals. We reverse. The dispositive issue i s whether the District Court e r r e d i n r e q u s i n g t o g i v e any o f t h e j u s t i f i a b l e u s e o f f o r c e i n s t r u c t i o n s o f f e r e d by d e f e n d a n t and by t h e S t a t e . The d e f e n d a n t , who was 37 y e a r s old a t the time of trial, l i v e s a l o n e on a f a r m n e a r F o r t B e n t o n , Montana. Tn 1986 a n d a g a i n in 1987, defendant h i r e d a crew o f custom c o m b i n e r s l e d by J i m R a r k e r o f Yazoo C i t y , Mi.ssissippi, to cut h i s grain. I n J u l y and August 1987, R a r k e r and h i s c r e w cut about 600 acres of g r a i n on d e f e n d a n t ' s farm, leaving about 400 a c r e s uncut. They t h e n went t o a n o t h e r j o b . Their v i e w was t h a t t h e r e m a i n i n g 4 0 0 a c r e s o f g r a i n w e r e n o t y e t r e a d y t o be c u t . D e f e n d a n t ' s v i e w was t h a t t h e y l e f t him i n the lurch. He h i r e d a n o t h e r combiner t o c u t t h e r e m a i n i n g grain. The following Saturday, Rarker and a member of his c r e w , H a s t i n g s , went t o d e f e n d a n t ' s f a r m t o c o l - l e c t t h e i r pay f o r t h e work t h e y had done. D e f e n d a n t and t h e c o m b i n e r s had a heated argument d u r i n g which H a s t i n g s swore a t d e f e n d a n t a n d d e f e n d a n t drew a handgun. B a r k e r and H a s t i n g s t h e n l e f t . The n e x t m o r n i n g , Barker and two o f his crewmembers a g a i n drove o u t t o d e f e n d a n t ' s farm. More h e a t e d words were exchanged. D e f e n d a n t f i r e d h i s gun e i t h e r i n t o t h e a i r ( h i s version) o r a t t h e t h r e e men (their version). B a r k e r and defendant then came t o t h e agreement t h a t if B a r k e r would obtain a written apology from Hastings and return to d e f e n d a n t some wooden b l o c k s and a c r e s c e n t wrench, d e f e n d a n t would pay f o r t h e work d o n e . L a t e r t h a t afternoon, Barker and a crewmember returned to defendant's farm with the r e q u e s t e d i t e m s and d e f e n d a n t w r o t e them a c h e c k . T h a t e v e n i n g d e f e n d a n t went t o t h e C i r c l e K s t o r e i n F o r t Benton t o g e t a t a k e - o u t sandwich. While h e was s t i l l there, Barker and two o t h e r s drove up and p a r k e d next to defendant's truck. Then a n o t h e r p i c k u p d r o v e u p a n d p a r k e d behind defendant's truck. The occupants of that truck t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h i s was t h e o n l y a v a i l a b l e s p o t f o r them t o park. D e f e n d a n t m e t B a r k e r a s d e f e n d a n t was w a l k i n g o u t of the store. Defendant a l s o saw t h e o t h e r custom c o m b i n e r s outside. He d i s p l a y e d h i s gun when B a r k e r said, "We will- s e t t l e t h i s r i g h t h e r e and now." Defendant r e t u r n e d t o h i s p i c k u p , y e l l e d a t t h o s e i n t h e t r u c k b e h i n d h i s t o move, t h e n rammed t h a t t r u c k o u t o f t h e way s o t h a t h e c o u l d l e a v e . One of that truck's passengers was just getting out when defendant rammed i t and i n j u r e d h i s k n e e . D e f e n d a n t went home. Defendant was charged with felony assault for the Saturday evening incident, intimidation and felony assault f o r t h e Sunday m o r n i n g i n c i d e n t , felony a s s a u l t f o r use of t h e gun i n t h e C i r c l e K i n c i d e n t , and c r i m i n a l endangerment for ramming the pickup in the Circle K incident. After hearing t h e evidence, t h e c o u r t dismissed t h e count a r i s i n g out of the Saturday evening incident. Defendant was convicted o f t h e remaining charges. A t trial, defendant offered several instructions concerning the defense of justifiable use of force. The c o u r t r e f u s e d them a l l , s t a t i n g , " T h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e a t a l l from which a threat can be aimed at the defendant and a u t h o r i z i n g him t o a c t t h e way h e d i d . " The S t a t e d i d n o t object to the defendant's proposed instructions on this subject and offered its own proposed j-nstructions on self-defense. The c o u r t r e f u s e d them, t o o . T t i s t h e duty o f t h e District Court t o i n s t r u c t t h e iury on every issue or theory which has support in the evidence. S t a t e v. Starr (19831, 2 0 4 Mont. 210, 217, 664 P.2d 893, 897. The e l e m e n t s of p r o o f n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h justifiable use of f o r c e were described