UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 95-60268
Summary Calendar
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KEVIN DION WILEY, also known as
Edward Jackson; MACK DANCY,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
(3:94-CR-078)
_________________________________________________________________
August 7, 1996
Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Kevin Wiley and Mack Dancy appeal their convictions for
conspiracy to possess and aiding and abetting the possession of,
crack cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841 and 846, and 18 U.S.C. § 2. They contend that the evidence,
largely the testimony of a co-conspirator, Williams, was
insufficient to support the verdict against them on both counts.
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
47.5.4.
There is no requirement that testimony by a co-conspirator
fulfilling a plea bargain be corroborated by independent evidence.
The jury is entrusted with the responsibility of evaluating the
credibility of witnesses, and even uncorroborated testimony of a
co-conspirator will sustain a guilty verdict unless, as is not the
case here, the testimony is incredible or otherwise insubstantial
on its face. United States v. Gardea Carrasco, 830 F.2d 41, 44
(5th Cir. 1987). The evidence was sufficient to establish the
requisite elements for a conspiracy conviction under 21 U.S.C. §
846 and for aiding and abetting the possession of crack cocaine
with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and
18 U.S.C. § 2.
Wiley contends that the district court erred by refusing two
proposed jury instructions on accomplice testimony. The existence
of Williams’ plea agreement was fully disclosed to the jury; and,
the district court properly instructed the jury on the caution with
which accomplice testimony is to be received, and that it should
not convict a defendant on the basis of the unsupported testimony
of an alleged accomplice unless it believed that testimony beyond
a reasonable doubt. The charge, as a whole, is a correct statement
of the law and clearly instructs jurors as to the principles of law
applicable to the factual issues confronting them. See United
States v. Clements, 73 F.3d 1330, 1338 (5th Cir. 1996).
Wiley and Dancy contend that the disparity between sentences
- 2 -
imposed for powder cocaine-related offenses and crack cocaine-
related offenses violates the equal protection component of the due
process clause. This contention is foreclosed under our prevailing
jurisprudence. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 77 F.3d 105,
112 (5th Cir. 1996). Wiley and Dancy seek reconsideration of this
jurisprudence, asserting, for the first time on appeal, that there
is no medical or scientific evidence to support Congress’ continued
imposition of the disparity, and that Congress’ rejection of the
Sentencing Commission’s proposal to equalize penalties for crack
and powder cocaine-related offenses demonstrates discriminatory
intent. Plain error considerations aside, we generally will not
consider new evidence on appeal. See United States v. Flores, 887
F.2d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 1989). Moreover, in the absence of an
overriding Supreme Court decision, a change in statutory law, or an
en banc decision by our court, our court’s prior rulings are
binding. E.g., United States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d 876, 877
(5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
AFFIRMED
- 3 -