Peterson v. Piedmont Technical

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT BOBBIE J. PETERSON,  Plaintiff-Appellant, v.  No. 00-1631 PIEDMONT TECHNICAL COLLEGE; DR. LEX WALTERS, Defendants-Appellees.  Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry R. Herlong, Jr., District Judge. (CA-98-3567) Submitted: October 31, 2000 Decided: November 20, 2000 Before LUTTIG and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. COUNSEL Bobbie J. Peterson, Appellant Pro Se. Charles J. Boykin, Thomas Kennedy Barlow, DUFF, DUBBERLY, TURNER, WHITE & BOYKIN, L.L.C., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. 2 PETERSON v. PIEDMONT TECHNICAL COLLEGE Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). OPINION PER CURIAM: Bobbie Peterson worked as a secretary at Piedmont Technical Col- lege (PTC) in South Carolina for twenty-two years before her employment was terminated in 1998. Peterson, who is black, filed this action asserting that her transfer to another position in January 1998 and her termination in November 1998 were motivated by racial dis- crimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-5 to 2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000). The district court entered summary judgment against Peterson on the rec- ommendation of the magistrate judge. Both concluded that, even assuming that Peterson established a prima facie case of discrimina- tion, she did not satisfy this court’s requirement that she have evi- dence showing PTC’s reasons for the disputed actions were pretextual, and that the real motive was discrimination—the so-called "pretext plus" standard. See generally Vaughn v. Metrahealth Cos., 145 F.3d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court has held recently that such a pretext plus requirement does not accurately describe the plaintiff’s burden in withstanding a summary judgment motion. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000). But we conclude that the district court’s decision must still be affirmed. First, we note that the issue of Peterson’s termination is not prop- erly before the Court. Peterson’s complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission dealt only with her transfer, and was filed before the termination. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction over any complaint of discrimination regarding her termination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962-63 (4th Cir. 1996). As to the transfer, Peterson has failed to make out a prima facie PETERSON v. PIEDMONT TECHNICAL COLLEGE 3 case of discrimination. As she has put forth no direct evidence of dis- crimination, Peterson’s prima facie case is assessed under the McDon- nell Douglas* method of proof. In this case, Peterson must establish: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) at the time of the adverse action she was per- forming up to her employer’s expectations; and (4) other similarly sit- uated employees who are not members of the protected class did not suffer the same adverse action. See Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 607 (4th Cir. 1999). Peterson’s transfer to a posi- tion with equal pay, benefits, seniority and responsibility as in her prior position does not qualify as an adverse employment action. See Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 255-56 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that reassignment can only support a Title VII claim if the reassignment had "significant detrimental effect"). As Peterson has not successfully supported a prima facie claim of employment discrimination, we affirm the judgment of the district court. Her conclusory allegations of bias against the district judge entitle her to no relief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).