UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-1883
DAWN M. GALLINA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY AND POPEO,
P.C.,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 03-1947
DAWN M. GALLINA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY AND POPEO,
P.C.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, District
Judge. (CA-02-647-A)
Argued: September 29, 2004 Decided: February 2, 2005
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by unpublished
opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge
Wilkins joined. Judge Niemeyer wrote a dissenting opinion.
ARGUED: Gregory Lynn Murphy, VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR & PEASE, L.L.P.,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and
Popeo, P.C. Annette Kay Rubin, Leesburg, Virginia, for Dawn M.
Gallina. ON BRIEF: Byron L. Pickard, VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR &
PEASE, L.L.P., Alexandria, Virginia, for Mintz, Levin, Cohn,
Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
2
SHEDD, Circuit Judge:
A jury determined that Dawn Gallina suffered a retaliatory
discharge from the law firm of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky,
& Popeo, P.C. (“Mintz Levin”) in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Mintz Levin now appeals the district
court’s denial of its Rule 50 (Fed. R. Civ. P.) motion for judgment
as a matter of law on Gallina’s retaliation claim. Gallina cross-
appeals the district court’s grant of Mintz Levin’s Rule 50 motion
dismissing her claim for punitive damages, as well as the district
court’s denial of her claim for front pay. For the reasons set
forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
further proceedings.1
I.
Mintz Levin is headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts, and has
offices located throughout the United States.2 Gallina worked as
an associate in the Business and Finance section of Mintz Levin’s
office in Reston, Virginia. Although based in the Reston office,
Gallina worked with attorneys from various offices during the
1
Mintz Levin also argues on appeal that the district court
erred with respect to certain jury instructions and trial
evidentiary rulings. We have carefully considered these arguments
and find them to be unpersuasive.
2
In this appeal from rulings on Mintz Levin’s Rule 50 motions,
we view the facts in the light most favorable to Gallina, the non-
movant. Babcock v. BellSouth Adver. and Publ’g Corp., 348 F.3d 73,
75 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003).
3
course of her employment. Gallina was employed at Mintz Levin from
October 14, 1999, until she was terminated on March 23, 2001, for
alleged poor performance.
Gallina’s problems at Mintz Levin began in November 1999, when
Mark Wishner, then acting as managing partner of the Reston office,
discovered that she has a small child. Wishner became disconcerted
about why Gallina had not informed him of her child when she
interviewed with the firm. Thereafter, Gallina felt that Wishner
began to treat her differently than male associates. For example,
Wishner was more collegial and cordial with male associates than he
was with Gallina. Wishner used unusually harsh language toward
Gallina (e.g., “f--king idiot”),3 and on at least one occasion he
called her a “stupid bitch.” J.A. 554. Wishner also spoke with
Gallina “about the commitment differential between men and women,
how women lawyers have more demands place[d] on them, and [how]
it’s very hard for them to balance when they have a family.” J.A.
554. Additionally, Wishner told Gallina what she regarded as a
“cautionary tale” about his prior experience with a female
associate who, upon her return from maternity leave, inquired about
achieving partnership. J.A. 554. Wishner was “beside himself”
that the female associate would make such an inquiry, and the story
3
David Fuentez, a male associate, testified that Wishner never
used such an epithet directly toward him, and Wishner could not
recall using such harsh language toward Fuentez.
4
left Gallina with the impression that “pregnant women don’t make
partner.” J.A. 555, 635.4
In February 2000, while on a trip to the Boston office,
Gallina complained about Wishner’s behavior toward her to Cindy
Deegan, who was the firm’s Business and Finance practice
administrator. Gallina told Deegan that Wishner was treating her
differently because she is female. Deegan referred Gallina to Stan
Twarog, a Mintz Levin partner who served as the Business and
Finance section manager. Gallina then met with Twarog and repeated
her belief that Wishner was treating her differently because she is
female. Twarog expressed concern about Gallina’s complaint, and he
asked her not to file a formal complaint because he felt that the
matter could be dealt with informally.5 Being new to the firm and
trying to be a “team player,” Gallina trusted that Twarog would
deal with the matter in an appropriate manner. J.A. 550.
By May the news of Gallina’s complaints to Boston reached the
Reston office. Scott Meza, a partner in the Reston office, told
Gallina that she had “caused a problem” for, and “embarrassed,” the
Reston office by complaining about Wishner to the Boston office.
J.A. 556-57. Meza told Gallina that “[a]ny dirty laundry that
4
Other female employees at Mintz Levin told Gallina that
Wishner had “a pathological view towards women” and “a serious
problem with women.” J.A. 627, 641.
