UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-4676
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RALPH H. COWGILL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Margaret B. Seymour, District
Judge. (CR-02-263)
Submitted: March 25, 2004 Decided: March 30, 2004
Before TRAXLER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ann Briks Walsh, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Kevin F. McDonald, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Ralph H. Cowgill pled guilty to one count of sending
written threatening communications through the Postal Service in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 976 (2000). He received a sixteen-month
sentence. Cowgill’s attorney has filed a brief in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in her
opinion, there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but asserting
that the district court failed to meet the requirements of Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure at the plea hearing and
failed to properly calculate Cowgill’s sentence. Cowgill has filed
a pro se supplemental brief. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
Neither claim presented by counsel was preserved in the
district court. Therefore, they are reviewed for plain error.
United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 526-27 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 899 (2002). First, Cowgill contends his Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 plea hearing was inadequate. In light of the district
court’s thorough plea colloquy, we find Cowgill was fully aware of
his rights and the consequences of his plea and that his plea was
knowing and voluntary. We find the district court complied with
the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Cowgill’s
plea.
Next, Cowgill challenges the district court’s calculation
of the guideline range and the specific sentence imposed. We find
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that the guideline range was correctly calculated. Furthermore,
because the sentence is within the properly calculated guideline
range and the statutory maximum penalty for the offense, this court
has no authority to review the district court’s imposition of this
specific sentence. United States v. Porter, 909 F.2d 789, 794 (4th
Cir. 1990).
We have reviewed the entire record in this case in
accordance with the requirements of Anders and find no meritorious
issues for appeal. We further find Cowgill’s claims in his pro se
supplemental brief without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the district court. This court requires that counsel
inform her client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If the client
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such
a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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