UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4452
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
SHAWN DALE BEASON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Joseph Robert Goodwin,
District Judge. (CR-03-266)
Submitted: January 26, 2005 Decided: April 25, 2005
Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, David R. Bungard,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellant. Kasey Warner, United States Attorney, Monica L. Dillon,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, Beckley, West Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Shawn Beason, a federal prisoner, was indicted on one
count of possession of marijuana by a federal prisoner, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2) (2000). Beason moved to
dismiss the indictment on the grounds that his detention in
administrative segregation for eleven months prior to his
indictment violated his due process and speedy trial rights under
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The district court denied the
motion. Following a bench trial, the district court found Beason
guilty and sentenced him to six months in prison. The sentence
runs consecutively to his undischarged sentence. Beason appeals,
asserting that the district court erred when it denied his motion
to dismiss. We affirm.
Addressing first Beason’s Fifth Amendment claim, a
defendant “may invoke due process to challenge delay both before
and after official accusation.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S.
647, 655 n.2 (1992). To determine whether pre-indictment delay
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, we examine:
(1) whether the defendant can show that he has suffered any actual,
substantial prejudice; and (2) if so, whether the reasons for the
delay justify the prejudice to the defendant. United States v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1996)
(noting that defendant’s burden is a heavy one). Here, Beason
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failed to demonstrate any actual prejudice, and we conclude that
there was no Fifth Amendment violation.
Beason contends that his placement in administrative
segregation constituted a de facto arrest that triggered Sixth
Amendment protections. However, “[t]he speedy trial right does not
apply to . . . pre-indictment delay because that right does not
attach until the defendant has been arrested or indicted.” Jones
v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 906 n.6 (4th Cir. 1996). Confinement in
administrative segregation is not the equivalent of an arrest or
accusation for Sixth Amendment purposes. See United States v.
Daniels, 698 F.2d 221, 223 (4th Cir. 1983). Therefore, there was
no Sixth Amendment violation.
Accordingly, we affirm Beason’s conviction. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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