UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4141
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LEROY FELTON, a/k/a Joe Nelson Felton,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Jerome B. Friedman, District
Judge. (CR-99-66)
Submitted: July 2, 2004 Decided: July 15, 2004
Before WILLIAMS and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Larry M. Dash,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Norfolk, Virginia, for
Appellant. Paul Joseph McNulty, United States Attorney,
Alexandria, Virginia; Laura Marie Everhart, Assistant United States
Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Leroy Felton appeals from the district court’s order
revoking his supervised release and imposing a four-month prison
term and a twenty-four month term of supervised release. Felton’s
counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), stating that, in their view, there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal but raising three issues. Felton was advised of
his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but did not do so.
We affirm.
Counsel contend that the district court erred by revoking
Felton’s supervised release. Our review of the record convinces us
that the preponderance of the evidence established that Felton
violated certain conditions of his supervised release. See 18
U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004). We therefore find
no abuse of discretion in the district court’s revocation of
Felton’s supervised release. See United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d
829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating standard of review).
Counsel also contend that the district court failed to
consider the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2004) before sentencing Felton. We find, however, that the
district court properly considered the factors set forth in
§ 3553(a). See United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir.
1995) (“A court need not engage in ritualistic incantation in order
to establish its consideration of a legal issue. It is sufficient
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if . . . the district court rules on issues that have been fully
presented for determination. Consideration is implicit in the
court’s ultimate ruling.”).
Finally, counsel suggest that Felton’s sentence is
plainly unreasonable. Because the district court sentenced Felton
to the low end of the suggested sentencing guideline range, see
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4(a), p.s. (2003), we find
that the sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
In accordance with the requirements of Anders, we have
reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no
meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm. This court
requires that counsel inform their client, in writing, of his right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believe that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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