UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4204
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MELVIN H. NOBLE, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior
District Judge. (CR-03-263)
Submitted: September 1, 2004 Decided: November 22, 2004
Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Amy L. Austin,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Michael J.
Elston, S. David Schiller, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Melvin H. Noble, Jr., was convicted of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2000), and misdemeanor possession of marijuana in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 844 (2000), and sentenced to a total of twenty-one months
imprisonment. The charges arose out of a traffic stop of Noble
while he was operating a moped. On appeal, Noble challenges the
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress the evidence
discovered during the traffic stop and any statements he made at
that time. Finding no error by the district court in denying the
suppression motion, we affirm.
During the hearing on Noble’s motion to suppress,
Lieutenant William C. Smith testified that he observed Noble
operating a moped without his helmet properly in place and without
protective eye wear. Upon approaching the moped from behind, Smith
noted that the moped had a license plate bracket, but no plate. He
testified that he stopped the moped “based on the violation that he
was not wearing his helmet properly, had no eye protection, no face
protection whatsoever, and the vehicle itself, it was -- I could
not determine whether or not it was properly registered or is a
non[-]motor vehicle, or could have been stolen.”*
*
The Virginia Code defines a moped to include vehicles “with
an engine displacement of [fifty] cubic centimeters or less and a
maximum speed of less than [thirty] miles per hour.” Va. Code Ann.
§ 46.2-100 (Michie Supp. 2004) (“Definitions”). If the vehicle
operated by Noble did not meet this definition, it would have
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Once stopped, Noble provided Smith with identification
and a registration form for a moped registered to someone having
the same address as Noble. The registration form listed a vehicle
identification number (VIN) for the moped. Lieutenant Smith
testified that he unsuccessfully attempted to locate the VIN on the
exterior of the moped to verify that the registration form provided
by Noble was for the moped that he was operating. Smith asked
Noble where the VIN was located; Noble replied that he did not
know. In response to Smith’s inquiry as to whether the VIN was
under the seat, Noble handed Smith his keys and said, “I don’t
know, but you can check.”
Smith then opened the seat compartment and, while looking
for the VIN, he discovered a firearm. Smith placed Noble under
arrest for his possession of the firearm, and searched Noble
incident to the arrest. This search uncovered three baggies of
marijuana, with a total approximate weight of 5.2 grams.
The district court denied the motion to suppress the
firearm, marijuana, and any statements Noble made, finding that the
officer’s actions in attempting to determine ownership of the moped
were reasonable, the firearm was discovered in the course of these
actions, and the marijuana was discovered during a valid search
incident to arrest. The court also found that Noble consented to
the search of the seat compartment.
required a license plate.
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This Court has held that a police officer may make an
investigative stop of a vehicle upon a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. United States v. Reedy, 990 F.2d 167, 168 (4th
Cir. 1993). When an officer observes the commission of a traffic
violation, he has a reasonable basis upon which to stop the vehicle
and inquire. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
Lieutenant Smith observed Noble operating the moped while
not wearing his helmet properly and not wearing eye protection.
These traffic violations justified the stop of the moped.
Additionally, Smith noted that there was no license plate in the
license plate bracket mounted on the moped. The presence of the
bracket suggested that the moped may require a license plate, and
the absence of a license plate suggested that the moped may have
been stolen. Based on these facts, Lieutenant Smith had reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity and the stop was justified. See
Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
Noble asserts that “[w]hen the driver has produced a
valid license and proof that he is entitled to operate the
[vehicle], he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being
subject to further delay by police for additional questioning.”
United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 876 (4th Cir. 1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Any further detention for
questioning is beyond the scope of the Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
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(1968)] stop and therefore illegal unless the officer has a
reasonable suspicion of a serious crime.” Id.
However, as Lieutenant Smith testified, Noble had not
produced proof that he was entitled to operate the vehicle. The
registration form Noble provided was not in his name.
Additionally, Lieutenant Smith was unable to determine whether that
registration form was for the moped that Noble was operating.
Smith’s attempt to match the moped to the registration by locating
a corresponding VIN on the moped was reasonable in light of his
suspicion at the time of the stop that the moped may have been
stolen. We agree with the district court that Smith’s inquiry did
not exceed the scope of the stop--which was for the dual purposes
of issuing a warning or a citation to Noble for the helmet
violation and determining whether the vehicle might be stolen in
light of the absence of a license plate in the mounted bracket.
Accordingly, we find no error by the district court in determining
that the firearm was discovered during a reasonable investigatory
stop. See United States v. Singh, 363 F.3d 347, 355-56 (4th Cir.
2004). Because the firearm was discovered during the officer’s
reasonable investigatory stop of Noble and the marijuana was
discovered during a search incident to a lawful arrest, Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), neither was required to be
suppressed.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying
Noble’s motion to suppress and accordingly affirm his conviction
and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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