IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-60591
(Summary Calendar)
MILDRED QUARLES, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants;
versus
AVA N. JACKSON, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District Of Mississippi
(3:95-CV-212)
(August 14, 1996)
Before GARWOOD, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM*:
This appeal requires us to examine, first, the district
court's denial of a motion to remand the instant case, and, second,
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
the court's ultimate dismissal of the action on preemption grounds.
We agree with the district court's conclusion that it had subject
matter jurisdiction over the case; accordingly, we affirm its
denial of the motion to remand. We disagree, however, with the
district court's determination that federal law preempts the entire
action. We therefore (1) vacate in part the order of dismissal,
and (2) remand to the district court the claims that are not
preempted, with instructions to exercise its discretion either to
accept supplemental jurisdiction over those claims or remand them
to state court.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Generally, in reviewing either denials of a motion to remand
or dismissals of a complaint, we are limited to a review of the
parties' pleadings.2 It is therefore difficult to discern the
basic facts of the instant case. Nonetheless, our best
reconstruction of the underlying facts is as follows.
In 1995, Alvin O. Chambliss, Jr. was suspended and then
terminated from his job as a staff attorney with the North
2
See, e.g., Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. School Dist., 44
F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir. 1995) (“A determination that a cause of
action presents a federal question depends upon the allegations of
the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint.”) (reviewing district
court's denial of motion to remand); see also C.C. Port Ltd. v.
Davis-Penn Mortgage Co., 61 F.3d 288, 289 (5th Cir. 1995) (“This
Court reviews de novo a district court's dismissal on the
pleadings, accepting as true those well-pleaded factual allegations
in the complaint.”).
2
Mississippi Rural Legal Services (Legal Services). His termination
was the culmination of a disagreement over how Legal Services would
handle a class-action discrimination case styled Ayers v. Fordice.
Apparently, there were two factions within Legal Services: The one
of which Chambliss was a member wanted to continue prosecuting the
Ayers case; the other preferred, for financial reasons, to drop it.
Chambliss’ faction lost and, as either a direct or indirect result,
he was terminated.
A “power struggle” within Legal Services ensued. Several pro-
Chambliss individuals2 attempted to have the question of
reinstating Chambliss placed on the agenda of the Board of
Directors’ August 19, 1995 meeting. For reasons that are unclear,
these efforts failed and the Chambliss issue did not make the
agenda. After completing the items of business on the August 19
agenda, Robert Buck, the Chairman of the Board of Directors,
terminated the meeting. Most of the meeting’s participants left,
but a contingent of pro-Chambliss individuals remained.
This contingent decided that the meeting had been improperly
adjourned and that a quorum remained present, so they purported to
continue to conduct business. After Mildred Quarles, the Vice-
Chairperson, took the helm, motions to reinstate Chambliss with
full back pay and to continue the Ayers litigation were adopted.
2
It is unclear whether these individuals were Legal Services
board members, Legal Services employees, members of the plaintiff
class in Ayers, or some combination of the three.
3
Later, Ava N. Jackson, the Executive Director, refused to honor the
measures adopted during the reconvened meeting of the Board.
On August 31, 1995, Quarles, individually and on behalf of
“other Board members” of Legal Services, filed a complaint for
injunctive, declaratory, and other relief in the Chancery Court of
Lafayette County, Mississippi (state court). Quarles’ complaint
alleged inter alia that (1) Chambliss had been suspended and
terminated from his job unlawfully; and (2) Jackson and her Legal
Services allies had violated Mississippi law by failing to
implement the decisions adopted during the reconvened meeting. The
complaint sought, among other relief, an injunction restraining
Jackson and “her officers, agents, employees, attorneys,
secretaries, advisors, and successors in office” from taking action
contrary to the mandate set forth during the reconvened meeting
“until the North Mississippi Rural Legal Services Board of
Directors issues a clear decision.”
On the day that the complaint was filed, the state court
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing Legal Services
to reinstate Chambliss with full back pay and enjoining Jackson
from “enforcing any of her sanctions until the Board of Directors
of North Mississippi Rural Legal Services Act [sic].” The
following day, Jackson removed the case to federal district court,
arguing that the litigation involved a claim for relief relating to
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and therefore
4
the federal district court had original jurisdiction.3
The following facts relevant to the removal are not in
dispute: (1) The employees of Legal Services are represented by a
certified collective bargaining representative, UAW Local 2320,
National Organization of Legal Services Workers; (2) Chambliss was
at all pertinent times a member of the collective bargaining unit
and of the union; (3) a CBA between Legal Services and the union
was in existence at all pertinent times; (4) the CBA contains a
grievance and arbitration procedure; (5) upon his suspension and
termination, Chambliss invoked the grievance and arbitration
procedure by filing a grievance; and (6) Chambliss remains involved
in the grievance procedure.
A few days after the removal of the suit, Jackson requested
that the district court dissolve the TRO and dismiss the complaint.
Jackson argued that because resolution of the case would require
the court to interpret the CBA, the case is preempted by federal
labor law and the TRO was improvidently granted. In response,
Quarles filed a motion to remand, contending that the district
court lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction. The district
court denied the motion to remand. Additionally, after finding
that Chambliss had failed to exhaust his remedies under the CBA,
the district court dissolved the TRO and dismissed the complaint.4
3
See 29 U.S.C. § 185.
