UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-1420
LINDA ALLEN; JULIE ORD,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
District Judge. (CA-02-1121)
Submitted: March 1, 2005 Decided: April 19, 2005
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WIDENER and TRAXLER, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kenneth F. McCallion, MCCALLION & ASSOCIATES, L.L.P., New York, New
York, for Appellants. C. Matthew Keen, Robert A. Sar, Rachel B.
March, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C., Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Linda Allen and Julie Ord (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal
a district court order dismissing their claims against
International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) arising from
alleged exposure to toxic mold. We affirm.
I.
Appellants formerly worked in Building 061 of IBM’s facility
at Research Triangle Park, North Carolina (the building). In late
April 2000, water flooded the center of the building after a pipe
burst. Within one week of the flood, IBM began removing water-
damaged materials from the building. In addition, employees
working in water-damaged areas of the building were temporarily
reassigned to other buildings. However, employees working outside
the water-damaged areas--including Appellants--were not relocated.
In connection with the cleanup of the building, IBM submitted
building-material and air-quality samples for testing; the results
of these tests, provided to IBM in July 2000, revealed the presence
of toxic mold.
Appellants continued to work in the building throughout the
post-flood renovation process, which lasted approximately seven
months. During this time, Appellants began suffering from
“constant vertigo, extreme sensitivity to motion and visual
stimuli, chronic fatigue, muscle spasms, suppressed immune systems,
and significant cognitive disorders.” J.A. 26. In November 2000,
2
after learning that one of their coworkers had developed similar
symptoms, Appellants asked IBM to investigate the cause of their
ailments; in particular, they expressed concern that toxic mold
might be responsible. Soon thereafter, IBM employees inspected the
building. According to Appellants, however, this inspection did
not include testing for mold and covered only a portion of the
building. Nevertheless, the inspectors assured Appellants that the
mold in question could be identified through visual inspection and
that there was no mold problem in the building.
In December 2000, Allen’s physician requested that IBM
relocate Allen to another building for six weeks to determine
whether her ailments were being caused by something in the
building. IBM denied this request, explaining that a company
physician had reviewed Allen’s medical records and concluded that
there was no medical reason to relocate her. Due to their
worsening symptoms, Appellants eventually went on medical leave;
neither has been able to work since that time. In March 2002, a
physician diagnosed Appellants’ medical conditions as resulting
from exposure to toxic mold in the building.
Appellants subsequently filed this action in North Carolina
state court alleging that IBM willfully failed to prevent
Appellants’ exposure to toxic mold, causing them to suffer numerous
health problems. Appellants’ complaint, which sought injunctive
relief and damages, relied on a judicially created exception to the
3
exclusivity provisions of the North Carolina Workers’ Compensation
Act. See Woodson v. Rowland, 407 S.E.2d 222, 228 (N.C. 1991)
(holding that an employer may be held liable in a civil action when
it “intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is substantially
certain to cause serious injury or death to employees and an
employee is injured or killed by that misconduct”).
IBM removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss
Appellants’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). In ruling on this motion, the district court noted that
Woodson establishes “an extremely demanding standard” for imposing
liability against an employer outside the workers’ compensation
system, Allen v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 308 F. Supp. 2d 638, 644
(M.D.N.C. 2004), and that a Woodson claim “is only cognizable ‘in
the most egregious cases of employer misconduct,’” id. at 644-45
(quoting Whitaker v. Town of Scotland Neck, 597 S.E.2d 665, 668
(N.C. 2003)). In particular, the district court recognized that
“[f]or a plaintiff to prevail on a Woodson claim, ... there must be
‘uncontroverted evidence of the employer’s intentional misconduct’
and that ‘misconduct [must be] substantially certain to lead to the
employee’s serious injury or death.’” Id. at 645 (quoting
Whitaker, 597 S.E.2d at 668) (third alteration in original). The
district court determined that Appellants’ allegations did not
satisfy these rigorous standards because (1) even assuming that IBM
knew toxic mold was present in the building, Appellants could not
4
show that IBM knew that the mold was substantially certain to cause
severe injury or death; (2) IBM did not violate any safety
regulations regarding toxic mold, nor was there any allegation that
such standards even existed; and (3) IBM did take some steps to
prevent employees’ exposure to mold in the building and to
investigate Appellants’ illnesses. The district court therefore
dismissed Appellants’ complaint.
II.
After reviewing the parties’ briefs and the applicable law, we
conclude that the district court correctly decided the issues
before it. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district
court. See id. at 643-46. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5