UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-1858
JUDY G. STANLEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE BARNHART, Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. Pamela Meade Sargent,
Magistrate Judge. (CA-03-84-2)
Submitted: November 3, 2004 Decided: November 18, 2004
Before NIEMEYER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John P. Bradwell, SHORTRIDGE & SHORTRIDGE, P.C., Abingdon,
Virginia, for Appellant. Donna L. Calvert, Regional Chief Counsel,
Patricia M. Smith, Deputy Regional Chief Counsel, Reesha Trznadel,
Assistant Regional Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; John L. Brownlee, United States
Attorney, Julie C. Dudley, Assistant United States Attorney,
Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Judy G. Stanley appeals the district court's decision
affirming the Commissioner's denial of supplemental security income
benefits. We affirm.
Stanley makes the following arguments: (1) the
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) improperly substituted his own
opinion for the opinion of the medical experts; (2) the ALJ
improperly weighed the residual function capacity assessments of
non-examining state agency physicians; and (3) the ALJ incorrectly
concluded that Stanley was not disabled as a result of her mental
impairments, despite her exertional abilities.
We must uphold the district court’s disability
determination if it is supported by substantial evidence. See 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th
Cir. 1990). Stanley argues that the ALJ substituted his own
opinion that Stanley did not suffer from a severe emotional
impairment for those of the medical experts. This argument is
without merit. In reaching his conclusion, the ALJ properly
discredited medical assessments based solely on Stanley’s
subjective reports of emotional impairment. The medical source
opinion regulations indicate that the more consistent an opinion is
with the record as a whole, the more weight the Commissioner will
give it. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d) (2004). The bulk of the
evidence indicated that Stanley’s daily life activities were not
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affected to the extent she alleged. Thus, we find that the ALJ’s
opinion was supported by substantial evidence.
Next, Stanley argues that the ALJ improperly gave more
weight to the residual functioning capacity assessments of non-
examining state agency physicians over those of examining
physicians. This argument is also unavailing. In reaching his
conclusion, the ALJ properly considered the evidence provided by
Drs. Senter and Kanwal in the context of the other medical and
vocational evidence. Again, the bulk of the evidence throughout
the lengthy record indicated that Stanley’s daily life activities
were not limited to the extent alleged.
Finally, Stanley argues that the ALJ incorrectly
concluded that she was not disabled as a result of her mental
impairments, despite her exertional abilities. Because we have
already concluded that there is substantial evidence supporting the
ALJ’s finding that Stanley can perform limited light work, it is
not necessary to address this argument.
Therefore, although Stanley clearly suffers from back and
knee problems, as well as carpal tunnel syndrome, borderline
intellectual functioning, depression, and anxiety, substantial
evidence supports a finding that these deficiencies do not
significantly limit Stanley’s ability to perform limited light
work.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying
benefits. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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