UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-7242
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
BRUCE DOUGLAS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Orangeburg. Patrick Michael Duffy, District
Judge. (CA-03-1511; CR-93-92)
Submitted: December 19, 2003 Decided: February 18, 2004
Before LUTTIG, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Bruce Douglas, Appellant Pro Se. Mark C. Moore, Assistant United
States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Bruce Douglas appeals the district court’s order denying
his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (2000),
based upon a retroactive amendment to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines.
In July 1993, Douglas was convicted of conspiracy to
possess with the intent to distribute cocaine base, and four counts
of distribution of cocaine base. Under the applicable section of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, his base offense level was
determined to be 40. The corresponding Guidelines range was 292 to
365 months. Douglas was sentenced to 300 months imprisonment.
In 1994, the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 505,
which reduced the maximum base offense level for Douglas’ offense
from 42 to 38. The amendment was made retroactively applicable
under USSG § 1B1.10. Based on this amendment, Douglas filed a
motion to modify his sentence. The district court denied his
motion.
The decision to reduce a sentence based on an amendment
to the sentencing guidelines is discretionary. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) (2000); United States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 727
(4th Cir. 2000). Thus, the district court’s decision not to reduce
Douglas’ sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See
United States v. Dorrough, 84 F.3d 1309, 1311 (10th Cir. 1996).
Douglas contends that in denying his motion for a reduced sentence,
- 2 -
the district court impermissibly relied upon his unwillingness to
cooperate with the Government and his refusal to testify at trial.
However, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the
district court relied on Douglas’ uncooperativeness and his refusal
to testify. Instead, the record indicates that the district court
considered the relevant factors listed in section 3553, and
declined to grant Douglas a modified sentence on the basis of those
factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) (providing a list of
relevant factors the district court must consider in every
sentencing). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
Dorrough, 84 F.3d at 1311.
We affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 3 -