UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-4503
DONATHAN WAYNE HADDEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-4504
DONATHAN WAYNE HADDEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge.
(CR-98-156, CR-98-400)
Submitted: June 6, 2000
Decided: July 18, 2000
Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Parks N. Small, Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellant. J. Rene Josey, United States Attorney, Alfred W.
Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Caro-
lina, for Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Donathan Wayne Hadden appeals his convictions and sentence in
No. 99-4503 for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and
distribution of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 841(a)(1) (West 1999) and 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 1999);
attempted possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in
violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 and 18 U.S.C.A.§ 2 (West 1969); and
using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug traffick-
ing crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West Supp. 2000) and
18 U.S.C.A. § 2. Hadden also appeals his conviction and sentence in
No. 99-4504 for failure to appear at trial in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3146(a)(1) (West Supp. 2000). Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
Hadden raises three issues on appeal, all pertaining to No. 99-4503:
(1) whether the district court abused its discretion in not allowing the
defense expert on police practices to testify to his opinion that Had-
den's arrest in the reverse sting was premature; (2) whether the dis-
trict court abused its discretion in giving an Allen charge;* and (3)
whether the district court erred at sentencing in attributing the two
pounds of fake methamphetamine in the reverse sting to Hadden as
part of the base offense level under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Man-
ual (U.S.S.G.) § 2D1.1 (1998).
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*Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
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First, we uphold the district court's decision to exclude portions of
the defense expert's proposed testimony. This court reviews the dis-
trict court's exclusion of expert testimony for abuse of discretion. See
United States v. Barsanti, 943 F.2d 428, 432 (4th Cir. 1991). Expert
evidence will be admissible if it "will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Because the proposed testimony would not have assisted the jury in
understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue, we find that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the
expert witness to testify that Hadden's arrest was premature.
Second, we find that district court's Allen charge was evenly bal-
anced and did not suggest that jurors should abandon their individual
judgment. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving
the challenged Allen charge. See United States v. Cropp, 127 F.3d
354, 359-60 (4th Cir. 1997).
Finally, we find that the district court did not err in attributing the
two pounds of fake methamphetamine used in the reverse sting to
Hadden. At sentencing, a district court's drug quantity finding must
be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and this court
reviews such findings only for clear error. See United States v.
Lamarr, 75 F.3d 964, 972 (4th Cir. 1996). The general rule in drug
conspiracy cases is that each defendant is responsible for the total
amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy so long as those amounts
were reasonably foreseeable and within the scope of the conspiracy.
See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (n.2); United States v. Banks, 10
F.3d 1044, 1058 (4th Cir. 1993). In reverse sting operations, this
amount is most precisely reflected by the amount agreed upon by the
parties. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (n.12). Because we find that
the entire two pounds of methamphetamine was reasonably foresee-
able to Hadden and clearly within the scope of the conspiracy, the dis-
trict court did not err in attributing this amount to him at sentencing.
Accordingly, we affirm Hadden's convictions and sentences in
Nos. 99-4503 and 99-4504. We deny Hadden's motion to file a pro
se supplemental brief and dispense with oral argument because the
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facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
No. 99-4503 - AFFIRMED
No. 99-4504 - AFFIRMED
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