UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4821
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DENNIS WAYNE SIMMONS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. James C. Turk, Senior
District Judge. (CR-03-97)
Submitted: February 18, 2005 Decided: May 27, 2005
Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions
by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Eric N. Strom, CAMPBELL, MILLER, ZIMMERMAN, Leesburg, Virginia, for
Appellant. John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, Joseph W. H.
Mott, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
A jury found Dennis Wayne Simmons guilty of one count of
conspiracy to possess and distribute less than 500 grams of cocaine
and less than 5 grams of methamphetamine, one count of distribution
of less than 500 grams of methamphetamine, and four counts of being
a controlled substance user in possession of a firearm. Simmons
was sentenced to 144 months’ imprisonment. Three days after
sentencing, the Supreme Court issued Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.
Ct. 2531 (2004). Simmons filed a motion to reconsider. He further
subsequently voluntarily dismissed his appeal to this court.
Nearly three months after sentencing, the court considered the
motion to reconsider and found it was without jurisdiction to
change the sentence. Simmons filed a notice of appeal from the
order denying the motion to reconsider and the judgment of
conviction. On appeal, Simmons contends his notice of appeal was
timely as to the judgment of conviction, despite the fact the
notice was filed more than ten days after the entry of judgment.
Simmons further argues the sentencing enhancements were improper
under Blakely. While we affirm the convictions, we vacate and
remand the sentence with instructions.
Although “the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not
specifically provide for motions for reconsideration and prescribe
the time in which they must be filed,” Nilson Van & Storage Co. v.
Marsh, 755 F.2d 362, 364 (4th Cir. 1985), the Supreme Court has
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held that a motion for rehearing or reconsideration extends the
time for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case if the motion
is filed before the order sought to be reconsidered becomes final.
See United States v. Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1991) (holding that
would-be appellants who file a timely motion for reconsideration
from a criminal judgment are entitled to the full time period for
noticing the appeal after the motion to reconsider has been
decided); United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 7-8 (1976) (same);
United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 77-79 (1964) (same); United
States v. Christy, 3 F.3d 765, 767 n.1 (4th Cir. 1993) (same).
Simmons filed the motion to reconsider seven business
days after the oral pronouncement of the sentence. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 45 (computing time). Thus, the motion was timely and was
filed before the sentence became final. See, e.g., United States
v. Shank, 395 F.3d 466, 469 (4th Cir. 2005) (the seven day period
under Rule 35 runs from the imposition of the sentence). Simmons
subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal after the motion to
reconsider was denied. Thus, the notice of appeal was timely as to
the judgment of conviction and the order denying the motion to
reconsider.
At sentencing, the district court added points to the
offense level for an amount of methamphetamine above what was found
by the jury, and additional points were added for possession of a
firearm. Simmons argued at sentencing this was in violation of the
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rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In
his motion to reconsider, he argued the sentence was in violation
of the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531
(2004).
In United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the
Supreme Court held that the “Sixth Amendment is violated when a
district court, acting pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act and
the guidelines, imposes a sentence greater than the maximum
authorized by the facts found by the jury alone.” United States v.
Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court
further found enhanced sentences based upon facts found by the
court alone violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. Accordingly, the
guidelines were stripped of their mandatory nature. The district
court’s discretion in issuing a sentence is not bound by the
guidelines. The guidelines are now advisory and the district court
may now impose a sentence within the range prescribed by the
statute of conviction, as long as the sentence is reasonable. Id.
at 546-47. Because the district court increased the offense level
for drug quantity and possession of a firearm and applied the
sentencing guidelines’ range as mandatory instead of advisory, we
must vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.*
*
Simmons contends he may be sentenced only up to the maximum
for the least-punished drug offense on which that conspiracy is
based. See United States v. Rhynes, 196 F.3d 207, 238 (4th Cir.
1999), vacated in part on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 218 F.3d
310 (4th Cir. 2000). The jury found Simmons guilty of conspiracy
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We further note that when the district court considered
Simmons’ motion to reconsider, it was without jurisdiction to
correct or modify the sentence. See Shank, 395 F.3d at 469
(jurisdiction to correct a sentence under Rule 35 must lapse seven
days after sentencing); United States v. Layman, 116 F.3d 105, 108
(4th Cir. 1997) (the district court may not simply reconsider the
application or interpretation of the sentence and the sentencing
guidelines after the imposition of sentence).
We affirm the convictions and vacate and remand the
sentence for resentencing consistent with the rules announced in
Booker and Hughes. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART
AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
to distribute both methamphetamine and cocaine. The statutory
maximum sentence is the same for both drugs. See 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(C) (2000). On remand, the court remains free to consider
the quantity of cocaine and methamphetamine, determined by a
preponderance of the evidence, attributed to Simmons. As stated
above, the range of imprisonment under the sentencing guidelines is
now advisory rather than mandatory.
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