UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-4728
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER DEON BELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (CR-03-46)
Submitted: March 22, 2004 Decided: April 15, 2004
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
William L. Osteen, Jr., ADAMS & OSTEEN, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Angela Hewlett Miller, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Deon Bell pled guilty to attempted bank
robbery and was sentenced to 121 months of imprisonment. On
appeal, his counsel has filed a brief under Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), alleging that there are no meritorious claims
for appeal but raising the following issues: Whether (1) Bell was
properly sentenced under the Sentencing Guidelines and (2) the
district court should have departed because he provided
extraordinary acceptance of responsibility or assistance to the
administration of justice. Although informed of the right to do
so, Bell has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm in part, and dismiss in part.
We review a question involving the legal interpretation
of guidelines terminology and the application of that terminology
to a particular set of facts de novo. United States v. Wessells,
936 F.2d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 1991). Factual determinations that
underlie the application of the guidelines are reviewed for clear
error. United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 217-18 (4th Cir.
1989). We find that Bell was properly sentenced. More
specifically, we find that the court’s decision to increase Bell’s
offense level by six, under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(B) (2000), was proper, as the firearm at issue was
“otherwise used.”
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Next, Bell alleges that the district court should have
departed downward because he provided “extraordinary acceptance” of
responsibility. Where, as here, the sentencing court was aware of
its authority to depart and declined to do so, we lack authority to
review its decision. United States v. Edwards, 188 F.3d 230,
238-39 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28,
30-31 (4th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, we dismiss this portion of the
appeal.
We have examined the entire record in this case in
accordance with the requirements of Anders and find no meritorious
issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm in part, and dismiss in
part. We deny counsel’s motion to withdraw. This court requires
that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the
client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
DISMISSED IN PART
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