UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4999
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHARLES SCOTT LEGETTE, a/k/a Mr. C.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(CR-04-484)
Submitted: June 23, 2005 Decided: June 28, 2005
Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Jonathan S. Gasser, Acting United
States Attorney, Rose Mary Parham, Assistant United States
Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Charles Scott Legette pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to one count of possessing a firearm and ammunition after
a felony conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
924(a)(2), 924(e) (2000) and to one count of possessing with intent
to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(D) (2000). Legette was sentenced to thirty months’
imprisonment. Legette argues on appeal that the district court
erred by applying the federal sentencing guidelines as mandatory
under United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). We do not
reach the merits of Legette’s claim because Legette agreed to be
sentenced under the United States Sentencing Guidelines and waived
all constitutional challenges to the sentencing guidelines in his
plea agreement. Therefore, we affirm his conviction and sentence.
Whether the defendant has effectively waived his right to
appeal is an issue we review de novo. United States v. Marin, 961
F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992). When the United States seeks to
enforce a waiver provision, as it does here, this Court “will
enforce the waiver to preclude a defendant from appealing a
specific issue if the record establishes that the waiver is valid
and that the issue being appealed is within the scope of the
waiver.” United States v. Blick, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 1252617
(4th Cir. May 27, 2005) (No. 04-4887).
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Here, the court specifically queried Legette and his
attorney with regard to the plea agreement in general and the
specific provision that stated Legette waived all constitutional
challenges to the sentencing guidelines. Legette’s attorney stated
he believed Legette understood the plea provision. Legette himself
acknowledged that he understood all the terms of the agreement.
The court found that Legette’s guilty plea was “knowing” and
“voluntary.” Finally, we find that the meaning of the plea
agreement and the waiver provision is clear. We conclude,
therefore, the waiver is valid.
Next we must determine whether Legette’s challenge to his
sentence under Booker falls within the scope of the waiver. The
applicable provision states that Legette agrees “to have his
sentence determined pursuant to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines and waive[s] any right to have facts that determine his
offense level under the Guidelines . . . presented to a grand jury,
alleged in an indictment, and found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.” And the final sentence provides “[t]he [d]efendant further
agrees to waive all constitutional challenges to the validity of
the Sentencing Guidelines.” We further note that the court
referred to this paragraph as the “Blakely provision,” referring to
Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), the precursor to
Booker. We find that the waiver provision contemplates the precise
issue that Legette is now asserting. Accordingly, we conclude that
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Legette’s waiver is valid and that the issues he has raised on
appeal are within the scope of the waiver. We, therefore, affirm
his conviction and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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