UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-1114
CRYSTAL O. SABROWSKI,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
ALBANI-BAYEUX, INCORPORATED; ERIN LITAKER;
ROBERT RICHARDSON,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
District Judge. (CA-02-728-1)
Submitted: January 31, 2005 Decided: February 25, 2005
Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard W. Rutherford, RUTHERFORD AND ASSOCIATES, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Robert E. Sheahan, ROBERT E. SHEAHAN &
ASSOCIATES, High Point, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Crystal O. Sabrowski appeals from the judgment of the
district court dismissing her complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Finding no error, we
affirm.
This court reviews dismissals for failure to state a
claim de novo. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is inappropriate
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts to support her allegations. Revene v. Charles County
Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 872 (4th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
Thus, when considering the propriety of a dismissal, we accept the
factual allegations in the complaint as true and afford the
plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from those allegations. Mylan Labs., 7 F.3d at 1134.
Sabrowski first claims that the district court erred in
dismissing her claims of intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. In North Carolina, to recover under a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, “a plaintiff must
prove ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) which is intended to
cause and does cause (3) severe emotional distress to another.’”
Beck v. City of Durham, 573 S.E.2d 183, 190-91 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)
(quoting Dickens v. Puryear, 276 S.E.2d 325, 335 (N.C. 1981)). To
give rise to liability, the conduct must be “so outrageous in
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character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and . . . be regarded as atrocious and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community.” Keziah v. W.M. Brown & Son,
Inc., 888 F.2d 322, 327 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Hogan v. Forsyth
Country Club, 340 S.E.2d 116, 123 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)).
We have reviewed the record as well as the supporting
caselaw contained in Sabrowski’s brief. Taking her allegations at
face value, as we must at this stage of the proceedings, see Mylan
Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993), we
cannot conclude that Defendants’ conduct was so outrageous or
extreme as to give rise to liability under North Carolina law.*
Accordingly we deny this claim.
Sabrowski next assigns error to the district court’s
dismissal of her wrongful discharge claim. As a general rule in
North Carolina, an at-will employee has no claim for wrongful
discharge. See Lorbacher v. Housing Auth. of Raleigh, 493 S.E.2d
74, 79 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); see also Guy v. Travenol Labs., Inc.,
812 F.2d 911, 912-15 (4th Cir. 1987). Although the North Carolina
courts have expressed a limited willingness to recognize an
exception to the at-will employment doctrine for reasons of public
policy, see id., those exceptions have been “designed either to
prohibit status-based discrimination or to insure the integrity of
*
We also agree with the district court that Sabrowski’s
characterization of Defendants’ intentional acts cannot establish
a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
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the judicial process or the enforcement of the law.” Kurtzman, 493
S.E.2d at 423. In determining what is or is not public policy, the
courts look to the “policy declarations contained in the North
Carolina General Statutes.” Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 416
S.E.2d 166, 169 (N.C. 1992).
Sabrowski has not identified, and we have not found, any
North Carolina authority establishing a public policy that shields
one’s medical records from her employer. As a consequence, we
cannot conclude that Sabrowski’s discharge was done in violation of
North Carolina’s public policy.
Finally, Sabrowski assigns error to the district court’s
dismissal of her invasion of privacy claim. North Carolina courts
recognize an invasion of privacy claim only in those circumstances
where one (a) appropriates another’s name or likeness, or
(b) intrudes into the seclusion of one’s private affairs. See
Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 713-14 (N.C. 1988). Although the
disclosure of one’s private personnel files and medical records
amounts to a per se intrusion into seclusion if the records contain
sensitive materials, see Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2002), Sabrowski can point to no disclosure of her medical
records. Indeed, the record indicates that Sabrowski’s employer
never had access to, much less disclosed, her medical records.
Accordingly, this claim is meritless.
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We affirm the judgment of the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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