UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4192
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHARLES E. HENLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District
Judge. (CR-03-226)
Submitted: August 20, 2004 Decided: August 31, 2004
Before TRAXLER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Carolyn V. Grady, CAROLYN V. GRADY, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Michael J.
Elston, Elizabeth C. Wu, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Charles E. Henley appeals from the judgment of the
district court convicting him of possession with intent to
distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000),
and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2000). Henley claims that the court
erred in denying his motion to suppress. Finding no error, we
affirm.
This court reviews the district court’s factual findings
underlying a motion to suppress for clear error, and the district
court’s legal determinations de novo. Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868,
873 (4th Cir. 1992). When a suppression motion has been denied,
this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government. See United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th
Cir. 1998).
Henley first claims that the district court erred in
concluding that his encounter with Officer Christopher Gleason of
the Richmond Police Department did not amount to an illegal seizure
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Our review of the record
supports the district court’s conclusion. During the entire
encounter, the officers never impeded Henley’s movement, threatened
him, or subjected him to any other kind of coercion. In fact, at
least one other individual walked away from the officer despite the
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officer’s request to speak with him. Therefore, the district court
correctly determined that no seizure occurred because, under the
totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe
that he was free to leave the encounter. See Florida v. Bostick,
501 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1991).
Next, Henley argues that his consent to search was not
voluntary but the product of police coercion. Our review of the
record supports the district court’s conclusion. No credible
evidence was introduced at the suppression hearing that suggested
that the officers used coercive tactics to gain Henley’s consent.
In fact, Henley complied to Officer Gleason’s request without
protest and did not hesitate to proceed with the search. The
district court did not clearly err in finding that Henley's consent
to search was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973); Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); United States v. Analla,
975 F.2d 119, 125 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gordon, 895
F.2d 932, 938 (4th Cir. 1990).
Accordingly, we find that the district court did not
clearly err in denying Henley’s motion to suppress. See Ornelas,
517 U.S. at 699. We affirm the judgment of the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
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are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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