UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-7400
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
BARKLEY GARDNER, a/k/a Big Black,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Malcolm J. Howard,
District Judge. (CR-95-41-8; CA-03-60-4-H)
Submitted: May 2, 2005 Decided: May 26, 2005
Before MOTZ and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Barkley Gardner, Appellant Pro Se. Rudolf A. Renfer, Jr.,
Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Barkley Gardner appeals the district court's orders
dismissing his motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) and
denying his motion to alter or amend his judgment pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b). We previously issued an order granting
a certificate of appealability as to Gardner’s claim that the
district court erroneously dismissed his § 2255 motion, filed May
5, 2003 (entered May 6, 2003), as successive. After receiving
additional briefing on this issue, we now vacate the district
court's orders and remand for further proceedings.
In 1997, following a month-long jury trial, Barkley
Gardner (“Gardner”) and several codefendants were convicted in the
Eastern District of North Carolina on racketeering, drug and
violent crime charges. Gardner was sentenced to life in prison.
Gardner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by this court, and
the Supreme Court denied certiorari. United States v. Celestine,
2002 WL 1821971 (4th Cir. Aug. 9, 2002) (No. 97-4219(L)), cert.
denied sub nom. Gardner v. United States, 537 U.S. 1095 (2002)
(unpublished).
While Gardner’s direct appeal was pending before this
court, on December 24, 1997, he filed a motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (2000), alleging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
during his trial. The district court dismissed the § 2255 motion
because the direct appeal was still pending and had not been
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decided. The dismissal order did not mention or address the merits
of the § 2255 motion.
After his direct appeal became final, Gardner timely
filed another § 2255 motion for relief from his conviction and
sentence, which was dismissed by the district court as successive.
Within ten days of this order, Gardner filed for relief from
judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b), asking the
district court to reconsider its ruling that the § 2255 motion was
successive. The district court denied that motion.
We note that Gardner’s first § 2255 motion was not
decided on the substantive merits of the claims, nor was it
dismissed as untimely filed under the AEDPA’s statute of
limitations. Rather, the order reflects that the motion was
dismissed as premature, because Gardner’s direct appeal in this
court was still pending at that time. When a first § 2255 motion
is disposed of without a decision on the merits, such as when it is
dismissed as prematurely filed, the petitioner does not need
authorization to file a second habeas action. See Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000) (holding that when initial
habeas petition is dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies,
and not based on adjudication of the merits, subsequent habeas
petition is not successive); Villanueva v. United States, 346 F.3d
55, 60 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523
U.S. 637, 643-44 (1998) (ruling that a § 2255 motion will not be
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considered an adjudication on the merits for successiveness
purposes if, among other circumstances, the motion was dismissed as
premature).
Accordingly, we vacate the district court's orders and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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