by this Court in S t a t e v. DeMers (Mont. 1988), 762 P.2d 860, 45 St.Rep. 1901.. They are (1) t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was n o t t h e a g g r e s s o r , ( 2 ) t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e d t h a t h e was i n imminent danger o f u n l a w f u l harm, and ( 3 ) t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t used r e a s o n a b l e f o r c e n e c e s s a r y t o d e f e n d h i m s e l f . DeMers , 763 P.2d at 865. In DeMers, the Court reviewed the defendant's testimony to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the issue of j u s t i f i a b l e use of force. In the present case, defendant testified t h a t during his Saturday evening argument with the combiners, when H a s t i n g s swore and began r u n n i n g toward d e f e n d a n t , " I t h o u g h t he f u l l y i n t e n d e d t o a t t a c k me." He s t a t e d t h a t he had been told that Hastings was "real crazy ... wild, irresponsible." He testified that he then grabbed his handgun and t u r n e d t o f a c e H a s t i n g s , s a y i n g "keep away from me. I' A s t o t h e Sunday morning i n c i d e n t , d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t when Barker and t h e two o t h e r crewmembers came t o t h e Popescu farm, t h e y p u l l e d up r a p i d l y r i g h t i n f r o n t o f h i s truck. " I t was v e r y h o s t i l e and a g g r e s s i v e when h e p u l l e d in." He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he feared a 3-against-l f i g h t and a gun i n t o t h e a i r . Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he looked o u t t h e window o f t-he C i r c l e K on Sunday e v e n i n g , he saw Barker p u l l i n a c r o s s t h e p a r k i n g l o t right diagonally at my pickup, the d r i v e r ' s d o o r , and p u l l up r i g h t n e x t t o it j u s t a s c l o s e a s he t h o u g h t he c o u l d g e t a t t h e time. And r i g h t behind t h a t came a n o t h e r p i c k u p , a r e d and w h i t e pickup. Parked behind m p i c k u p . y I was blockaded i n a t t h a t p o i n t . He stated that when he walked out of the store and met Barker, he had his gun in his hand, pointing at the ground. After Barker said, "We will settle this, right here and now," Barker noticed the gun and asked, "Are you going to fire that here in front of everybody?" Defendant testified that he replied, "I will do what is necessary." Defendant testified that when he got into his pickup he "thought I better get out of here. I am going to have to get out of here." He stated that he called out to the occupants of the pickup behind his to move their vehicle, but that they ignored him. He then "lightly tapped" the pickup behind him with his truck, hut the occupants continued to ignore him so he "backed out and moved the pickup out of my wa17." be conclude that under the circumstances presented in 7 this case, the defendant's testimony was sufficient to warrant submitting to the jury the issue of whether defendant exercised justifiable use of force. Defendant's counsel properly entered his obfection to the District Court's refusal to give such instructions. We hold that it was error to fail to instruct on this issue. Because of this error, we reverse. The defendant raised several other issues in his appeal. The first of these is whether the District Court erred in refusing to permit a licensed clinical psychologist to testify in defendant's behalf. The defense offered this testimony under 46-14-102, MCA, which relates to evidence that defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect. However, the defense did not give pretrial notice of relying on mental disease or defect, as required bv S 46-14-201, MCA. We conclude that under these circumstances the court did not err in refusing to allow the testimony. Defendant also raised three issues relating to whether certain witnesses should have been allowed to testify or not. These issues concern failure of the State to provide previous notice of witnesses who testified on rebuttal, failure of the court to grant a continuance to allow the defense to pursue possible exculpatory testimony, and failure of the court to issue certificates for subpoenas for out-of-state witnesses desired by the defense. These issues may or may not re-arise on retrial. We will not consider them now. Finally, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of intimidation for the Sunday morning incident. Since the evidence may not be identical on retrial, we decline to address the issue at this time. Reversed and remanded for retrial. 9/ * y w A ~ - We concur: hief Justice M