UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4044
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
JOHN W. BEARD,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District
Judge. (CR-03-265)
Argued: September 30, 2004 Decided: January 7, 2005
Before WILLIAMS, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Michael James Elston, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellant. Amy Lee Austin, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Paul J. McNulty,
United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Frank
W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia; Mary
E. Maguire, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
The Government appeals the district court’s order granting
John Beard’s motion to suppress statements he made to police
officers. Because the district court applied the wrong legal test
in determining that Beard was in custody, and because Beard was not
in custody under the correct legal test, we reverse.
I.
On April 26, 2003, Richmond police received a report of a
domestic disturbance at 1043 Barlen Drive. Two police officers,
Officers Eugene J. Provost and Tim Degrauwe, responded to the
report. Officer Provost interviewed Beard’s mother, sister, and
brother, while Officer Degrauwe went inside the house to speak with
Beard.
Through his interviews, Officer Provost learned that Beard had
threatened his sister with a shotgun. Officer Provost retrieved
the shotgun from a van parked outside the house. After discovering
that the barrel of the shotgun had been sawed off and was an
illegal length, Officer Provost went inside to talk to Beard.
Officer Provost found Officer Degrauwe and Beard, who was ironing
clothes, in Beard’s bedroom.
As Officer Provost entered the room, he signaled to Officer
Degrauwe, “we [are] going to end up cuffing [Beard].” (J.A. at 21,
32.) There is, however, no evidence that Beard either observed or
2
understood this signal. Officer Provost then advised Beard of his
“Miranda rights,” (J.A. at 21), but exactly what Officer Provost
said is unclear. Officer Provost questioned Beard about the
shotgun, and Beard confessed that he was a convicted felon, the gun
was for home protection, and he had accidentally pointed the
shotgun at his sister the night before. The officers handcuffed
Beard and took him to the police station. The entire episode, from
the time Officer Provost walked into Beard’s bedroom to the time
the officers handcuffed Beard, happened very quickly. At the
police station, the officers gave Beard a Rights Waiver Form, but
Beard refused to sign it or to cooperate further.
On July 22, 2003, a grand jury sitting in the Eastern District
of Virginia charged Beard in a two-count indictment with being a
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.A §
922(g)(1) (West 2002) (Count One) and possessing an unregistered
firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C.A § 5861(d) (West 2002) (Count
Two). On December 1, 2003, Beard filed a motion to suppress his
confession, arguing that it was taken in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). On December 12, 2003, the district
court held a hearing on the motion.
Officer Provost was the only witness who testified at the
hearing. On the stand, he recounted the events that lead up to
Beard’s arrest. When he discussed whether he informed Beard of his
rights at the house, Officer Provost stated that he had advised
3
Beard of his “constitutional rights,” (J.A. at 21), his “Miranda
rights,” (J.A. at 21), or simply his “rights” (J.A. at 23.) The
prosecutor did not ask Officer Provost to clarify exactly what he
had said to Beard, and the district court closed the evidentiary
portion of the hearing. At argument on the motion, Beard’s
attorney contended that Officer Provost’s testimony was
insufficient for the Government to carry its burden of showing it
complied with Miranda. In response, the Government moved to reopen
the record to allow Officer Provost to testify as to exactly what
he said to Beard, but the district court denied the motion. The
district court then granted the motion to suppress, finding that
(1) the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes, and (2) the
Government had not shown that Officer Provost complied with
Miranda:
Now, the . . . issue was whether or not Mr. Beard was
under a custodial situation at the time that these
questions were propounded to him, and it is clear to the
Court, and I find, that he was not free to leave. And
that’s the test. As Officer Provost walks into the room
and gives the signal to Degrauwe, the question you ask is
at that point in time, [if] Mr. Beard says, “Adios, I’m
taking off, I’ll see you guys later,” would they let him
leave? And the answer is clearly no. So he was in
custody at the time.
***
Provost indicated that, and I’ll use the exact wording
from the testimony, he was advised of his constitutional
rights and in later questioning, referred to advised of
Miranda rights. There was an indication to Officer
Provost that the defendant understood these rights,
whatever they were. And then there was some discussion.
And in the course of that discussion, the defendant made
certain statements. Among them, that he did indeed aim
4
the shotgun at his sister because he mistook her for
someone trying to break into the house, and that the gun
was for home protection. And I believe that he also
indicated that he was a convicted felon. . . .
Now, the problem . . . is that the burden is on the
government to establish that the particular warnings
given to the defendant were such that they would
reasonably convey to a suspect what his actual rights
are. And there is no way that I can come to any
conclusion about that because I don’t know what was said.
The Court has been clear that you don’t have to have some
specific language. It doesn’t have to be talismanic.
But it is also clear that there must be enough for the
Court to say that what was said was reasonably calculated
to convey the message that needed to be conveyed. On
this record, obviously, I can’t do that.
(J.A. at 32-34 (altered paragraph order).)
The Government noted a timely appeal, and we have jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004) (allowing
interlocutory appeals from district court orders suppressing
evidence if prosecutor makes appropriate certification).
II.
The Government argues that the district court erred in
determining that Beard was in custody for Miranda purposes.1 It
contends that the district court applied the wrong legal test in
determining that Beard was in custody, and that under the correct
test, the facts show Beard was not in custody. (Appellant’s
1
The Government does not challenge either the district court’s
denial of its motion to reopen the evidence or the district court’s
conclusion that the Government failed to carry its burden of
proving that Beard had received the necessary warnings under
Miranda. (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 3.)
5
Opening Br. at 6-11.) We review a district court’s factual
findings on a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Parker, 262 F.3d 415, 419
(4th Cir. 2001).
In Miranda, the Supreme Court found that statements officers
obtain by questioning a suspect in custody are presumptively
compelled because of the inherently coercive nature of custodial
interrogation. 384 U.S. at 457-58. To protect the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, see U.S. Const. amend. V (“[n]o
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself”), such statements are generally
inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief unless the
government overcomes the presumption by showing that officers first
(1) warned the suspect that (a) he has the right to remain silent,
(b) anything he says can be used against him, (c) he has the right
to an attorney, and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will
be appointed to him, and (2) obtained a waiver of these rights.
See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 429 (1994) (“[I]f the police
take a suspect into custody and then ask him questions without
informing him of [his rights], his responses cannot be introduced
into evidence to establish his guilt.”); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444
(listing warnings).
Miranda’s exclusionary rule only applies, however, when
officers elicit admissions by questioning a suspect who is “in
6
custody.” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). In this
context, custody is a flexible concept, which does not require a
defendant actually be handcuffed or behind bars. See Texas v.
Orozco, 394 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1969) (holding that under certain
circumstances, suspect can be in custody under Miranda in his own
home). Rather, a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes when,
as in Miranda itself, the circumstances of the interrogation
“exert[ ] upon a [suspect] pressures that . . . impair his free
exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination,” Berkemer,
468 U.S. at 437, or, in other words, when the “suspect’s freedom of
action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’”
Id. at 440 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125
(1983)).
Because the Miranda Court was concerned with coercion, a
reviewing court determines whether a suspect is in “custody” by
first examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
limitations on the suspect’s freedom as the suspect himself
perceived them. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995);
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437-38. Second, a reviewing court must focus
not on how the suspect actually interpreted these facts, but rather
on what a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have
thought knowing the facts available to him. See Thompson, 516 U.S.
at 112; Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994).
Therefore, “[a] policeman’s unarticulated plan has no bearing on
7
the question whether a suspect was ‘in custody’ at a particular
time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the
suspect’s position would have understood his situation.” Berkemer,
468 U.S. at 441.
In holding that Beard was in custody under Miranda, the
district court found that
[Beard] was not free to leave. And that’s the test. As
Officer Provost walk[ed] into the room and g[ave] the
signal to Degrauwe, the question you ask is at that point
in time, [if] Mr. Beard says, “Adios, I’m taking off,
I’ll see you guys later,” would they let him leave? And
the answer is clearly no.
(J.A. at 34.) The district court’s test asked what the officers
would have done if Beard had attempted to leave his bedroom; it
neither focused on the circumstances as Beard perceived them nor
examined the conclusions a reasonable man would draw therefrom.
Cf. Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112. The district court therefore erred.
Applying the correct test, we conclude that Beard was not in
“custody.”2 The facts here are similar to those in Parker, 262
F.3d at 417. In Parker, federal officers came to Parker’s home and
met with her and her family for approximately 20 minutes in the
kitchen of the house. Id. at 418. The officers then requested to
interview Parker in private, and her aunt pointed out a spare
2
The ultimate issue of whether Beard was in custody under
Miranda is one that we may decide. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516
U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (holding that Miranda custodial determination
is a legal question qualifying it for “mixed question of law and
fact” review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
8
bedroom. Id. During the 30-minute bedroom interview, Parker’s
aunt twice entered the room to speak with her. Id. Parker did not
leave the room during the interview, and at some point the officers
informed her that she was not under arrest. Id. The officers
testified, however, they would not have allowed Parker to leave the
house had she attempted to do so. Id. On these facts, we found
that the defendant was not in “custody”:
[Parker] was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained, and
the agents did not draw their weapons in her presence.
She was also in her own home during the questioning, and
one of her relatives, at the relative’s request, entered
the interview room on two occasions during the
questioning. She was not forced to enter the room with
the officers, and she was never told that she was not
free to leave.
The fact that one of the agents testified at the
suppression hearing that they likely would have arrested
Parker had she attempted to end the interview and leave
the house does not successfully undercut the holding of
the district court that Parker was not under the
functional equivalent of arrest during questioning.
Custody determinations do not depend on the subjective
views of . . . the interrogating law enforcement officers
. . . . The agent’s unarticulated views at the time [a
suspect] was being questioned is of little weight. The
relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man would have
understood the suspect’s position at the time.
Id. at 419 (citations omitted).
Like Parker, Beard was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained.
In addition, there is no evidence that the officers drew their
weapons in Beard’s presence or were antagonistic toward him. Beard
was in his own house, even his own room, and was never told that he
was not free to leave. Finally, there is no evidence that Beard
9
saw or understood Officer Provost’s signal to Officer Degrauwe.
Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that a reasonable man
in Beard’s position would have believed his freedom of action was
restrained to a “degree associated with formal arrest.” Beheler,
463 U.S. at 1125.
Beard attempts to distinguish Parker by noting that (1) Beard
was segregated from the other residents of the house, (2) Officer
Provost was carrying the shotgun when he walked into Beard’s
bedroom, and (3) Beard was never allowed to associate with other
household residents during the interview.3 (Appellant’s Br. at 7-
9.) These factual differences do not change the outcome in this
case. First, there is no evidence that the officers affirmatively
segregated Beard from the other residents of the house; in fact,
the testimony indicates that Beard either was ironing clothes in
3
Beard also notes that the interview in Parker lasted 30
minutes, while here, the exchange between Beard and Officer Provost
“happened very quickly.” (Appellee’s Br. at 9). But Beard does
not point out, nor do we see, how this factual distinction helps
him. In fact, common sense dictates that, all else being equal, a
long interview is more likely than a short one to create a
custodial situation.
Beard does not focus on the fact that in Parker officers told
the suspect that she was not under arrest. While this factual
difference is not irrelevant, we do not find it significant given
the totality of the circumstances, including the facts that, (1)
like in Parker, the officers never told Beard he was under arrest,
see Davis v. Allsbrook, 778 F.2d 168,171-72 (4th Cir. 1985)
(“Though informing a suspect that he is not under arrest is one
factor frequently considered to show lack of custody, it is not a
talismanic factor. Where, as here, the entire context establishes
a lack of custody, failure to inform defendant of his status is not
dispositive.”) (citations omitted), and (2) here, unlike in Parker,
the officers questioned Beard for only a short period of time.
10
his bedroom when the officers arrived or had enough freedom of
movement after their arrival to go into his bedroom and begin
ironing. These acts are simply inconsistent with a finding of
custody under Miranda. Second, the fact that Officer Provost
confronted Beard with the shotgun is not sufficient to put him into
“custody.” Cf. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (holding that interview
at police station during which officers falsely told suspect that
his fingerprints were found at crime scene was not custodial);
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976) (holding that
interview with IRS investigators at home of suspect during which
investigators informed suspect that they were investigating his tax
records was not custodial); Davis v. Allsbrook, 778 F.2d 168, 172
(4th Cir. 1985) (holding that interview at police station where
officers showed suspect pictures of crime scene was not custodial).
Third, there is no suggestion that Beard asked to speak to his
relatives, that his relatives attempted to enter the bedroom, or
that the officers would have prevented such entry. Beard was not,
therefore, in custody when he gave the incriminating statements.4
4
In so holding, we do not discount the possibility that the
giving of Miranda warnings itself can contribute with other
circumstances to put a suspect into “custody.” See Sprotsy v.
Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the giving
of Miranda warnings can be a relevant circumstance in determining
whether custody exists); Davis, 778 F.2d at 172 (holding that the
giving of Miranda warnings “by itself” does not create custody).
Even assuming, however, that Officer Provost gave Beard the full
panoply of Miranda warnings, this fact would not, when combined
with the other circumstances of Beard’s confession, be sufficient
to transform what was an otherwise non-custodial situation into a
11
III
We conclude that the district court applied the wrong legal
test to decide whether Beard was in custody under Miranda.
Applying the correct standard, we conclude that Beard was not in
“custody” when he gave the incriminating statements. We therefore
reverse the district court’s order granting Beard’s motion to
suppress and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
custodial one. Cf. Sprotsy, 79 F.3d at 642 (“[I]n the context of
a prolonged detention where there is persistent, accusatory
questioning by several officers, the fact that the police observed
certain formalities of a custodial arrest [such as giving the
suspect Miranda warnings] without actually telling [the suspect]
that he was not under arrest does provide some support for an
inference that [the suspect] was in custody for purposes of
Miranda.”) (emphasis added); Davis, 778 F.2d at 112 (noting that
giving of Miranda warnings could create custody where “a
[subsequent] clash of wills over a suspect’s desire to remain
silent would create custody through overbearing police behavior.”).
On the facts of this case, Officer Provost’s warnings, whatever
they were, did not contribute with other circumstances to place
Beard in custody.
12