UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4186
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MARY ELLEN PALLO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (CR-04-7)
Submitted: August 25, 2004 Decided: September 14, 2004
Before WIDENER, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Frank D. Whitney, United States Attorney, Christine
Witcover Dean, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Mary Ellen Pallo appeals from the district court’s order
revoking her supervised release and sentencing her to four months
imprisonment. On appeal, she contends that the court abused its
discretion when it revoked her release. We affirm.
We review the district court’s decision to revoke a
defendant’s supervised release for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). The district
court need only find a violation of a condition of supervised
release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3583(e)(3) (West Supp. 2004). We review factual determinations
informing the conclusion that a violation occurred for clear error.
United States v. Carothers, 337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Whalen, 82 F.3d 528, 532 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding
district court’s credibility determinations concerning evidence
presented at a supervised release revocation hearing not reviewable
on appeal).
Here, the court found Pallo’s testimony that her
violations of supervised release were caused by miscommunications
to be not credible. In addition, although Pallo provided excuses
for failing to meet her financial and reporting requirements, it is
undisputed that she did not comply with the conditions of her
supervised release. Thus, we find that a preponderance of the
evidence supported the district court’s findings. The district
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court was, therefore, statutorily authorized to revoke supervised
release and impose a prison term. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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