UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4643
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
LATONIA WALLACE, a/k/a Pooter,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Joseph Robert Goodwin,
District Judge. (CR-03-187)
Argued: February 3, 2005 Decided: March 2, 2005
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
Reversed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Michael Lee Keller, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia,
for Appellant. Andrew Jeram Katz, THE KATZ WORKING FAMILIES LAW
FIRM, L.C., Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Kasey Warner, United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia,
for Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
In this case, the Government appeals the district court’s
grant of Latonia Wallace’s motion to suppress certain statements
made after Wallace entered into a plea bargain with the Government.
The district court excluded these statements under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403. For the following reasons, we find that the district
court abused its discretion in so ruling.
I.
Wallace was indicted on November 13, 2003, by the federal
grand jury for the Southern District of West Virginia for
conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base in
violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 1999) and for possession of
ammunition for a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 922(g)(1)
(West 2000) and 924(a)(2) (West 2000). Wallace surrendered to
authorities in Columbus, Ohio, and was returned to West Virginia on
December 31, 2003. On January 6, 2004, Wallace met with Detective
T.C. Bramlee and the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA)
assigned to the case to provide information to the Government.
Wallace and the Government had not entered into a plea bargain at
that time.
During the January 6 meeting, Wallace admitted her role in the
drug conspiracy and attributed 11.75 ounces of cocaine powder and
33.5 ounces of cocaine base to the conspiracy. On January 13,
2
2004, Wallace entered into a plea agreement with the Government.
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Government agreed to drop the
firearm charge in exchange for Wallace’s guilty plea on the drug
conspiracy count. The plea agreement stated that Wallace’s
potential term of imprisonment was ten years to life.
On January 29, after the plea deal was signed but before
Wallace’s Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy was
conducted by the district court, Wallace again met with Bramlee and
the AUSA to provide further information on the drug conspiracy.
During this later meeting, Wallace told Bramlee that her co-
conspirators were responsible for 18 ounces of cocaine powder and
69 ounces of cocaine base. Wallace’s guilty plea was accepted by
the district court on March 3. Shortly thereafter, Wallace’s
counsel filed a motion to withdraw and Wallace moved, pro se, to
appoint new counsel. Wallace also moved to withdraw her plea at
that time. After conducting a hearing, the district court granted
all three motions.
Following the appointment of new counsel, Wallace moved to
suppress certain statements she had made. Relevant here, Wallace
moved, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 410, to
suppress the statements she gave to Bramlee and the AUSA on January
6 and January 29.1 The Government conceded before the district
1
Wallace also moved to suppress statements taken in July 2003
during a search of Wallace’s residence in Huntington, West
Virginia. The Government conceded that these statements were taken
3
court that the statements given on January 6 were inadmissible in
its case in chief,2 and the district court ruled that, under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the January 29 statements were also
inadmissible.3 The Government filed a timely appeal and the
required certification under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731 (West Supp. 2004).
II.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether Rule 403 permitted
the exclusion of the January 29 statements. “A district court’s
evidentiary rulings are reviewed under the narrow abuse of
discretion standard.” United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 831
(4th Cir. 1998). Rule 403 provides that “[a]lthough relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” Fed. R.
Evid. 403. Under this rule, “damage to a defendant’s case is not
a basis for excluding probative evidence,” because “[e]vidence that
in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and were
inadmissible in its case in chief.
2
The Government’s concession was based on Federal Rule of
Evidence 410(4), which provides for the exclusion of “any statement
made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the
prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or
which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.” Fed. R. Evid.
410(4).
3
The district court agreed with the Government that the
January 29 statements were not inadmissible pursuant to Rule 410.
On appeal, Wallace has not pressed Rule 410 as an alternate ground
for affirmance.
4
is highly probative invariably will be prejudicial to the defense.”
Grimmond, 137 F.3d at 833; see also 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret
A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 404.21(3)(b) (Joseph M.
McLaughlin, ed., 2d. ed. 2002) (noting that “[u]nfair prejudice
under Rule 403 does not mean the damage to a defendant’s case that
results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence”)
(emphasis omitted). “Rule 403 only requires suppression of
evidence that results in unfair prejudice – prejudice that damages
an opponent for reasons other than its probative value, for
instance, an appeal to emotion, and only when that unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.”
United States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 619-20 (4th Cir. 2003)
(quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Unfair prejudice “speaks
to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the
factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof
specific to the offense charged.” Old Chief v. United States, 519
U.S. 172, 180 (1997). In sum,
[W]e have stated that undue prejudice occurs when there
is “a genuine risk that the emotions of a jury will be
excited to irrational behavior, and that this risk is
disproportionate to the probative value of the offered
evidence.” Because the evidence sought to be excluded
under Rule 403 is concededly probative, the balance under
Rule 403 should be struck in favor of admissibility, and
evidence should be excluded only sparingly.
United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1378 (4th Cir. 1996)
(quoting United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1252 (4th Cir.
1993)).
5
The district court found that the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighed the probative value of the January 29
statements. The district court concluded that the probative value
of the statements was “substantially diminished” because (1)
“Wallace [in her January 29 statements] roughly doubled the amount
of controlled substances attributed to her fellow conspirators;”
and (2) because of the “presently undisputed account of Ms.
Wallace’s trouble with memory loss.”4 (J.A. at 163.) The district
court also determined that the statements were unfairly prejudicial
because “the jury will almost certainly abandon its obligation to
carefully consider all of the evidence in this case” (J.A. at 164)
once Wallace’s statements were entered into evidence.
We believe that the district court abused its discretion in
excluding the January 29 statements under Rule 403. First, the
district court should not have considered Wallace’s credibility in
determining the probative value of these statements. It is
“relatively clear that in the weighing process under Rule 403 the
judge cannot consider the credibility of witnesses.” 22 Charles
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
5214 (2d ed. 1994). As we have previously explained, “the
credibility of a witness has nothing to do with whether or not his
testimony is probative with respect to the fact which it seeks to
4
The Pre-Sentence Report found that Wallace had been in a
serious car accident and that “[Wallace] reported having short-term
memory loss as a result of her injuries.” (J.A. at 186.)
6
prove.” United States v. Welsh, 774 F.2d 670, 672 (4th Cir. 1985)
(emphasis added). The January 29 statements, as admissions of
guilt, were highly probative. Questions regarding the effect of
Wallace’s short-term memory loss and the discrepancies between the
drug amounts attributable to the conspiracy were questions of
credibility for the jury and do not diminish the statements’
probative value.
In addition, although the statements were undoubtedly
prejudicial to Wallace, they were not unfairly prejudicial.
Obviously, inculpatory statements are prejudicial to Wallace in
that they damage her case. Rule 403, however, is concerned only
with unfair prejudice, that is, prejudice resulting from the
“capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the
factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof
specific to the offense charged.” Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180.
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only when there is a “genuine risk
that the emotions of a jury will be excited to irrational
behavior.” United States v. Bailey, 990 F.2d 119, 123 (4th Cir.
1993). No such risk exists in this case.5 The inculpatory
statements made by Wallace on January 29 will not excite the
passions of the jury and lure them into convicting Wallace on a
ground irrelevant to the charges against her.
5
There is no suggestion that the Government intends to reveal
that these statements were made after Wallace signed a plea
agreement.
7
Rule 403 permits the exclusion of evidence when its probative
value is substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair
prejudice. Wallace’s inculpatory statements were highly probative
and were not unfairly prejudicial. Accordingly, we hold that the
district court abused its discretion in excluding the statements
under Rule 403.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the district court is
reversed.
REVERSED
8