rUNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 00-4090
TONY DARNELL KINTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Chief District Judge.
(CR-98-304)
Submitted: June 15, 2000
Decided: June 28, 2000
Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges,
and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Nils E. Gerber, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Walter
C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Paul A. Weinman, Assistant
United States Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appel-
lee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Tony Darnell Kinton pled guilty to bank robbery in violation of 18
U.S.C.A. § 2113(a) (West Supp. 2000), and was sentenced as a career
offender to a term of 210 months imprisonment. See U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (1998). Kinton appeals his sentence,
alleging that the district court clearly erred in finding that he
obstructed justice, see USSG § 3C1.1, and in denying him an adjust-
ment for acceptance of responsibility. See USSG § 3E1.1. We affirm.
When he was interviewed by the probation officer before the pre-
sentence report was prepared, Kinton said he had no prior charges or
convictions under any other name. In fact, as the probation officer
soon discovered, he had seven convictions in 1992 and 1993 under
the name Tony Lester, including two convictions for assault and one
for resisting an officer. At sentencing, Kinton testified that he had
simply forgotten that he had used an alias. The district court did not
find his testimony credible and consequently accepted the probation
officer's recommendation for a two-level adjustment under § 3C1.1.
While we do not review the district court's estimation of Kinton's
credibility, see United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir.
1989), we find that the district court did not clearly err in determining
that Kinton attempted to obstruct justice by providing materially false
information to a probation officer with respect to a presentence inves-
tigation. See USSG § 3C1.1, comment. (n.4(h)) (Section 3C1.1
applies to such conduct). Material information is information that, if
believed, would affect the issue under determination. See USSG
§ 3E1.1, comment. (n.6). If believed, Kinton's false statment would
have lowered his criminal history score. Although Kinton was a
career offender even without reference to the "Tony Lester" offenses,
these offenses were pertinent to the correct calculation of his criminal
history, and we find that the information was material.
2
The court also found that Kinton had not fully accepted responsi-
bility for his criminal conduct. We cannot say that the district court
clearly erred in so finding. See USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n.4) (con-
duct resulting in obstruction of justice adjustment ordinarily indicates
lack of acceptance of responsibility).
We therefore affirm the sentence. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
3