UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4093
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHARLES ALEXANDER HUGHES, JR., a/k/a Curly,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert J. Staker, Senior
District Judge. (CR-94-15)
Submitted: September 1, 2004 Decided: September 21, 2004
Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William Harding, TWYMAN & HARDING, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellant. Kasey Warner, United States Attorney, Stephanie L.
Haines, Assistant United States Attorney, Huntington, West
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Charles Alexander Hughes, Jr., appeals the district
court’s judgment revoking his term of supervised release and
imposing a term of imprisonment of twenty-four months. Finding no
error, we affirm.
Hughes asserts the district court erred in concluding he
violated the terms of his supervised release without considering
the affidavit or testimony of Rebecca Dennison. This court reviews
a revocation of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642-43. The Government’s evidence
was sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
Hughes violated the terms governing his supervised release. See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2000). Further, the district court did not
abuse its sound discretion by excluding Dennison’s affidavit from
evidence. See United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734, 744 (4th
Cir. 1996). Moreover, Hughes’ claim that the district court acted
prejudicially because it failed to grant a continuance to hail
Dennison into court to testify is unsupported by the record. Thus,
this claim lacks merit.
Hughes further contends that the district court failed to
find that the United States Probation Officer Michael Hill engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law when he filed the revocation
petition. Specifically, Hughes claims that the plain and clear
language of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3603(8)(B), (9) (2000), only allows a
- 2 -
probation officer to report violations to the court and prohibits
a probation officer from petitioning the court for revocation of
supervised release. However, Hughes’ claim is meritless because
the statute does not prohibit the probation officer from
petitioning the court; in fact, 18 U.S.C. § 3603(8)(B) directs the
probation officer to immediately report any violation of the
conditions of release to the court. Therefore, the district court
did not plainly err in failing to find that Probation Officer Hill
exceeded the authority of his office by filing a petition to revoke
Hughes’ term of supervised release. See United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
Accordingly, we affirm the revocation of Hughes’
supervised release and the consequent imposition of imprisonment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 3 -