UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-6664
JAMES STRONG,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
JON E. OZMINT, Director, South Carolina
Department of Corrections; GARY MAYNARD, South
Carolina Department of Corrections Official;
ROBERT WARD, South Carolina Department of
Corrections Official; LAURIE F. BESSINGER,
South Carolina Department of Corrections
Official; BERNARD MCKIE, South Carolina
Department of Corrections Official; JAMES
SLEIGH, South Carolina Department of
Corrections Employee; TRACY BAXLY, South
Carolina Department of Corrections Employee;
GENE NOLES, South Carolina Department of
Corrections Employee; NFN MARTIN, South
Carolina Department of Corrections Employee;
NFN ESSTIES, South Carolina Department of
Corrections Employee; MARCELLA MCCOY, South
Carolina Department of Corrections Employee;
ALVIN GRABER, South Carolina Department of
Corrections Employee; ROBERT M. STEWART, South
Carolina State Law Enforcement Division;
ROBERT ESPISITO, South Carolina Department of
Corrections Employee; JOEL MOORE, South
Carolina Department of Corrections Employee;
SAM LATTA, South Carolina Department of
Corrections Employee; ALEX UNDERWOOD,
Corporal, South Carolina Law Enforcement
Division; VAUGHN JACKSON, South Carolina
Department of Corrections Employee; TYRONE
MURRAY, South Carolina Department of
Corrections Employee; SAM DUCKETT, South
Carolina Department of Corrections Employee;
NFN ROBINSON, South Carolina Department of
Corrections Employee; NFN BOULWARE, South
Carolina Department of Corrections; LARRY
BINBOW, South Carolina Department of
Corrections Employee; TEDDY REEVES, South
Carolina Department of Corrections Employee;
SAM PARKER, JR., South Carolina Department of
Corrections Employee; SERGEANT PETERSON, South
Carolina Department of Corrections; JAMES
GLOVER, South Carolina Department of
Corrections Employee; ELLIOT PALLARD, South
Carolina Department of Corrections Employee;
PHILLIP ADAMS, South Carolina Department of
Corrections Employee,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Margaret B. Seymour, District
Judge. (CA-03-2256)
Submitted: July 9, 2004 Decided: August 11, 2004
Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
James Strong, Appellant Pro Se. Andrew Frederick Lindemann, Barton
J. Vincent, DAVIDSON, MORRISON & LINDEMANN, P.A., Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
James R. Strong, who is an inmate in the maximum security
unit of Kirkland Correctional Institution in Columbia, South
Carolina, initiated a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) action in which he
challenged various conditions of his confinement. In the course of
that proceeding, Strong filed the following motions, the denial of
which is the subject of this appeal: (1) For declaratory judgment
and/or preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from cutting
his hair and beard; (2) For a temporary restraining order to
restrain the defendants from denying him “incoming publications,
periodicals, renewal of subscriptions, religious literature,
magazines, books, etc.”; and (3) For a preliminary injunction for
removal of restraints during outdoor exercise. Those motions,
along with several others, were referred to a magistrate judge for
a recommendation. The magistrate judge recommended that all of the
motions be denied. After considering Strong’s objections, the
district court adopted the report and recommendation and denied all
of Strong’s motions, and Strong timely appealed. We dismiss in
part and affirm in part.
To the extent that Strong appeals the denial of
temporary restraining orders, such orders are generally not
appealable. See Virginia v. Tenneco, Inc., 538 F.2d 1026, 1029-30
(4th Cir. 1976). We therefore dismiss the appeal insofar as Strong
is appealing the denial of temporary restraining orders. We review
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the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, which is appealable
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), for abuse of discretion “only in order
to determine ‘whether the trial court abused its discretion in
finding the presence or absence of irreparable harm and a
probability that the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits.’” See
Planned Parenthood of Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352, 359 (4th
Cir. 1998) (en banc). We find no such abuse of discretion in the
district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief. Thus, to
the extent that Strong appeals the denial of preliminary injunctive
relief, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.
See Strong v. Ozmint, No. CA-03-2256 (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 2004).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART
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