UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
DAVID A. SUMRALL,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 00-6325
STEWART SIMMS,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Marvin J. Garbis, District Judge.
(CA-00-343-MJG)
Submitted: July 25, 2000
Decided: September 12, 2000
Before MURNAGHAN,* WILKINS, and TRAXLER,
Circuit Judges.
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Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
David A. Sumrall, Appellant Pro Se.
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*Judge Murnaghan was assigned to the panel in this case but died prior
to the time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by a quorum of
the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
David A. Sumrall appeals the district court's order dismissing his
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A
(West Supp. 2000). He challenges the Division of Corrections' failure
to award him 129 days of credit toward his sentence; he alleges, and
the materials in the current record suggest, that the denial was based
on the Division's loss of records pertaining to the credits.
Sentence and credit calculations are generally issues of state, not
federal law, and these claims do not give rise to federal habeas juris-
diction unless the violation of state law amounts to a "fundamental
defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice."
See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Hailey v. Dorsey,
580 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1978) (quoting Hill , 368 U.S. 424, 428
(1962)). Inmates may have a protectable liberty interest in credits
against their sentences, if the state statute creating those credits is
mandatory rather than permissive. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of
Nebraska Penal & Correctional Ctr., 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979); Paoli v.
Lally, 812 F.2d 1489, 1492-93 (4th Cir. 1987); Jackson v. Carlson,
707 F.2d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 1983); Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 1037,
1039 (4th Cir. 1976). While the relevant statutory sections are permis-
sive, and expressly permit the Division of Corrections to rescind the
credits for disciplinary infractions, see Md. Ann. Code art. 27,
§§ 700(g); 704(A)(g), Sumrall does not claim his liberty interest was
infringed by a discretionary denial of credits. Further, the record does
not suggest that the credits were revoked based on a disciplinary
infraction. Rather, Sumrall alleges that the Division of Corrections is
denying him credits based upon its decision that Sumrall will not
receive the disputed credits solely because the Division cannot locate
appropriate incarceration records for Sumrall and therefore cannot
"verify" the credits. (R. 2, at Exhibits).
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In the absence of a response to the petition, we cannot determine
whether Sumrall's claims amount to an arbitrary and capricious denial
of credit for time he earned, or whether there is some proper basis for
declining to award him credit. Accordingly, we grant a certificate of
appealability, vacate the order of the district court, and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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