Rogers v. McDade

OPINION ON REHEARING UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT JEFFREY DWAYNE ROGERS,  Petitioner-Appellant, v. MARTIN MCDADE, Superintendent;  No. 00-7823 NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Respondents-Appellees.  Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Graham C. Mullen, Chief District Judge. (CA-96-15-4-MU) Submitted: September 28, 2001 Decided: April 3, 2002 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. COUNSEL Jeffrey Dwayne Rogers, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CARO- LINA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. 2 ROGERS v. MCDADE Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). OPINION PER CURIAM: Jeffrey Dwayne Rogers seeks to appeal the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Respondents and denying his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (West 1994) (current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001). We grant Respondents’ petition for rehearing but deny rehearing en banc. Upon our review, we find insufficient evidence that the State’s factfinding was deficient in some significant respect. See Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, we affirm based on the reasoning of the dis- trict court. Rogers v. McDade, No. CA-96-15-4-MU (W.D.N.C. filed Nov. 27, 2000; entered Nov. 30, 2000); see North Carolina v. Rogers, File No. 93 CRS 7128, 7129 (Sup. Ct. Wilkes County June 12, 1995). We note that the district court granted Rogers’ request for a certifi- cate of appealability. However, such a certificate is not necessary because this § 2254 petition was filed prior to the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557, 565-66, (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1065 (1999). To the extent it is necessary, we grant a certificate of probable cause. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1994). We dis- pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED