UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4033
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
BARBARNAS M. SUMPTER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (CR-03-356)
Submitted: December 23, 2004 Decided: January 24, 2005
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Garryl L. Deas, THE DEAS LAW FIRM, Sumter, South Carolina, for
Appellant. J. Strom Thurmond, Jr., United States Attorney, Eric
Wm. Ruschky, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Barbarnas Maurice Sumpter of willfully
converting to his own use more than $1000 belonging to the United
States by receiving and retaining active duty pay from the United
States Air Force when he was not on active duty, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 641 (2000). On appeal, Sumpter contends that the district
court erred by instructing the jury on willful blindness, that the
court’s willful blindness instruction was inadequate, and that the
evidence was insufficient to convict him. We affirm.
Sumpter asserts on appeal that the district court abused
its discretion in instructing the jury on willful blindness because
the record did not support such an instruction. “A ‘willful
blindness’ . . . instruction ‘allows the jury to impute the element
of knowledge to the defendant if the evidence indicates that he
purposely closed his eyes to avoid knowing what was taking place
around him.’” United States v. Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 384 (4th Cir.
1999) (quoting United States v. Schnabel, 939 F.2d 197, 203 (4th
Cir. 1991)). “A willful blindness instruction is proper when the
defendant asserts a lack of guilty knowledge but the evidence
supports an inference of deliberate ignorance” on the defendant’s
part.* Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Our
*
Sumpter also urges us to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s approach
in United States v. Baron, 94 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1996). We
decline to do so. This court rejected that approach in Ruhe, 191
F.3d at 385, and we cannot overrule another panel’s decision. See
Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 271-72 n.2 (4th
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thorough review of the trial testimony contained in the joint
appendix leads us to conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in deciding to instruct the jury on willful
blindness. See United States v. Hylton, 349 F.3d 781, 789 (4th
Cir. 2003) (stating standard of review), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
2391 (2004).
Next, Sumpter argues that, to the extent the facts
supported a willful blindness instruction, the instruction was
inadequate. Sumpter correctly notes that a district court must
ensure that a “jury is not permitted to infer [a defendant’s]
guilty knowledge from a mere showing of careless disregard or
mistake.” United States v. Guay, 108 F.3d 545, 551 (4th Cir. 1997)
(citing United States v. Mancuso, 42 F.3d 836, 846 (4th Cir.
1994)). We have reviewed the district court’s instruction in this
case and conclude that the instruction was adequate. See United
States v. Martin, 773 F.2d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 1985).
Finally, Sumpter contends that the district court erred
in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim.
P. 29, because the evidence was insufficient to prove he acted
knowingly. We review the district court’s decision to deny a Rule
29 motion de novo. United States v. Lentz, 383 F.3d 191, 199 (4th
Cir. 2002) (“[A] panel of this court cannot overrule, explicitly or
implicitly, the precedent set by a prior panel of this court. Only
the Supreme Court or this court sitting en banc can do that.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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Cir. 2004). Where, as here, the motion was based on insufficient
evidence, “[t]he verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is
substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the
Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
80 (1942). This Court “ha[s] defined ‘substantial evidence,’ in
the context of a criminal action, as that evidence which ‘a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient
to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir.
2003) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862-63 (4th
Cir. 1996) (en banc)). We have reviewed the trial testimony in the
joint appendix and are convinced that the evidence was sufficient
to convict Sumpter. See United States v. Dien Duc Huynh, 246 F.3d
734, 745 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing elements of offense); see
United States v. Sun, 278 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e do
not review the credibility of the witnesses and assume the
[factfinder] resolved all contradictions in the testimony in favor
of the government.”).
Accordingly, we affirm Sumpter’s conviction. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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