5
The record is unclear whether Twarog contemplated an EEOC
complaint or intra-office complaint.
5
there may be in Reston needs to be handled in Reston. You don’t
need to go to Boston.” J.A. 557. During a meeting in July, Meza
informed Gallina that she was not perceived as being “as committed”
as the other lawyers in the Reston office, and he stated that she
needed to decide whether she wanted to be “a successful mommy or a
successful lawyer.” J.A. 560. Also, Meza reiterated how Gallina
had “embarrassed us when [she] went to Boston.” J.A. 560.
After her July meeting with Meza, Gallina was upset and
concerned with Meza’s response to her complaints. Consequently,
Gallina met with Christina Gadiano, a female attorney in the Reston
office. At this meeting, Gallina discussed her concerns about the
treatment she had received and stated her belief that it was
because she is female. Gadiano related that during her own
pregnancy while at the firm, she had heard Wishner’s “pregnant
women don’t make partner” story. Gadiano also stated that Wishner
had made a sarcastic remark to her that “we just had to get you out
of here, pregnant and all” before making future hiring decisions.
J.A. 522. Gadiano suggested that Gallina speak to Susan Weller,
another female attorney that had children. Taking Gadiano’s
advice, Gallina met with Weller shortly thereafter and expressed
her concerns about Wishner’s conduct.
In September, Gallina took her complaints of gender
discrimination to Joan Howland, the Director of Human Resources for
the Boston office. Gallina sought an interim performance
6
evaluation from reviewers in Boston because she believed that some
of her Reston evaluations were biased. Later, in October, Howland
denied Gallina’s request for the interim performance evaluation and
advised her to “keep [her] head down and do [her] work.” J.A. 565.
In November, David Barmak, a partner practicing employment
law, succeeded Wishner as the managing partner of the Reston
office. Shortly afterward, Barmak met with Howland to discuss
Gallina’s “situation.” J.A. 872. On January 12, 2001, Barmak
withheld Gallina’s annual pay increase pending the results of her
performance evaluations. The performance evaluations were
completed in mid-January. In an e-mail on March 19, Barmak
notified Gallina that the performance evaluations had been
assembled. On these performance evaluations, all four reviewers
from the Reston office gave Gallina negative reviews, while both
reviewers from other offices gave her positive reviews. Notably,
two of the negative evaluations from the Reston office came from
Wishner and Meza. Four days later, on March 23, Barmak terminated
Gallina’s employment.
Gallina thereafter brought this action against Mintz Levin
alleging claims under Title VII for gender discrimination, sexual
harassment, and retaliation. Additionally, Gallina asserted a
claim under the Equal Pay Act. Gallina sought compensatory
damages, back pay, front pay, punitive damages, and reinstatement.
7
Before trial, the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Mintz Levin on Gallina’s Title VII claims of gender
discrimination and sexual harassment, and her claim under the Equal
Pay Act. The case then proceeded to trial on Gallina’s Title VII
retaliation claim. At the close of the evidence, Mintz Levin moved
pursuant to Rule 50 for judgment as a matter of law. The district
court denied the motion as to the retaliation claim, finding that
credibility issues made this the “quintessential . . . jury case.”
J.A. 941. The district court granted the motion as to Gallina’s
claim for punitive damages, noting that she failed to satisfy her
burden of showing that Mintz Levin had not acted in good faith.
The jury thereafter returned a verdict in Gallina’s favor, awarding
her $190,000 in compensatory damages and $330,000 in back pay.
Mintz Levin then renewed its Rule 50 motion on the retaliation
claim, which the district court denied. The district court also
denied Gallina’s reinstatement and front pay claims.
Mintz Levin now appeals the district court’s denial of its
Rule 50 motion on the retaliation claim. On cross-appeal, Gallina
challenges the district court’s dismissal of her punitive damages
claim and its denial of her front pay claim. We address these
arguments in turn below.6
6
We have reviewed Gallina’s argument concerning front pay. An
award of front pay is an equitable remedy within the district
court’s discretion. Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, 144 F.3d 294, 307
(4th Cir. 1998). A district court must temper an award of front
pay “[b]ecause of the potential for windfall.” Duke v. Uniroyal,
8
II.
Mintz Levin first argues that the district court erred in
denying its Rule 50 motion on Gallina’s retaliation claim. We
review this ruling de novo. Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs, Inc.,
333 F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir. 2003). Under Rule 50(b), our inquiry
is whether a jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to Gallina, “could have properly reached the conclusion reached by
this jury.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). If reasonable
minds could differ about the result in this case, we must affirm.
Id.
Gallina can prove unlawful retaliation by showing (1) that she
engaged in a protected activity, (2) that Mintz Levin took an
adverse employment action against her, and (3) that a causal
connection links the protected activity and the adverse action.
Id. Once Gallina makes this showing, Mintz Levin could defend
itself by producing “evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for taking the adverse employment action.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted). The jury must then decide whether the adverse
action was actually taken for the proffered reason, or whether that
reason was merely pretext for retaliation. Id. In reviewing the
district court’s judgment, “we examine the full trial record to
determine whether sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict
Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1424 (4th Cir. 1991). We have reviewed the
record and conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Gallina’s claim for front pay.
9
on the ultimate question of the alleged retaliatory
discrimination.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).7
Gallina presented sufficient evidence at trial to establish
that she engaged in a protected activity. Through Title VII,
Congress has forbidden employers to retaliate against employees for
engaging in protected activities such as opposing gender
discrimination in the workplace. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
“Employees are thus guaranteed the right to complain to their
superiors about suspected violations of Title VII.” Bryant, 333
F.3d at 543-44. Gallina made such complaints. The jury heard
evidence that Gallina complained to at least four superiors at
Mintz Levin about her concerns of gender discrimination, lodging
most of her complaints after assurances by a partner that the
matter would be dealt with informally.
Further, although Mintz Levin contends that Gallina lacked a
good faith, reasonable belief that the conduct she complained of
violated Title VII, see Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th
Cir. 2003), Gallina’s repeated complaints and expressions of
concern in response to this conduct demonstrate that she actually
believed she was being subjected to gender discrimination.
Additionally, Wishner’s alleged course of conduct toward Gallina,
7
The burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is inapposite when the trial has
proceeded to completion. Jiminez v. Mary Washington College, 57
F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 1995).
10
viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to Gallina, was
sufficiently serious to show that Gallina’s belief of illegal
discrimination was reasonable. See Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport
Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 192 n. 16 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining
that “[a]ctionable discrimination includes conduct ‘because of’ the
victim’s gender, which is broader than conduct of a ‘sexual
nature’”).
Mintz Levin does not dispute that it took adverse employment
actions against Gallina. Indeed, Mintz Levin deferred Gallina’s
pay increase and ultimately terminated her.
Gallina also presented evidence sufficient for a reasonable
jury to find that Mintz Levin’s pay deferral and firing were the
result of her complaints about gender discrimination. After
Gallina complained about Wishner’s conduct toward her to Deegan and
Twarog in Boston, Twarog asked Gallina not to file a formal
complaint and assured her that the matter would be dealt with
appropriately. Subsequently, Meza explained on two occasions how
Gallina had embarrassed the Reston office by complaining about
Wishner to the Boston office -- where Gallina had complained about
gender discrimination. Further, Meza requested that Gallina bring
future complaints to him. Despite these apparent efforts to stifle
her attempts to complain of gender discrimination, Gallina
continued to complain to Gadiano, Weller, and Howland. Within two
months of Barmak’s becoming the managing partner of the Reston
11
office, he met with Howland to discuss Gallina’s “situation” and
deferred her pay increase. Then, only two month’s after the pay
deferral, Barmak fired Gallina. The jury could have reasonably
inferred from this evidence that Gallina’s pay deferral and firing
were manifestations of Mintz Levin’s retaliation against her.
The reasonableness of this inference is buttressed by
Gallina’s evidence that Mintz Levin had no other valid reason for
deferring her pay or terminating her. Gallina presented evidence
that on her performance evaluations all four reviewers from the
Reston office (including Wishner and Meza) gave her negative
reviews, while both reviewers from other offices gave her positive
reviews. This evidence supports the inference that, but for the
bias of the Reston office, Gallina’s work was acceptable to Mintz
Levin, and the firm fired Gallina because of her continued
complaints of gender discrimination.
We therefore hold that there is sufficient evidence to
support the jury’s verdict on Gallina’s retaliation claim.
III.
We now turn to Gallina’s cross-appeal. Gallina argues that
the district court erroneously granted judgment as a matter of law
to Mintz Levin on her claim for punitive damages. Our inquiry
requires that we determine whether the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to Gallina, would have permitted a reasonable
12
jury to return a verdict in her favor on punitive damages.
Anderson v. G.D.C., Inc., 281 F.3d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 2002).
