United States v. Tuttle

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  Plaintiff-Appellee, v.  No. 02-4727 CHRISTOPHER LEE TUTTLE, Defendant-Appellant.  Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. Frank W. Bullock, Jr., District Judge. (CR-02-80) Submitted: January 30, 2003 Decided: February 6, 2003 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. COUNSEL Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, William C. Ingram, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Randall S. Galyon, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Caro- lina, for Appellee. 2 UNITED STATES v. TUTTLE Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). OPINION PER CURIAM: Christopher Lee Tuttle pled guilty to bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2000). He contests the 156-month career offender sentence imposed by the district court, arguing that the dis- trict court erred by enhancing his base offense level by three levels for possession of a firearm during the offense when that fact was not alleged in the indictment. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 2K2.1(b)(4), 4B1.1 (2001). He contests his career offender sen- tence on the same ground. We affirm. Tuttle contends that, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), facts that increase the sentencing guideline range must be charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. However, Apprendi is not implicated when the sentencing court makes factual findings that increase the sentencing guideline range but the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. Harris v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2406, 2418 (2002). The statutory maximum for Tuttle’s offense is 240 months. Because neither of the issues raised by Tuttle has merit, we affirm the sentence imposed by the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pre- sented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED