UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-1564
LISA ARTHUR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
TOWN OF BLACKSTONE, VIRGINIA,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
CLYDE ROTHGEB; THE BLACKSTONE POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
No. 04-1588
LISA ARTHUR,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TOWN OF BLACKSTONE, VIRGINIA,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
CLYDE ROTHGEB; THE BLACKSTONE POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District
Judge. (CA-03-670-3)
Submitted: September 29, 2004 Decided: October 14, 2004
Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
No. 04-1564 affirmed; No. 04-1588 dismissed by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
William G. Shields, James A. Eichner, THORSEN & SCHER, L.L.P.,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant/Cross-appellee Arthur. Robert A.
Dybing, THOMPSON & McMULLAN, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee/Cross-appellant Town of Blackstone.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
In Appeal No. 04-1564, Lisa Arthur appeals from the
district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the
Town of Blackstone, Virginia (“Town”), and Clyde Rothgeb
(“Rothgeb”) in this employment discrimination action. Arthur
contends that the district court erred (1) in finding that her
administrative charge was untimely as to comments made by Rothgeb
in the Fall of 2000 that she alleged established a hostile work
environment and (2) in rejecting her retaliation claim on the
ground that she did not engage in a protected activity. In Appeal
No. 04-1588, the Town cross appeals and sets forth an additional
ground on which the district court could have granted summary
judgment. We affirm the judgment of the district court and dismiss
the cross appeal.
The district court referred this case to a magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2000), and the
magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied. The timely
filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge’s
recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the
substance of that recommendation. See Wells v. Shriners Hosp., 109
F.3d 198, 201 (4th Cir. 1997); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841,
845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985). Arthur has waived appellate review of the timeliness of
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the hostile work environment claim raised on appeal by failing to
file objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation.
Arthur also challenges the district court’s conclusion
that she failed to forecast evidence of a prima facie case of
retaliation. We note that counsel mentions the ground on which the
district court relied—-that Arthur’s complaint about a rumor
Rothgeb allegedly spread about Arthur did not constitute protected
activity—-but does not put forth any argument that the district
court erred with respect thereto. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)
(“[T]he argument . . . must contain . . . appellant’s contentions
and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and
parts of the record on which the appellant relies.”). And although
Arthur does make such an argument in her reply brief, “‘an issue
first argued in a reply brief is not properly before a court of
appeals.’” United States v. Lewis, 235 F.3d 215, 218 n.3 (4th Cir.
2000) (quoting Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1152 n.2 (4th
Cir. 1996)). We therefore find that this issue is not properly
before us.* See id. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
*
Moreover, even if the claim were not abandoned, Arthur’s
general objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation is
insufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. See
Page v. Lee, 337 F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he failure
to raise an objection ‘sufficiently specific to focus the district
court’s attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in
dispute’ waives any appellate review.”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1115 (2004).
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Turning to the Town’s cross appeal, the Town correctly
recognizes that “we need not reach the arguments raised by the
Town[] in [its] cross-appeal” where the order granting summary
judgment is affirmed. APAC Carolina, Inc. v. Town of Allendale,
S.C., 41 F.3d 157, 160 n.2, 167 (4th Cir. 1994). We therefore
dismiss the cross appeal in No. 04-1588. See Pension Trust Fund
for Operating Eng’rs v. Fed. Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 944, 947 n.1 (9th
Cir. 2002) (dismissing cross appeal by party not aggrieved by
district court judgment).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
No. 04-1564 AFFIRMED
No. 04-1588 DISMISSED
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