A Title VII plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages if her
employer engaged in intentional retaliation “with malice or with
reckless indifference to [her] federally protected rights.” 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). This standard does not require “a showing of
egregious or outrageous discrimination,” but rather proof that the
employer retaliated “in the face of a perceived risk that its
actions will violate federal law.” Kolstad v. American Dental
Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535-36 (1999).8 However, “in the punitive
damages context, an employer may not be vicariously liable for the
discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where
these decisions are contrary to the employer’s good-faith efforts
to comply with Title VII.” Id. at 545 (internal quotations
omitted). Thus, the questions we must answer are: (1) whether
Gallina presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find that
Mintz Levin, in the course of its unlawful retaliation, perceived
the risk of violating Title VII and (2) whether Mintz Levin
presented sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could
8
For Mintz Levin to be held vicariously liable for punitive
damages, Gallina “must also show that the discriminating employee
served the employer in a managerial capacity and committed
intentional discrimination while acting within the scope of
employment.” Bryant, 333 F.3d at 548 n.4. In this appeal, there
is no dispute that the Mintz Levin employees (including partners at
the firm) responsible for Gallina’s pay deferral and firing
qualified as managerial agents acting within the scope of
employment.
13
only conclude that it engaged in good-faith efforts to comply with
Title VII.9
We hold that Gallina presented evidence that is sufficient for
a reasonable jury to find that Mintz Levin perceived the risk of
violating federal law through its retaliation. A reasonable jury
could have found that members of a prominent law firm, and
especially a law firm with an employment law section in the
relevant office, perceived the risk of violating federal law in
retaliating against an employee. See Lowery v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431, 443 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that an
employer perceived the risk of violating federal law where that
employer required every manager “to attend a week-long training
seminar that included education on the federal anti-discrimination
laws”); Anderson, 281 F.3d at 460 (finding that an employer
perceived the risk of violating federal law where that employer
merely knew of an anti-discrimination poster in the workplace).
Notably, Barmak was an employment lawyer and was aware of Gallina’s
complaints of gender discrimination, so he undoubtedly could have
perceived the risk of violating federal law. Barmak even admitted
9
We agree with other circuits that have held that it is the
employer’s burden to establish that it has engaged in good-faith
efforts to comply with Title VII. See Zimmermann v. Associates
First Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 385 (2d Cir. 2001); Romano v. U-
Haul, Int’l, 233 F.3d 655, 670 (1st Cir. 2000); Passantino v.
Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 516 (9th
Cir. 2000); Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 188 F.3d
278, 286 (5th Cir. 1999).
14
that if a member of a protected class raises complaints, employers
should explore the possibility that Title VII issues have arisen.
J.A. 884. Thus, a reasonable jury could have found sufficient
evidence that Mintz Levin perceived the risk of violating federal
law through its retaliation against Gallina.
We also hold that Mintz Levin did not proffer sufficient
evidence such that a reasonable juror could only conclude that the
firm engaged in good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.
Although Mintz Levin proffered evidence of the existence of a
“Sexual Harassment Prevention Training” manual and a contact person
to deal with sexual discrimination issues, there was no evidence
that Mintz Levin had any specific policy regarding retaliation.
The only evidence of any policy was a reference in the “Sexual
Harassment Prevention Training” manual, but there was no evidence
that anyone at the firm was aware of that policy, nor that it was
implemented or enforced. Particularly condemning is the fact that,
assuming any policy existed to deal with gender discrimination and
retaliation, the policy completely failed Gallina because her
complaints of gender discrimination caused her ultimate
termination. After considering the conflicting evidence presented,
we are not persuaded that a reasonable juror could only conclude
that Mintz Levin engaged in good-faith efforts to comply with Title
VII. Accordingly, the district court erred by disallowing
Gallina’s punitive damages claim to go to the jury.
15
IV.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand for consideration of punitive damages.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
16
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
On this record, I would reverse the district court's
order denying Mintz Levin's Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter
of law because Gallina failed, as a matter of law, to prove that
her complaints with respect to Wishner's behavior constituted
protected activity. In particular, the evidence on the severity
and pervasiveness of Wishner's discriminatory conduct was too weak
to support a jury finding that Gallina reasonably believed it to
constitute a violation of Title VII. She also failed to prove that
Mintz Levin's proffered reason for discharging her -- that she was
performing poorly -- was pretextual.
To survive a Rule 50 motion, a plaintiff in a Title VII
retaliation claim must present enough evidence that a reasonable
juror could find (1) that the plaintiff engaged in a protected
activity; (2) that the employer acted adversely to the plaintiff;
and (3) that the protected activity was causally related to the
adverse action. Beall v. Abbot Labs., 130 F.3d 614, 619 (4th Cir.
1997). And although the employee need not successfully establish
an underlying violation of Title VII to succeed on a retaliation
claim, for an employee's complaints to constitute a "protected
activity," the employee must have held a reasonable belief that the
complained-of conduct violated Title VII. Peters v. Jenney, 327
F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2001). Thus, this "protected activity"
test contains both a subjective and an objective component.