4
The district court's order does not specify whether the
complaint was dismissed with or without prejudice. This court has
5
Quarles timely appealed.
II
DISCUSSION
A. DENIAL OF MOTION TO REMAND
On appeal, Quarles argues, first, that federalism, comity, and
the doctrine of abstention require the remand of this case. The
denial of a motion to remand an action removed from state to
federal court is a question of federal subject matter jurisdiction
and statutory construction subject to de novo review.5
Section 1441 of Title 28, the Judicial Code, governs the
propriety of removal to federal district courts. Removal under §
1441(b), the basis of removal here, is appropriate only for those
claims within the federal question jurisdiction of the district
courts; that is, claims "arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States."6 A determination that a cause of
action presents a federal question depends on the allegations of
held that “[u]nless an involuntary order of dismissal specifies
that it is without prejudice, . . . it operates as an adjudication
on the merits.” See Callip v. Harris County Child Welfare Dep't,
757 F.2d 1513, 1519 (5th Cir. 1985) (internal quotations omitted).
Thus, the district court effectively dismissed the complaint with
prejudice. See id.
5
Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1336 (5th Cir.
1995); Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th
Cir. 1994); Garrett v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. of Am., 938 F.2d
591, 593 (5th Cir. 1991).
6
28 U.S.C. § 1331.
6
the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint.7 Generally, for purposes
of § 1331, a suit arises under federal law if there appears on the
face of the complaint some substantial, disputed question of
federal law.8
With Quarles’ complaint, we need not venture far to find a
“substantial, disputed question of federal law.” For example, the
second paragraph of her complaint reads as follows:
This complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive and other
Relief enjoining Ava N. Jackson, Executive Director of
North Mississippi Legal Services, Inc., and others from
violating the rights of Plaintiff, her attorney and other
class members he represent [sic] as secured by 42 U.S.C.
Sections 2201 and 2202; 42 U.S.C. [sic] 2000a-(1)(2)(3):
[sic] 2000b-(2); 2000c-(8) [sic] 2000d . . . and the
fifth, ninth, thirteenth, an [sic] fourteenth amendments
to the State and Federal Constitutions.
When a complaint expressly seeks the vindication of rights
enumerated in both a federal statute and the Constitution, that
complaint, at least on its face, involves “substantial, disputed
questions of federal law.” Moreover, the complaint itself states
that jurisdiction for this case rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To
quote the district court, for Quarles “[t]o complain now that [she]
only seek[s] to enforce state law rights is disingenuous.”
Accordingly, we hold that the district court had federal question
jurisdiction under section 1331.
7
Carpenter v. Witchita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362,
366 (5th Cir. 1995).
8
Id. (citing Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 12 (1983)).
7
B. PREEMPTION
After determining that it had subject matter jurisdiction over
the case, the district court held that § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (§ 301)9 preempts each claim raised by the
suit, as the claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the
interpretation of the CBA. The court therefore ordered the state
court's TRO dissolved and the cause dismissed. Quarles does not
contest the district court's dismissal on preemption grounds of a
number of her claims; accordingly, she has waived any such
arguments. Nevertheless, Quarles does contend that her state law
governance claims, grounded in the Mississippi Administration
Procedures Act (MAPA)10 and the Mississippi Open Meetings Act
(MOMA)11 (collectively, the governance claims), are not preempted
and therefore should have not been dismissed. We agree.
Preemption is a question of law reviewed de novo.12 A state
law claim is preempted by § 301 “'if the resolution of [the] claim
depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement.'”13
9
See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
10
See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-43-1 et seq. (1972 & Supp. 1996).
11
See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-41-1 et seq. (1972 & Supp. 1996).
12
Matter of Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435, 1440 (5th Cir. 1991).
13
Baker v. Farmers Electric Coop., Inc., 34 F.3d 274, 279 (5th
Cir. 1994) (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486
U.S. 399, 405 (1988).
8
Accordingly, “the critical inquiry concerns the necessity of
looking to the terms of the CBA to resolve the state law claim.”14
In the instant case, the CBA is entirely irrelevant to the
resolution of Quarles's state law claims alleging that Jackson and
her supporters improperly defied directives of the Board. As we
need not look to the terms of the CBA to resolve those claims, they
are not preempted by § 301. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of
the district court's order dismissing Quarles's governance claims
and remand those claims to the district court. As Quarles has not
appealed the district court's dismissal of her federal claims, it
is within the district court's discretion either to (1) accept
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law governance claims, or
(2) decline jurisdiction and remand the governance claims to state
court.15
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's
denial of Quarles's motion to remand. We also affirm the court's
dismissal order with respect to each of Quarles's claims except her
14
Id. at 280.
15
See Hubbard v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 42 F.3d 942,
947 (5th Cir.) (“When all federal claims are dismissed, the
district court enjoys wide discretion in determining whether to
retain jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.”) (citing
Welch v. Thompson, 20 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 1994); Burns-Toole v.
Byrne, 11 F.3d 1270 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2680
(1994)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2276 (1995).
9
governance claims. We vacate the dismissal order insofar as it
incorporates the governance claims and remand those claims to the
district court with instructions to exercise its discretion as to
whether to retain jurisdiction or remand them to state court.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
10