UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4067
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TONYA RYANS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District
Judge. (CR-02-1253)
Submitted: June 15, 2005 Decided: July 13, 2005
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Andrew D. Grimes, ANDREW D. GRIMES, P.A., North Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellant. J. Strom Thurmond, Jr., United States
Attorney, Rhett Dehart, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Tonya Ryans appeals her sixteen month sentence, imposed
after she pleaded guilty to one count of student loan fraud in
violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1097(a) (2000).
Ryans argues the district court violated her Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial when it applied a two level
enhancement to her base offense level for obstruction of justice
pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (2003). See
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
In Booker, the Supreme Court concluded that sentence
enhancements based on facts found by the court alone and not by the
jury violated the Sixth Amendment’s imperative that “any fact
(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established
by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at
756 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). The
Court severed and excised two provisions of the Sentencing Reform
Act: 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000), requiring sentencing courts to
impose a sentence within the guideline range, and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(e) (2000), setting forth standards of review on appeal. The
Court held the remainder of the guidelines remain as advisory,
requiring a sentencing court to consider applicable guidelines
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ranges, but allowing the court to “tailor the sentence in light of
other statutory concerns . . . .” Id. at 757.
Section 3C1.1 directs a sentencing court to increase a
defendant’s offense level by two levels if the defendant “willfully
obstructed or impeded . . . the administration of justice during
the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the
instant offense of conviction, and the obstructive conduct related
to the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct.”
United States v. Hudson, 272 F.3d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing
USSG § 3C1.1 (subdividing letters and numbers omitted)). The
Application Notes for § 3C1.1 explain that “willfully failing to
appear, as ordered, for a judicial proceeding” amounts to the type
of conduct for which the enhancement applies. See USSG § 3C1.1,
cmt. n. 4(e)). We conclude that because Ryans admitted at
sentencing that she intentionally ignored the district court’s
correspondence notifying her about her sentencing hearing, her
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was not violated.
We also conclude that Ryans has failed to establish that
her sentence under a mandatory sentencing scheme constituted plain
error affecting her substantial rights. See United States v.
White, 405 F.3d 208, 223 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendants
must demonstrate actual prejudice).
Accordingly, we affirm Ryans’s conviction and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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