17
In this case, no reasonable juror could have concluded,
based on the evidence presented at trial, (1) that Gallina actually
held a belief that Wishner's conduct violated Title VII or (2) that
such a belief would have been objectively reasonable. This alleged
belief of discrimination must be assessed in light of the
underlying Title VII claim. In this case, Gallina alleged that her
complaints were in response to Wishner's treatment of her during
the course of her employment. Her allegations most closely
resemble a hostile work environment claim, the elements of which
are (1) the conduct was done "based on the plaintiff's sex"; (2)
the conduct was unwelcome; (3) the conduct was sufficiently "severe
or pervasive" so as to alter the terms and conditions of her
employment; and (4) the conduct was imputable to her employer.
Anderson v. G.D.C., Inc., 281 F.3d 452, 458 (4th Cir. 2002).
The evidence presented at trial does not support a
conclusion that Gallina held a good-faith, reasonable belief that
Wishner's conduct was sufficiently "severe or pervasive" as
effectively to alter the terms and conditions of her employment.
Id. The Supreme Court has noted that "'simple teasing,' offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will
not amount to discriminatory changes in the 'terms and conditions
of employment.'" Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788
(1998) (internal citation omitted). More relevant to the case
before us, the Supreme Court has said that a single, isolated
18
incident is insufficient to support a finding that the plaintiff
reasonably believed that the conduct was severe and pervasive.
Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001).
Gallina bases her claim on a handful of isolated
incidents: (1) Wishner routinely used foul language with respect
to Gallina's work and threatened to fire her if she "f--ked up"
assignments. (2) On a couple of occasions Wishner required Gallina
to work on weekends even in the absence of a pressing due date.
(3) Wishner required Gallina to remain in constant contact with him
("wired") during her vacation. (4) Wishner commented about the
commitment differential between men and women. (5) Wishner
remarked on the audacity of a woman who returned from maternity
leave and immediately asked about making partner. (6) On one
occasion, Wisher called Gallina a "f--king idiot" and a "stupid b--
ch." And (7) on one occasion, Wishner asked Gallina to make coffee
when she worked on a weekend.
With respect to the first three incidents (foul language,
working weekends, and remaining "wired"), the record demonstrates
that they were not discriminatory, as Wishner treated Gallina's
male counterparts in the firm in the same manner. The next two
incidents (the comment about the "commitment differential" and the
maternity leave story) are analogous to what the Supreme Court
referred to as "simple teasing" or "offhand comments" in Faragher,
524 U.S. at 788. Gallina is thus left with only two legitimate
19
instances of discriminatory conduct -- the name-calling incident
and the coffee-making incident. Those incidents, however, do not
come close to being so "severe or pervasive" as effectively to
change the terms and conditions of Gallina's employment.
It is noteworthy that the record contains evidence that,
at the time, Gallina did not understand Wishner's conduct to be
severe or persuasive, since she nominated Mintz Levin for the "100
Best Companies for Working Moms" list and recommended the firm to
her boyfriend. If Wishner's conduct were as severe or pervasive as
Gallina claimed at trial, it is doubtful that she would have
nominated or recommended the firm. The record does show that
Wishner was a very demanding supervisor and often used
inappropriate language when communicating with his inferiors, but
Gallina has failed to prove that Wishner regularly treated her more
severely than he treated male attorneys. Accordingly, I would
reverse the district court's denial of Mintz Levin's Rule 50
motion.
In addition, the evidence failed to show that Gallina's
discharge was caused by her complaints about Wishner's behavior.
Mintz Levin provided extensive evidence of Gallina's inadequate
performance and failures as an attorney and contended that her poor
performance was the reason that the firm discharged her. Gallina
contends that the firm's proffered reasons for discharging her were
pretextual. Even though Gallina presented some evidence that she
20
performed well on occasion, she does not provide any response to
the incidents in which she was clearly deficient. The firm pointed
to four evaluations from attorneys in the Reston office (where
Gallina worked) rating her work below-average. It described one
transaction, on which she worked, where Gallina failed in her
responsibility to file documents creating preferred stock shares,
and another transaction where she failed to account for a stock
split when preparing an employment agreement for the client. The
latter mistake required the firm to rework the deal.
Because the evidence was insufficient to prove two of the
three requirements for a Title VII retaliation claim, I would
reverse the district court's denial of Mintz Levin's motion under
Rule 50 and remand this case to the district court with
instructions to enter judgment in favor of the defendants.
21